
























This copy has been supplied by the Library of the University of Otago on the understanding that 
the following conditions will be observed: 
 
1. To comply with s56 of the Copyright Act 1994 [NZ], this thesis copy must only be used for 
the purposes of research or private study. 
 
2. The author's permission must be obtained before any material in the thesis is reproduced, 
unless such reproduction falls within the fair dealing guidelines of the Copyright Act 1994.  
Due acknowledgement must be made to the author in any citation. 
 
3. No further copies may be made without the permission of the Librarian of the University of 
Otago. 
 
Medical decision making on behalf of the incapacitated elderly. 
June 30th 2006 
Frances G Matthews 
A thesis submitted for the degree of 
Master of Laws 




This thesis describes the law governing medical decision making on behalf of the 
incapacitated elderly in New Zealand, especially in relation to standard medical treatment 
and participation in medical experiments. It compares legislation in New Zealand with 
legislation in England and New South Wales, and suggests ways in which New Zealand's 
main piece of legislation, the Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 (PPPR 
Act), may be amended in order to promote and protect the rights and welfare of 
incapacitated adults more effectively. 
Most of the medical decisions made on behalf of the incapacitated elderly are made by 
those administering the treatment using common law justifications for their actions. 
Decisions made under the common law must be made in the best interests of the person, 
but such decisions lack objectivity and depend on the views of the person making the 
decision. Some decision makers have very negative perceptions of the elderly and those 
with disabilities, and their decisions may be biased. Other, rights-based decision making 
may confer more protection upon incapacitated adults. 
The PPPR Act closely resembles the common law, but its purpose is to promote and 
protect the personal and property rights of incapacitated adults. It allows decision making 
by those appointed by the person, and by those ~ppointed by the Family Court. Section 
18(1) places limitations on their powers to refuse consent to standard medical treatment 
which is intended to save the person's life or prevent serious damage to their health 
(s.l8(1)(c)); and to consent to participation in medical experiments (s.18(1)(f)). Both 
these provisions may cause confusion for designated decision makers. The person may be 
subjected to forms of treatment he or she may have refused while competent, and may be 
deprived of treatment he or she might have consented to. Some amendments to the Act 
may clarify the situation. 
The rights of incapacitated adults may be strengthened by widening the scope of the Act 
to impose duties on all those who care for them; to confer powers to make some decisions 
on family members if there is no other person who can lawfully make decisions on their 
behalf; and to create the office of a Public Guardian. 
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Chapter 1. 
Introduction: Who is affected and who decides? 
This thesis is about the law governing medical decision making on behalf of the 
incapacitated elderly in New Zealand, with particular reference to acceptance and refusal 
of both standard and experimental medical treatment by those who make decisions on 
their behalf. It describes the categories of decision makers, their powers, and limitations 
on their powers in relation to consent to, or refusal of, medical treatment on behalf of 
incapacitated adults. 
The principal questions discussed are: 
( 1) Who can make medical decisions on behalf of the incapacitated elderly? 
(2) What legal powers, both common law and statutory, are bestowed on decision makers 
in relation to decisions to accept or refuse standard and experimental treatment? 
(3) What legal principles govern such decision making? 
(4) What are the restrictions on proxy decision makers described in s.18 of the Protection 
of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 (PPPR Act), and are they sufficiently precise, 
or should there be more clarification ofthe terms "standard" and "experimental" medical 
treatment which the PPPR Act uses when referring to consent and refusal of various 
forms of medical treatment? 
These questions are analysed by reviewing the relevant statutes both in New Zealand 
and overseas, reports of leading cases, and articles in both medical and legal journals. In 
particular, the PPPR Act is compared and contrasted with overseas legislation concerning 
the protection of incapacitated adults. 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: after the introduction chapter two deals with 
medical decision making by those who have not been appointed to make decisions by the 
courts, but who have a common law duty of care towards the incapacitated adult in their 
care. Such persons include carers, medical staff, and family members. On some occasions 
the courts have been consulted, and the principles involved in decision making are 
explored, as well ~s the way in which the courts tend to view different categories of 
decision maker. Chapter three deals with the role and powers of the courts in New 
Zealand in medical decls~on making on behalf of incapacitated adults, while chapter four 
2 
covers the rights of incapacitated adults. Succeeding chapters deal with the Protection of 
Personal and Property Rights Act 1988, the English Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA), 
and the New South Wales Guardianship Act 1987 (GA) in relation to consent to, and 
refusal of both standard and non standard medical treatment. 
In the remainder of this introduction I describe the categories of adult who lack the 
capacity to consent to or refuse medical treatment, the kind of medical decisions which 
may need to be made, and the categories of decision maker who may make decisions on 
behalf of incapacitated adults. 
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Diagram 1 
People and bodies making medical decisions on behalf of incapacitated adults 
Family/ Friends Welfare Guardians ~ 
Donees of Enduring Powers of attorney 
Principal sources of relevant legal rules 
The common law 
Protection ofPersonal and Property Rights Act 1988 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
Health and Disability Services Consumers' Code Regulations 1996 
Crimes Act 1961 
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(1) Who can make decisions on behalf of the incapacitated elderly? 
(a) Incapacity and medical care. 
The loss or absence of the ability to understand, retain, and process information may 
lead, in the elderly, to an inability to make decisions and to give informed consent to 
medical treatment. This thesis does not deal with concepts of competence and 
incompetence in relation to medical decision making, but accepts that there are significant 
numbers of people in New Zealand, particularly among the elderly, who are not 
competent to make decisions for themselves in relation to medical care. A few will 
recover capacity if their illnesses or injuries are successfully treated, but most are 
suffering from irreversible illness and will never regain the capacity to make decisions for 
themselves. The ability to give informed consent to medical examination and treatment is 
central to the doctor-patient relationship, and is underpinned by concepts of autonomy, 
physical and psychological integrity, dignity, and personal security. Most incapacitated 
adults will, at some time, need medical treatment, and decisions to accept or refuse 
treatment must be made by others on their behalf. 
(b) Adults who lack capacity 
Older people who lack the capacity to make or communicate their own decisions fall 
into two categories: 
(i) Those who were never competent, as may be the case with those with genetic disorders 
such as Down's Syndrome which result in varying degrees of intellectual disability, and 
those who suffer injury or illness in early childhood which results in impaired 
neurological development. 
(ii) Adults who were once competent, but have suffered from dementia, brain injury, or 
stroke, and can no longer make decisions for themselves. This is the largest group of 
incompetent adults. Most are 65 years of age or more, but a small number of adults are 
affected by injury, infection, or early onset dementia before the age of 65. It is estimated 
that in New Zealand in 2002 there were approximately 38,000 people with dementia, 
5 
about half of whom lived in elder care facilities, while half lived in their own homes. 1 
Worldwide, about 24.3 million people suffer from some form of dementia, with over 8 
million in Western Europe and North America.2 
The World Health Organisation defines dementia as: 
"A syndrome due to disease of the brain in which there is disturbance of 
multiple higher cortical functions, including memory, thinking, orientation, 
comprehension, calculation, learning capacity, language and 
judgement...Impairments of cognitive function are commonly accompanied, 
and occasionally preceded by deterioration in emotional control, social 
behaviour, and motivation. "3 
Adults with dementia may suffer from other medical problems associated with 
advancing age, such as diabetes, heart disease, arthritis, and cancer. Those who have 
suffered strokes may have severe physical disabilities in addition to their cognitive 
impairment, as may those who have suffered brain injuries as a result of accident or 
infection. 
Family members and friends of the incapacitated elderly may wish to be involved in 
decisions concerning their medical care which may lead to conflict between different 
individuals with an interest in the person's welfare, and sometimes conflict with 
healthcare professionals. In New Zealand, friends and family do not have the right to 
make decisions on behalf of other adults unless appointed to do so, although their 
opinions may be sought by those caring for the incapacitated elderly. 
Many of the incapacitated elderly have outlived their contemporaries and have no 
family members living nearby but still need to have decisions made on their behalf in 
relation to medical and other care. In New Zealand the Protection of Personal and 
Property Rights (PPPR) Act 1988 is "An Act to provide for the protection and promotion 
of the personal and property rights of persons who are not folly able to manage their own 
1 
Lewis H. Dementia in New Zealand: improving quality in residential care. A report to the Disability Issues 
Directorate. Ministry of Health. 2002: see www.moh.govt.nzlmoh.nsfaccessed May2nd 2006 
2 
Ferri CP, Prince M, Brayne L, Brodaty H, Fratiglioni L et al. Global prevalence of dementia: a Delphi 
consensus study. Lancet 17th Dec 2005; 366:2112-2117 
3 
WHO. 1992. I CD-I 0. International statistical classification of diseases and related health problems, tenth 
revision, Geneva 
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affairs." The Act allows for the appointment of others to make decisions on behalf of 
incapacitated adults and empowers the Family Court to make decisions and orders in 
relation to their property and welfare. It is the main piece of legislation used to protect 
incapacitated adults in New Zealand, other than the criminal law. 
Most of those caring for the incapacitated elderly do not involve the courts in relation 
to medical decision making. They rely on common law justifications for their actions, and 
on statutory duties and powers, with recourse to the courts for major decisions such as 
those involving the withdrawal of life sustaining treatments,4 or the administration of 
experimental, 5 or novel treatments. 6 This thesis will discuss the common law and the 
statutory position of those delivering medical care and the rights enjoyed by those 
receiving it. In particular, the rights of the competent adult to accept or refuse treatment 
offered, including the right to participate in research, are contrasted with the rights of 
those who are not competent. This thesis also discusses the restrictions on individuals 
who have been appointed to act on behalf of incapacitated adults, and the reasoning of the 
courts in making healthcare decisions on behalf of incapacitated adults. 
Adults who are incapacitated by dementia are under-represented in the cases before the 
courts, both in New Zealand and Britain, as most of the discussion revolves around 
younger adults with brain injuries or illnesses. 7 One reason for this is that older adults 
with dementia are not usually offered life prolonging treatment such as ventilation, 
dialysis, and artificial hydration and nutrition. Access to common investigations and 
treatments, for example, for heart disease, are often dictated by the patient's age, 8 and 
4 
For example Re G [1996] NZFLR 362 
5 
For example ReS (electric shock treatment) [1992] NZFLR 208 
6 
In Simms v Simms and Another [2004] Lloyds Rep Med 236 a family sought, and obtained, a declaration 
from the High Court in England that it would not be unlawful to administer a treatment for human- variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease even though the treatment had never been tested on humans. 
7 
Short/and v North/and Health Ltd [1998] 1 NZLR 433 involved an older adult with dementia and the 
complications of diabetes, and the withdrawal of dialysis from him. Anthony Bland was 17 years old when 
he suffered severe brain injury, see Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821. Mr G (Re G, above) 
was an older adult with a brain injury, not dementia. Jonathon Simms (Simms v Simms and Another) was a 
teenager. 
8 
Bond M, Bowling A, McKee D, Kennelly M, Banning AP et al. Does ageism affect the management of 
ischaemic heart disease? J Health Serv Res Policy 2003;8(1):40-47 
7 
presumably their cognitive function. Their personal representatives may struggle to obtain 
all but the most basic medical care for them: the problem is not that they are receiving 
treatment they would refuse if they were competent, but that they are often not offered 
treatment they would otherwise have requested (and probably been offered). Clinicians 
treating the incapacitated elderly have wide, and largely unscrutinised, powers to decide 
on the kind of treatment offered, to whom, and whether it should be continued or 
withdrawn. The courts tend to uphold the rights of clinicians to make these decisions, and 
rarely require them to provide treatment they do not want to give. Simms is unique among 
the cases in Britain and New Zealand dealing with medical treatment for incapacitated 
adults in that the High Court declared that it would not be unlawful to administer, rather 
than withdraw, treatment. Even then a Health Authority could not be compelled to 
provide treatment, but another Health Authority, willing to provide it, had to be found. 
(c) Decision making on behalf of incapacitated adults by doctors 
Possible treatments may not be offered to all patients, particularly the elderly, because 
ideas about who will benefit, particularly from expensive treatments, are dependant on 
clinicians' perceptions of the quality of life the person has, and will have if offered the 
treatment. Ideas about quality of life, particularly ideas about the quality of life of those 
suffering from disabilities, are related to the quality oflife enjoyed by the observer, not by 
the person in question. Those who are healthy and able bodied tend to make negative 
assessments of the quality of life enjoyed by those who are old or disabled. Studies of 
physicians' abilities to assess quality of life shows that they tend to underestimate patients' 
quality of life compared with the patients themselves,9 and that nurses and spouses of 
patients tend to be most accurate in their assessment of quality oflife. 10 
9 
Wilson KA, Dowling AJ, Abdolell M,Tannock IF. Perception of quality of life by patients, partners, and 
treating physicians. Qual Life Res. 2000;9:1041-52 
10 
Novella JL, Jochum C, Jolly D, Morrone I, Ankei J, Bureau F, Blanchard F. Agreement between patients' 
and proxies' reports of quality oflife in Alzheimers' disease. Qual Life Res. 2001;10(5):443-52 
8 
(d) Decision making by others 
If treatment is offered, competent adults can consent to and refuse it. There are two 
avenues open to competent adults who wish to exert some control over future treatment 
decisions should they become incompetent: 
(i) to make an advance directive. 11 
(ii) to donate an enduring power of attorney to another adult, empowering them to make 
decisions about medical treatment on their behalf should they become incompetent. 12 
If there is no relevant advance directive, and the person has not donated an enduring 
power of attorney, the courts may be involved in medical decision making in the 
following ways: 
(iii) Appointment of a welfare guardian to make medical decisions. 13 
(iv) Direct decision making by the court, 14 for example by a declaration that it would be 
lawful or unlawful for a treatment to proceed. 
The two main types of decision making are: 
(1) Substitute decision making. Here the court tries to find out what the person would 
have wanted and decides accordingly. Those appointed to make decisions on the person's 
behalf, such as welfare guardians or attorneys should, if they know what the person's 
wishes were when competent, attempt to honour those wishes. If the person was never 
competent, or there is no way of knowing the person's wishes, then no substitute decision 
making is possible. 
(2) 'Best interests' decisions on behalf of the person. In most cases the person has not 
made their wishes known, and those making decisions on their behalf, including courts, 
welfare guardians, attorneys, and carers, and those who must make emergency medical 
decisions, must make decisions and perform actions which are in the best interests of the 
11 
Right 7(5) Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights Regulation 1996. 
12 
See Part IX PPPR Act 1988 
13 
Section 12 PPPR Act 1988 
14 
Buchanan AE, Brock DW. Deciding for others- the ethics of surrogate decision making. Cambridge 
University Press 1990 
9 
person. These decisions and actions may take account of the person's known wishes, but 
the person's best interests are paramount. 
Best interests may be similar to substitute decision making, but they are not always 
identical, although the two may be conflated by those making a decision on the person's 
behalf. In New Zealand and Britain the wishes of the person, if known, are often taken 
into account, but decisions made are said to be based on the person's best interests. 
Sometimes the courts are completely ignorant of what the person would have wanted, but 
claim that the decision made in their best interests is the one the person would have made 
if competent, 15 although there may be no basis for such statements. Competent adults can 
make all kinds of apparently irrational decisions, some of which may not seem to serve 
their best interests, and they usually have the right to make them. Those making decisions 
on behalf of others are not usually entitled to make decisions contrary to the best interests 
of the person, but what their best interests are is sometimes very difficult to discern, and 
is a topic discussed at length by courts in New Zealand, Britain, and elsewhere. 
Interpretations of best interests are fraught with difficulty. Another approach to 
determining what is best for the incapacitated elderly may be a rights-based approach, 
which may or may not coincide with best interests tests as currently used, both in relation 
to standard treatments, and novel and experimental treatments. 
(e) The legal framework 
Under current New Zealand law both welfare guardians and attorneys must act in the 
best interests of the person. In making medical decisions they cannot refuse standard 
medical treatment intended to save the person's life or prevent damage to their health, 16 
and cannot consent to experimental treatment unless it is for the purpose of saving the 
person's life or preventing damage to their health.17 There is widespread confusion about 
15 
It was said of Anthony Bland that he would not w1;1nt to be remembered as an object of pity, but no 
evidence was offered to the court that he had ever thought about the consequences of being in a persistent 
vegetative state when he was competent. His parents and sister said that, based on what they knew of him, 
he would not hav~ wanted to be kept alive while in a persistent vygetative state, but they had not discussed 
the matter with him. See Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER at 826 
16 
Section 18(1)(c) PPPRAct 1988 
17 
Section 18(1)(f)PPPRAct 1988 
10 
what constitutes standard medical treatment, because ideas about standard medical 
treatment vary according to the clinical condition of the patient, the time and place, and 
the views of the treating clinician. This may mean that personal representatives feel 
unable to refuse treatments such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) which may well 
be futile, and which the person would have refused if competent, but which treating 
clinicians and carers might consider standard treatment in the absence of an advance 
directive. The Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 does not define 
standard medical treatment and appears to protect those delivering the treatment, rather 
than those receiving it, as the treatment only has to be intended to save life, even if there 
is little or no prospect of salvation. This is particularly true of CPR administered in elder 
care facilities by staff who lack appropriate equipment, to patients who have vanishingly 
small prospects of survival, and who invariably suffer neurological damage if they do. 
On the other hand, the Act protects incapacitated adults from exploitation by 
forbidding consent to their participation in medical experiments except in special 
circumstances, but it may also deny them access to new treatments. The Act, almost 
twenty years old, uses the emotive term "experiment" rather than "research" or "clinical 
trial" and is vague and imprecise compared with legislation such as the English Mental 
Capacity Act 2005, which sets out in some detail the circumstances under which 
incapacitated adults may participate in research. 
Representatives of incapacitated adults who wish to refuse some forms of medical 
treatment, or allow participation in many forms of medical research must therefore 
approach the courts. In New Zealand only one form of experimental treatment (aversion 
therapy using electric shocks) has been considered under the PPPR Act, 18 and no court in 
New Zealand has considered participation in large scale clinical trials. Those seeking 
withdrawal of medical treatment have not used the PPPR Act, but have approached the 
High Court for declarations that the proposed withdrawal would not be unlawful, or for 
consent to withdrawal using parens patriae powers. The powers and role of the courts in 
New Zealand are discussed in chapter three. 
18 
ReS (electric shock treatment) [1992] NZFLR 208. The Family Court refused to order that experimental 
aversion therapy using electric shocks be performed. 
11 
New Zealand, unlike Britain, has retained the parens patriae powers of the High Court. 
There are therefore two alternatives to the series of declaratory judgments in relation to 
incapacitated adults used in England for obtaining a judicial decision on such matters. 
They are reliance on the court's parens patriae powers, and the PPPR Act 1988. 
The English Mental Capacity Act (MCA) does not come into force until2007, so there 
is no equivalent legislation in England and Wales at present specifically dealing with the 
protection of incapacitated adults. 
Both Britain and New Zealand have human rights legislation. In Britain this has had 
considerable influence on medical decision making in relation to incapacitated adults, 
while the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NBORA) tends to be used only 
occasionally in relation to medical treatment. The rights affirmed by the NZBORA are 
discussed in chapter 4. 
The final sections of this thesis deal with overseas legislation comparable with the 
PPPR Act and asks if they can offer some solutions to the problems posed by medical 
decision making on behalf of the incapacitated elderly, particularly the problems of 
refusal of medical treatment, and consent to experimental treatment. It also asks if the 
PPPR Act should be amended to better reflect changes in medical treatment, and 
changing views about the rights of the incapacitated elderly. 
The conclusions reached are that the common law, while important, may confer 
insufficient protection on the incapacitated elderly and that the PPPR Act does not clearly 
define either standard or experimental treatment, which may lead to confusion on the part 
of those making decisions on behalf of the incapacitated elderly. Many of those who 
make decisions on behalf of such people have known them for long periods of time, and 
fmd that their powers to make decisions are not as wide as they (and the person) might 
have hoped. This may mean that the incapacitated elderly may sometimes receive 
treatment they would have refused, if competent, and may not have access to treatments 
they might have consented to. Section 18 of the PPPR Act may need to be amended to 
better reflect changes in medical practice. 
12 
Chapter2 
Clinical decision making: the powers and duties of healthcare professionals and the 
rights of patients and their representatives 
This section deals with medical decision making on behalf of the incapacitated elderly 
by those who have not been appointed by the courts. The vast majority of medical and 
other welfare decisions are made on a day to day basis by people who have not been so 
appointed. These decision-makers fall into three main categories: 
1. The person himself or herself if they made an advance directive concerning the relevant 
treatment, while competent. 
2. The person's family members and friends. 
3. The person's doctors and other healthcare professionals. 
The courts may have to arbitrate in disputes between family members, or between 
families and clinicians, or they may be asked to make declarations about the lawfulness of 
the proposed treatment or its withdrawal, even if families and clinicians are in agreement 
about the course of action required. 
The chapter begins with a discussion of advance directives, some samples of which are 
appended to this thesis. In New Zealand advance directives have not been discussed by 
the courts, though they have received attention overseas. It then discusses the role of 
family members in decision making and the relative importance attached to the views of 
the family of the incapacitated person and the views of the clinicians treating the person. 
The second part of the chapter deals with the common law concepts of necessity and 
emergency, ideas about standards of medical treatment, and best interests tests in relation 
to medical treatment. 
Part 1 
(1) Advance Directives 
Any competent adult has the right to accept or refuse medical treatment. This right has 
been part of the common law for many years. It was first enunciated by Cardozo J in 
13 
Schloendorf v Society of New York Hospital: 1 
"Every human being of adult years and sound mind has the right to determine 
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation 
without his patient's consent, commits an assault" 
This sentiment has been repeated many times in various courts in many countries. In 
New Zealand the right of a competent adult to refuse treatment is contained in the 
common law and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990;2 and in the Code of Health 
and Disability Services Consumers' Rights 1996.3 A competent adult may leave 
instructions (an advance directive) about the kind of medical care they wish to receive 
when they are no longer competent. In New Zealand this may be a written instruction, or 
a verbal one. Usually advance directives are used to refuse a particular medical treatment 
rather than request that it is given, but there are some exceptions in New Zealand, as 
advance directives may take many forms. For example: upon admission to nursing homes 
in New Zealand, patients and their relatives are asked about their wishes regarding 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) should they suffer a cardiac arrest. A competent 
patient may refuse or request it and the form signed acts as a kind of advance directive in 
the event the person suffers a cardiac arrest. If the person is not competent, family 
members or personal representatives may be asked to refuse or consent to CPR on behalf 
of the person. They may tell staff that the person has expressed a wish not to be 
resuscitated if they are incapacitated by illness and this acts as a verbal advance directive. 
In Britain advance directives must be in writing and can only be used to refuse treatment, 
not to require a certain kind of treatment be given,4 but in New Zealand the use of 
advance directives has not been tested in the courts. 
Difficulties may arise when different family members give differing accounts of the 
person's wishes, or clinicians or relatives have reason to believe the person may have 
changed their mind, or the advance directive is not explicit enough. 
A written advance directive clarifies matters somewhat. In New Zealand the most 
1 
Schloendorfv Society ofNew York Hospital [1914] 211 NY 125 
2 
Section 11 Right to refuse to undergo medical treatment 
3 
Right 7(7) Every consumer has the right to refuse services and to withdraw consent to services 
4 
R (on the application ofOliver Leslie Burke) v General Medical Council [2005] Lloyd Rep Med 403 
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commonly used types of advance directives can be found on the New Zealand Medical 
Association's website5 (see Appendix 1). The first kind of directive specifies the kind of 
conditions which might lead to incapacity, such as Alzheimer's, AIDS, arterial disease, 
brain injury, cancers, or progressive degenerative disease of the nerves or muscles. It 
conflates the lack of capacity to make a decision with the inability to communicate a 
decision, using the phrase: "mentally incompetent to express my opinion about accepting 
or declining life sustaining treatment", which is in keeping with the inclusion of 
progressive degenerative neuromuscular disease. Such conditions lead to inability to 
communicate and do not result in the inability to process information or make a decision. 
The person must, in the opinion of two medical practitioners, be suffering from an 
irreversible condition before the directive can be considered. 
The directive confers the ability to refuse CPR, treatment such as antibiotics for any 
separate life threatening disease, and artificial hydration and nutrition, and allows the use 
of analgesics and sedatives for symptom control. There is a section for any other requests. 
Another form of advance directive allows patients to specify the conditions under 
which the treatment may be accepted/declined/withdrawn, and to relay the medical 
information they have received. 
Difficulties may arise when the person's advance directive is not considered specific 
enough, or the patient's doctor does not yet consider the situation hopeless enough to 
justify the withdrawal of life saving or life sustaining treatment and the substitution of 
comfort cares. 
In the US, in an effort to address the question of specificity, nursing homes and 
hospitals use the POLST form (Physician Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment) which 
the patient or their personal representatives fill in after discussion with the treating 
clinician, or the order is made in the best interests of the person by the treating physician. 
The doctor must indicate the person or persons they have discussed the treatment plan 
with, and file it in the patient's notes. The first section covers cardiac arrest; the form 




medical interventions but does not specify the conditions under which it may be used, 
other than the fact that the patient has a pulse and is still breathing. Treatment options 
vary from comfort measures to full treatment, with room for additional orders such as 
renal dialysis. The patient can agree to be transferred to hospital and can agree to 
intensive care or not. The third and fourth sections deal with the use of antibiotics and 
artificial hydration and nutrition (see Appendix 2). 
The American Medical Association has a much more wide ranging advance directive 
form which includes the appointment of attorneys to make decisions about healthcare; 
wishes regarding terminal illness; wishes regarding treatment if the person should be in a 
persistent vegetative state; and wishes regarding treatment for non terminal illness, organ 
donation, and autopsy. Both the American forms allow the person to consent to treatment 
as well as refuse it (see Appendix 3). 
Studies suggest that about 11% of Americans who have made an advance directive 
receive treatment they have refused, for instance unauthorised CPR.6 In New Zealand no 
action has been brought against a doctor or an institution for failing to obey an advance 
directive but this does not mean that it has not happened. Family members or personal 
representatives may feel that seeking damages under the common law may be too 
cumbersome and expensive a process to undertake, especially in the aftermath of the 
person's death, or they may be unsure of the complaints procedure in a hospital or 
institution. The whole process may seem too daunting to undertake in a short period of 
time while treatment is being administered in defiance of an advance directive, and a 
personal relationship with the treating physician may mean that family members are 
reluctant to complain. Complaints to the Health and Disability Commissioner may result 
in a protracted investigation resulting in a finding that the Health and Disability Services 
Consumers' Code had been breached, but little else. 
In theory an adult in New Zealand can make an advance directive regarding consent to 
a certain kind of treatment, but the ability to consent does not mean that the treatment will 
be administered, or even offered. In a publicly funded health care system, economic 
6 
Goodman MD, Tarnoff M, Slotman GJ. Effect of advance directives on the management of critically ill 
patients. Crit Care Med 1998;24(4):701-4 
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constraints may dictate the extent and type of treatment received by incapacitated adults, 
and the courts are likely to follow the British pattern of upholding advance directives by 
competent adults to refuse treatment even if that results in the person's death, 7 but not 
requiring doctors to continue to administer treatment they regard as inappropriate even if 
an advance directive requests it. 
(2) Family Members 
In New Zealand family members do not have an automatic legal right to consent to, or 
refuse, medical treatment on behalf of incapacitated adults, although clinicians caring for 
those who are incapacitated may consider it good practice to consult with family, friends 
and carers of their patients. Those caring for incapacitated adults at home may make day 
to day decisions about medical care, for instance, ensuring that the person takes their 
medication, and taking them to clinic and hospital appointments, so that their health does 
not suffer. 
Welfare guardians (who may or may not be family members) appointed by the Family 
Court have a duty to act in the best interests of the person, and their powers and duties are 
defined in the Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 (PPPR Act), which 
deals with the care of incapacitated adults in New Zealand. Welfare guardians are 
required to promote and protect the welfare and best interests of the person. 8 Donees of 
enduring powers of attorney (who may also be family members or friends) are not 
specifically 
instructed to act in the person's best interests, but their powers can be revoked by the 
Family Court ifthey do not do so.9 There are statutory limitations on the powers of both 
attorneys and welfare guardians in relation to medical treatment and other matters.10 
7 
See Ms B v an NHS Trust [2002] Lloyds Rep Med 265. Ms B made an advance directive requiring 
withdrawal of ventilation if she had a further haemorrhage into her upper spinal cord. Medical staff did not 
want to switch off her ventilator because of their long relationship with her, and sought to persuade her to 
accept treatment in a spinal injuries unit, claiming that she was not competent to make the advance directive 
owing to depression. She successfully contested their claim that she was not competent, and was transferred 
to another hospital where staff were willing to accede to her request for withdrawal of ventilation. 
8 
Section 18(3) PPPRAct 1988 
9 
Section 105(1) PPPRAct 1988 
10 
Section 18(1) PPPRAct 1988 
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Those providing care for the incapacitated are required to provide care which is in 
accordance with standard medical practice and is in the best interests of the person. This 
duty to provide appropriate care and to act in the person's best interests underpins the 
inability of guardians and attorneys to refuse standard medical treatment which is 
intended to save life or prevent serious damage to health which rule is contained in s.l8 
of the PPPR Act. 
Family members and others who have an interest in the person's welfare, and who do 
not have powers under the PPPR Act 1988, may still approach the courts for decisions on 
treatment or its withdrawal, and the role of the courts in these decisions are discussed in 
the next chapter. In some of the leading cases in New Zealand and the UK family 
members and medical staff have been in agreement about the best interests of the person, 
and the appropriate course of action to be taken. 11 In one unusual case in Britain, Re Y 
(Mental incapacity: Bone marrow transplant), 12 a woman dying of leukaemia obtained a 
declaration that it would not be unlawful to use her intellectually disabled sister, Ms Y, as 
a bone marrow donor even though her sister was not able to consent. This illustrates the 
powerful influence of family members when not opposed by clinicians, as the procedure 
to harvest a litre of bone marrow conferred no therapeutic benefit on Ms Y, and carried 
some risk to her health. The reasoning of the court in declaring that such a procedure was 
not unlawful, and in her best interests, will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
When the views of family members conflict with the views of clinicians, the courts 
tend to give greater weight to the views of the clinicians. In the next section I consider the 
duties and powers of doctors in relation to medical decision making on behalf of the 
incapacitated elderly. 
11 
In Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney General [1993] 1 NZLR 235 all medical specialists and 
family members agreed that a man who was irreversibly ill with Guillan-Barre syndrome should have 
ventilatory support withdrawn, while in Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821 and Re G [1996] NZFLR 262 families 
and clinicians were in agreement that treatment should be withdrawn. 
12 
Re Y (Mental incapacity: Bone marrow transplant) [1997] Fam110 
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Part2 
(1) Emergency, necessity, and best interests 
In an emergency, if the patient is unable to consent to treatment and has left no 
instructions about the treatment, the doctor treating the person must make an appropriate 
treatment decision which is in accordance with good medical practice and which is in the 
best interests of the patient. Delays in obtaining consent from another person, or from the 
courts, would deprive the person of medical treatment which could save their life. Not all 
forms of necessary medical and dental treatment are emergencies, but they may be 
important for the well being of the person, and if left undone might result in serious 
illness later on. Day to day care such as attention to hygiene, administration of regular 
medication, dressing, and the treatment of minor ailments are not emergencies, but they 
are necessities, and decisions involving day to day care are made by doctors, nurses, 
carers and family members without seeking permission from the courts. Emergency 
treatment of incapacitated adults, and treatments which are necessary but not 
emergencies, were first considered in Britain in F v West Berkshire Health Authority. 13 It 
was held that treatments which were emergencies or necessities could be performed 
without consent if they were in the best interests of the incapacitated person. Some 
treatments such as sterilisation could be performed only after the approval of the court 
had been sought. The common law allowed that treatment could be given to a person who 
was unable to give consent if the treatment was in their best interests and was performed 
to save their lives or prevent deterioration in their physical or mental health. If the 
common law could not be interpreted in this way, then those who were unable to consent 
would be deprived of medical treatment that they would otherwise be able to benefit 
from. 
Doctors have two main duties when deciding on an appropriate treatment for an 
incapacitated adult: 
(a) To give appropriate treatment which is in accordance with accepted medical practice, 
13 
Also known as Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1989] 2 All ER 545. Here the mother of an 
intellectually disabled woman sought a declaration that it would not be unlawful to sterilise her daughter 
who had begun a sexual relationship with another patient at the institution in which she lived. 
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and 
(b) To act in the best interests ofthe patient. 
There may be more than one accepted way of treating a particular medical condition, 
each with its adherents within the medical profession. Some forms of treatment may be 
considered more appropriate than others because of the particular circumstances of the 
patient: for example an adult who had been previously well and suffered a heart attack 
would be admitted to a coronary care unit, and if they then suffered a cardiac arrest, 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation would be administered. Such a course of action would be 
considered an appropriate response by a responsible body of medical opinion, and it 
would be in the patient's best interests to administer it because the there would be a 
chance that the patient could be resuscitated and eventually leave hospital and lead a 
normal life. If a person suffering from multi-organ failure due to a widespread and 
terminal cancer were to suffer a cardiac arrest, a substantial body of medical opinion 
would not consider the administration of cardiopulmonary resuscitation to be an 
appropriate response because it would not cure the underlying condition, cancer, and 
would have a very poor chance of success. It would not be considered to be in the 
patient's best interests because it would be unlikely to confer any benefit and may result in 
further harm such as neurological damage, resulting in a much poorer quality of the short 
remainder of the patient's life. 
Ideas about the kind of treatment which should be given are closely related to, but not 
identical with, ideas about the patient's best interests, and can be considered separately. 
(a) Appropriate treatment and Bolam 
Doctors have a legal duty to ensure that they are properly qualified and trained to 
deliver care to patients and that they deliver appropriate care competently. Section 3 of 
the Health Practitioners' Competence Assurance Act 2003 outlines the purpose of the Act 
which is designed to ensure that health practitioners are fit to practise, while the Code of 
Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights Regulations 1996 gives patients the 
right to receive services of an appropriate standard (Right 4). To deliver treatment which 
is not of an appropriate standard could be negligent as well as a breach of Right 4 of the 
20 
Code. Concepts of competency are largely dependant on professional regulatory bodies 
such as the Royal Colleges and the Medical Council of New Zealand, so concepts of the 
appropriateness of treatment and what constitutes an appropriate standard of medical 
practice are very much in the hands of the medical profession, and are dictated by the 
prevailing professional standards at that time. The Health and Disability Commissioner is 
advised by medical experts in various fields, who are members or fellows of the relevant 
Colleges. 
Decisions about the appropriateness of the proposed treatment generally rest with the 
clinicians treating the person. Such decisions should be deemed appropriate by a 
responsible body of medical opinion. There may be more than one course of action 
available, and each course of action would be approved by some, but not all practitioners. 
The agreement of the person's family and personal representatives is desirable, but not 
essential, as may be the agreement of relevant ethics committees in some cop.troversial 
cases. In some circumstances the agreement of personal representatives may be dispensed 
with, and the course of action proposed by the treating clinician is the one approved by 
the courts, so long as it enjoys the approval of a body of medical opinion.14 On one 
occasion, in Simms, 15 the English High Court took a different view from the hospital 
ethics committee and some of the treating clinicians, and declared that it would be lawful 
to administer a novel treatment, which had the support of the patients' families and a 
small body of specialist medical opinion. This was an unusual decision to authorise 
treatment which had not been tested on humans. 
Most discussion of what constitutes appropriate medical treatment starts with the 
Bolam test, first enunciated in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee. 16 The 
case concerned medical negligence and the jury was directed that: "a doctor is not 
negligent if he is acting in accordance with a practice considered proper by a responsible 
body of medical men skilled in that particular art, merely because there is a body of such 
opinion which takes a contrary view." 
14 
In Shortland v Northland Healthcare Ltd [1998] 1 NZLR 433 comfort cares were substituted for renal 
dialysis despite the view of the patient's personal representatives that dialysis should continue. 
15 
Simms v Simms and Another [2004] Lloyds Rep Med 236 
16 
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118 
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The idea of a responsible body of medical opinion as the driving force behind what is 
not negligent permeates discussion on what constitutes appropriate medical practice, 
though a practice which is not considered negligent is not the same as good, or even 
standard, practice. Administering treatment which is approved by a responsible body of 
medical opinion to an incapacitated patient would shield a doctor from accusations of 
negligence and battery.17 It does not necessarily mean that the treatment provided was of 
a good standard, only that it had not fallen below acceptable standards, although the two 
are sometimes conflated. The High Court in England, however, regards the Bolam test as 
the appropriate one when determining the standard of the care administered to 
incapacitated adults, and it has been mentioned in most of the leading cases including 
Bland, 18 Simms, 19 and Re F.20 In New Zealand the underlying principles of a consensus 
among the medical profession as to what is and is not approved, with some variation, are 
described without mentioning Bolam. 
The kind of treatment decisions made on behalf of incapacitated adults may be 
categorised in the following ways: 
(i) withdrawal or withholding treatment by clinicians with the agreement of the person's 
representatives; 
(ii) withdrawal or withholding treatment by clinicians without the agreement of the 
person's representatives; 
(iii) administering treatment to which the treating clinicians object (treatment requested 
by the patient while competent, or by personal representatives); 
(iv) administering treatment to which personal representatives object, or which the person 
would not have wanted, but which the clinicians support. 
17 
Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [ 1989] 2 All ER 545 
18 
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER at 844 
19 
Simms v Simms and Another [2004] Lloyds Rep Med at 243 
20 
Re F [1989] 2 All ER 545 at 549 
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(i) Withdrawal of treatment with agreement of personal representatives 
In New Zealand personal representatives is a term which can be used to cover both 
family and friends who have known the person for a long time and have an interest in 
their welfare. The person may have donated an enduring power of attorney to a friend or 
family member when competent. Welfare guardians appointed by the Family Court are 
often, but not invariably family members or close friends. These people can also be 
considered personal representatives. Most of the incapacitated elderly do not have welfare 
guardians or attorneys. In Britain the leading cases involving incapacitated adults do not 
refer to attorneys or welfare guardians, as at present it is not possible to donate a power of 
attorney in relation to welfare, and the courts are unable to appoint guardians. (See 
Chapter 6, the Mental Capacity Act 2005) 
In relation to withdrawal of treatment from incapacitated adults, the courts in New 
Zealand have used phrases such as "collegiate decision" and "prevailing medical 
standards ... which command general approval within the medical profession." In Auckland 
Area Health Board v Attorney-General21 doctors treating a man who was irreversibly 
paralysed and who could not breathe unaided sought a declaration that withdrawal of 
ventilation would not be unlawful, even though it would result in his death. The 
withdrawal of treatment was said to be in accordance with good medical practice if the 
decision was a collegiate one by the treating doctors; if it had been endorsed by the 
relevant ethics committee; and if it was with the informed consent of the patient's family. 
Bolam was not specifically mentioned, but the necessity of making a collegiate decision, 
that is, one made by a group of doctors and reflecting their view of an appropriate course 
of action, was emphasised. Good medical practice was said to consist of treatment which 
was in the best interests of the patient, and encompassed "prevailing medical standards, 
practices, procedures and traditions which commanded general approval within the 
medical profession, "22 an idea which has its roots in Bolam, but which goes beyond it to 
encompass the patient's best interests. 
21 
Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 235 
22 
Auckland Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 235 at 251 
23 
In Re G23 a number of clinical opinions were obtained, all of which concurred with the 
opinion of the treating clinician that Mr G was irreversibly ill, and that further artificial 
hydration and nutrition and treatment with antibiotics was futile and should be 
withdrawn. The case was unusual as Mr G's family had made the application with the 
support of medical staff. 
The decisions doctors make in relation to incapacitated patients must be decisions that 
a responsible body of medical opinion would regard as medically appropriate, and 
preferably with the consent of the patient's personal representatives. A medically 
inappropriate decision which could be regarded as arbitrary and irrational could result in 
disciplinary action against the practitioner. In a recent case in Britain a consultant 
anaesthetist was struck off the medical register for prematurely removing an unconscious 
patient from a ventilator, resulting in his death, over the objections of his family. 
Although the police had investigated several complaints against her regarding withdrawal 
of treatment, no criminal charges have yet been laid.24 
(ii) Withdrawal of treatment without the consent of personal representatives 
Although desirable, informed consent of the family could be dispensed with when it 
conflicts with medical judgment, and judgments in both New Zealand and Britain tend to 
uphold the power of the treating clinician to decide on both the appropriate treatment and 
the patient's best interests. 
In Short/and v North/and Healthcare Ltd,25 clinicians made a decision not to continue 
with dialysis for a man with diabetes, dementia and renal failure on the grounds that it 
was clinically inappropriate to do so. The decision was in accordance with clinical 
guidelines and was said to be consistent with good medical practice. The informed 
consent of his family, one of whom was the donee of an enduring power of attorney, was 
not necessary. The court refused to order that the dialysis continue. 
In Short/and, two conflicting medical opinions were offered: the majority opinion, 
23 
Re G [1996] 15 FRNZ 362 at 381 
24 
Dyer C. Anaesthetist could face prosecution after GMC strikes her off. Brit Med J2005; 331:1226 
25 
Short/and v North/and Healthcare Ltd [1998] 1 NZLR 433 
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shared by the treating clinicians, was that dialysis was inappropriate and should not be 
offered; and a minority opinion that the treatment was appropriate and should be 
continued. Neither of these courses of action would be considered negligent in Bolam 
terms, but only one (the majority) opinion was said to be in accordance with good 
medical practice, although both administration of dialysis and withdrawal of dialysis were 
argued to be in the patient's best interests. Possibly, asking clinicians to reverse their 
decision would put them in the position of having to deliver treatment that they did not 
think was in the best interests of their patient, and the courts generally show great 
reluctance to do this. 26 
(iii) Administration of treatment to which treating clinicians object 
In Britain the courts have recently tackled the issue of whether doctors should have the 
sole right to decide the fate of their patients: both cases involved requests to treat, rather 
than withdraw treatment. In Simms,27 the family of a young adult afflicted by variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (the human version of "mad cow" disease), a rapidly 
progressive and fatal neurological disorder, applied on his behalf for a declaration that he 
was incompetent, and for a declaration that administration of a novel treatment which had 
never been administered to humans was not unlawful. The hospital's ethics committee 
had already turned down a request for the treatment. Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss made 
the necessary declarations and interpreted Bolam to mean that if there were no body of 
responsible medical opinion rejecting the treatment then Bolam was satisfied. In this case, 
the nature of the disease and the relatively few practitioners specialising in its treatment 
meant that the responsible body of medical opinion was a very small one, and 
inexperience with the treatment which had only been administered to animals in Japan 
meant that it was very difficult for experts to oppose its use. She commented that Bolam 
ought not to be allowed to inhibit medical progress. The hospital which had been treating 
26 
In Re J (a minor) [1992] 3 WLR 507 the court refused to order a paediatrician to administer further 
resuscitation to a severely brain damaged child on the grounds that a practitioner should not be required to 
adopt a course of treatment which was, in their bona fide clinical judgement, contra-indicated, and not in the 
patient's best interests. This power was "for them alone to exercise. " 
27 
Simms v Simms and Another [2004] Lloyds Rep Med 236 
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J onathon Simms declined to administer the treatment, despite the declaration, and the 
Department of Health had to find another hospital prepared to carry out the treatment. A 
hospital in Northern Ireland administered the treatment to Mr Simms and to others, with 
some success. In this case the original hospital and its staff could not be compelled to 
administer treatment despite the declarations, but the declarations paved the way for 
treatment to be administered by those who were willing to do so. 
The second British case involved a man with a progressive neurological disorder which 
did not impair his cognitive function, but which would lead to paralysis and inability to 
speak or swallow before he died. In Burke,28 Oliver Burke obtained judicial review ofthe 
UK General Medical Council's (GMC) guidance to doctors on withdrawing artificial 
nutrition and hydration (ANH) on the grounds that the guidance, which was based on 
leading medical opinion, placed too much emphasis on the rights of competent adults to 
refuse ANH, and not enough emphasis on their rights to require that it be administered. 
Mr Burke wished to make an advance directive requiring that when he became unable to 
swallow and speak, he would be fed artificially rather than be allowed to starve to death. 
In the judgment it was said that the competent patient was the best judge of his own best 
interests. (This suggestion drove a wedge between the Bolam test of appropriate medical 
treatment, and ideas about best interests. Medical opinion as to the appropriateness of the 
treatment and the best interests of the patient would no longer be decisive.) It was also 
said that the guidance issued by the GMC was incompatible with human rights legislation 
and was unlawful and that a decision to withdraw ANH despite a valid advance directive 
to the contrary would be incompatible with human rights legislation. Doctors who did not 
wish to provide treatment should continue to treat according to the patient's wishes until 
they were able to find another doctor to take over the treatment. 
There was considerable analysis of both Bolam and concepts of best interests, and the 
judgement was seen as an important one for those with disabilities. The General Medical 
Council immediately appealed, fearing that doctors would be deprived of the ability to act 
in what they perceived to be the best interests of their patients, and would be forced to 
administer treatment they regarded as clinically inappropriate. 
28 
Regina (Burke) v General Medical Council [2005] 2 WLR 507 
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All the declarations were set aside on appeal. 29 The reasons for the reversal of the 
decision were that the GMC's guidelines entitled "Withholding and withdrawing life-
prolonging treatments: Good Practice in decision making" were not relevant to Mr 
Burke's situation, and there were no grounds for declaring them unlawful, and that Mr 
Burke was sufficiently protected by the law as it stood. A doctor who withdrew ANH 
from a competent patient would have no defence to a charge of murder. Doctors' common 
law duties to care for their patients include a duty to take such steps as are reasonable to 
keep the patient alive. If the ANH is prolonging life the doctor is obliged to provide it. it 
was also held that the best interests of the competent patient were not the same as his 
wishes, and that patients could not compel doctors to deliver treatment they did not think 
was in the best interests of their patients. Finally it was held that the best interests test 
should be objective, and is most useful when applied to patients who are not competent, 
and most easily applied to situations dealing with medical best interests. 
The idea that best interests tests should be objective, only applied to incompetent 
patients, and should be confined to medical issues is an appealing one, but in reality there 
is no objective test of best interests. Those making the decision are influenced by their 
own beliefs and desires, and the idea that the patient's best interests are composed of more 
than just medical best interests has been present in judgments from Re F onwards. The 
elderly and those with disabilities are particularly likely to be seen as groups of patients 
who best interests do not involve access to certain types of treatment, because those 
making the decision do not regard them as having a quality of life worth sustaining. 30 
The Court of Appeal considered the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and concluded that its 
provisions relating to advance directives were in accord with the common law position: 
that it is possible to refuse treatment in an advance directive, but that an advance directive 
cannot require doctors to administer treatment which is not in the best interests of the 
29 
R(Burke) v General Medical Council (Official Solicitor and others intervening) [2005] ppyds Rep Med 
403 . 
30 
In the Burke appeal, the case of a woman with severe disabilities was discussed. Mrs Jane Campbell 
developed pneumonia and two consultant physicians did not think her life worth saving because of her 
severe disabilities. Despite her disabilities she had graduated from university, and when her husband 




(iv) Administration of treatment to which personal representatives object, but clinicians 
support 
Some forms of treatment may be unacceptable to the person, and he or she may already 
have made an advance directive, either verbally or in writing, refusing it. Examples are: 
the use of cardiopulmonary resuscitation when the person is suffering severe neurological 
disease, or the use of ANH when the person has progressive dementia and cannot 
swallow. In most cases there will be a body of medical opinion supporting palliative care 
only, rather than more aggressive measures. Personal representatives may be in favour of 
palliative care only, and may occasionally come into conflict with clinicians who favour 
more active treatment. In New Zealand welfare guardians and donees of enduring powers 
of attorney can consent to medical treatment but cannot refuse treatment which is 
intended to be lifesaving or prevent serious damage to the person's health. They could 
therefore refuse some forms of treatment, but not if the clinician deems the treatment to 
be lifesaving or will prevent serious damage to health. Family members who are not 
welfare guardians or attorneys may take the view that some forms of treatment are 
unacceptable and try to negotiate with the treating clinician. They cannot consent to 
treatment or refuse it, but are able to make their wishes, and the likely wishes of the 
person know to both doctors, and if necessary, the courts. 
In the setting of rest homes and nursing homes, it is possible for personal 
representatives to ask for another doctor, more sympathetic to their views, to take over 
the person's care, or they may turn to the courts for help. They may approach the Family 
Court for a personal order for medical advice and treatment consisting of palliative care 
only, or they may approach the High Court for a declaration that the treatment proposed 
would not be unlawful, or fo:r: consent to the treatment on behalf of the person under 
31 
R (Burke) v General Medical Council (Official Solicitor and others intervening) [2005] Lloyds Rep Med 
403 at 414. Section 4 of the Act which describes the factors which should be considered when deciding best 
interests only requires that the patient's wishes be taken into consideration, not that they should be 
detenninative. 
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parens patriae powers. Personal representatives would have to show that the person 
would not have wanted more aggressive treatment, and that it was not in their best 
interests to receive it. 
Summary 
In order to be considered good medical practice a treatment or procedure should be one 
which is approved by a body of responsible medical opinion, which may be a large or 
small number of practitioners. There may be a variety of ideas about the nature of the 
treatment, all of which are held by a body of medical opinion. The decision to deliver a 
certain kind of treatment, or to withdraw it should be made, if possible, with the 
agreement of the person's family and the hospital ethics committee. Although the opinion 
of the person's family is of great importance, the opinion of the treating clinicians, if 
supported by a responsible body of medical opinion, is usually decisive in the event of 
conflict between medical staff and personal representatives. The courts will not normally 
order a doctor or hospital to perform a treatment or procedure that is contrary to their 
ideas of good medical practice, because when treating incapacitated adults, doctors 
should administer treatment which is in accordance with good medical practice and is in 
the best interests of the person. 
(b) Best interests 
In New Zealand there is no statutory definition of "best interests" and the PPPR Act, 
unlike the British Mental Capacity Act 2005, does not contain guidance on factors 
involved in deciding the best interests of incapacitated adults. 32 Medical best interests are 
largely decided by clinicians, although their perceptions of the impact of the patient's 
condition and treatment on quality of life may be inaccurate. Although there may be a 
number of treatments available for a particular condition, some treatments may be more 
appropriate than others for a particular patient, at a particular time, than others. Such 
treatments would be those thought to be in the patient's best interests. In both Britain and 
New Zealand best interests have been discussed by the courts, and concepts of best 
32 
Section 4 Mental Capacity Act 2005 
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interests have expanded to include both medical and non medical factors (despite the 
Burke appeal which held that best interests considerations were best confined to medical 
best interests). 
In Re F the court discussed the common law duty of doctors to provide treatment to 
patients who were incompetent, so long as that treatment was in the person's best 
interests. It was said that the treatment could be regarded as being in the patient's best 
interests "if, and only if, it is carried out to save their lives or to ensure improvement or 
prevent deterioration in their physical or mental health", 33 a sentiment which is echoed in 
s.l8 of the PPPR Act 1988.34 It was important that some appropriately qualified person be 
able to make a decision on the patient's behalf so as not to deprive them of necessary 
medical treatment. In order to make such a decision the question which should be asked 
was: " ... what action does the patient's health and welfare require?".35 This acknowledges 
that there are medical and non medical dimensions to treatment decisions on behalf of 
incapacitated adults. 
Right 7(4) of the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights allows 
providers to provide treatment to those who are unable to consent and have no-one to 
consent on their behalf if the treatment is in their best interests. The Code does not define 
best interests. The provider must also take reasonable steps to ascertain the views held by 
the person while competent and provide treatment which is consistent with the choices 
the person would have made while competent. If there is no way of knowing what the 
person would have wanted the provider must consult with ''suitable persons" interested in 
the person's welfare and able to advise the provider. The Code implies that the views of 
the person and their family, friends and carers play an important role in decisions about 
treatment, a view shared to a certain extent by the courts. 
33 Re F [1989] 2 All ER 545 at 551 
34 
Section 18(1)(c) No court shall empower a welfare guardian, and no welfare guardian shall have power 
to .... refuse consent to the administration to that person of any standard medical treatment or procedure 
intended to save that person's life or to prevent serious damage to that person's health .... 
35 Re F [1989] 2 All ER 545 at 560 
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(i) Medical factors in deciding best interests 
Normally there is a very strong presumption in favour of the continuation of life and 
the promotion of health, whether or not the patient is competent. Although Re F 
concerned sterilisation, which is not a procedure required by the incapacitated elderly, it 
was the first time there had been discussion of the common law in relation to the 
administration of treatment to incompetent adults and some of its principles are 
applicable to all incompetent adults. Although most purely medical decisions could be 
left to doctors, some decisions, both medical and non-medical could involve the courts. 
Re F involved sterilisation, which is a procedure with both medical and social 
implications, and a decision to sterilise an incompetent adult was outside the sphere of 
medical decision making which would normally be left to doctors. The courts in England 
would have to be consulted in regard to procedures such as sterilisation and organ and 
tissue donation, which may both be non-therapeutic for the incompetent adult, but have 
social and medical dimensions which cannot be left in the hands of treating clinicians. In 
New Zealand the Family Court has made decisions regarding termination of pregnancy 
and sterilisation,36 but not organ donation. In both Britain and New Zealand the courts 
have considered withdrawal of treatment without which the patient would die. 
(ii) Best interests and the withdrawal of treatment 
The best interests of the patient must be considered not only in decisions about the kind 
of treatment offered, but also in decisions about those treatments not being offered, or 
withdrawn, from the seriously ill. Even when medical personnel, family members, and 
carers have agreed that further treatment is not in the best interests of the patient, the 
courts have sometimes been asked to intervene, if withdrawal or withholding oftreatment 
would result in the death of the patient. 
Normally a very high value is placed on the continuation of life, and acts resulting in 
the death of the person, and which are unlawful, may be a crime, 37 a violation of the 
36 
KR v MR [2004] 2 NZLR 847. Here the decision to permit termination of pregnancy and sterilisation was 
referred back to the Family Court from the High Court. 
37 
Crimes Act: s.l50 standard of care required of persons under legal duties, s.l51 Duty to provide the 
necessaries of life, s.l57 Duty to avoid omissions dangerous to life, s.l60(2)(a) and (b) Culpable homicide 
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person's rights,38 and breach of the common law duty of care. Decisions to withdraw life 
sustaining treatment such as ventilation and artificial hydration and nutrition are usually 
the kind of decision which may involve the courts. The prolongation of life is not always 
the only consideration, and there may be circumstances under which treatment may be 
discontinued because it may not be in the best interests of the person to endure the quality 
of life it sustains. The person's underlying disease process may then seen as causing their 
death, not the withdrawal of treatment. 
Shortly after Auckland Area Health Board v A-G39 was decided in New Zealand, the 
case of Anthony Bland40 was considered in Britain. The hospital treating him, with the 
support of his family, sought a declaration that it would not be unlawful to withdraw 
treatment from him. Mr Bland had suffered severe crushing of his chest at the 
Hillsborough stadium disaster, and had been deprived of oxygen for so long that his brain 
was irreversibly damaged. He remained alive in a persistent vegetative state: able to 
breathe unaided, but without consciousness, and without the ability to feed himself. He 
could not move his limbs and suffered recurrent chest infections and urinary tract 
infections, for which he required antibiotics. The court discussed the role of the treating 
clinicians very extensively, concluding that the withdrawal of treatment was a decision 
that they were entitled to make if it were in Anthony Bland's best interests. Factors in the 
decisions included: 
(a) the fact that treatment had been initiated in the hope he would recover, but after so 
long there was no prospect of recovery. 
(b) this opinion was shared by the treating clinician and a number of independent experts 
who had examined him. 
The conclusion was reached that it was not in his best interests to prolong his existence, 
which was said to confer no benefit on him. 
38 
Section 8 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Right not to be deprived of life- No one shall be 
deprived of life except on such grounds as are established by law and are consistent with the principles of 
filndan1entaljustice 
39 
Auckland Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 235 
40 
Airedale NHS Trust v Anthony Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821 
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The concept of benefit in medical treatment was also discussed in Simms. 41 It is related 
to best interests in that treatment which is in the person's best interests must confer a 
benefit on the person, either by saving their life, improving their health, or preventing 
deterioration in their present condition. The treatment's risks should not outweigh the 
benefits conferred. In order to obtain benefit from the proposed treatment the person 
should already have some quality oflife worth preserving. In the case of Jonathon Simms, 
that quality of life was held to be present, albeit at a low level. Anthony Bland, on the 
other hand, was unconscious and in a persistent vegetative state, and did not have the 
quality of life required to justify further treatment. 
The nature of the proposed treatment is therefore an important consideration in 
decisions to continue or withdraw treatment. In Auckland Healthcare Services Ltd. v L,42 
which involved a baby, it was said: "The decision must be taken in the best interests of 
the patient, having regard for established medical practice. The continued suffering of the 
patient would be a relevant factor." 
On some occasions the person may be already dying, and administration of treatment 
prolongs the dying process and inflicts pain and suffering on them. Under such 
circumstances withdrawal of life sustaining treatment may take place. It cannot be 
considered life saving. 43 
(iii) Withholding treatment from the elderly. Is it in their best interests? 
Many treatment decisions involving administration or withholding treatment from the 
incapacitated elderly rely on ideas about quality of life which might be hard to sustain in 
the face of the discussion in Simms. Only those very severely disabled by brain injury or 
dementia are likely to be as seriously in~apacitated as Jonat4on Simms, who was 
considered to have sufficient quality of life to be worth preserving, and who could have 
treatment administered. The elderly are often denied treatments which would be 
administered to younger people, even though they are not as seriously disabled as the 
41 
Simms v Simms and Another [2004] Lloyds Rep Med 236 at 245-246 
42 
Auckland Healthcare Services vL [1998) NZFLR 998 at 1003 
43 
Auckland Healthcare Services v L [1998] NZFLR 998 
33 
patients discussed in Simms. They may well benefit from treatment, but the fact that they 
are old is often sufficient to exclude them from even simple treatments which would help 
them. Such treatments include access to drugs such as statins, which lower cholesterol, 
and which have clear benefits.44 
Life prolonging treatment may not be offered to the incapacitated elderly, although 
younger people who are more incapacitated may receive them, because the quality of life 
of the elderly is seen as too poor to justify its continuance. Unlike Jonathon Simms the 
incapacitated elderly are old and have a much shorter life expectancy even with treatment. 
This shortened life expectancy, coupled with the inevitability of deterioration of their 
conditions, and their overall physical frailty, lead to decisions to withdraw or withhold 
treatment such as dialysis, artificial hydration and nutrition, aggressive surgical treatment, 
and some forms of drug treatment on the grounds it is not in their best interests to receive 
it. Ideas about best interests are often conflated with ideas about number of years of 
remaining life, rather than quality of remaining life. While some decisions to withdraw or 
withhold treatment may be clinically justifiable, others may not. Ideas about the best 
interests of the incapacitated elderly are very different to ideas about the best interests of 
younger incapacitated adults, suggesting that best interests tests are far from objective. 
Many doctors' ideas about best interests are related to the person's age and length of 
remaining life, rather than the benefits conferred by treatment. The lack of clear 
guidelines about treating the incapacitated elderly, and the status accorded to the freedom 
to make clinical decisions may mean that there is no consistency in the type of best 
interests decisions made on behalf of the incapacitated elderly by clinicians. Clear 
guidelines about the kind of treatment which is appropriate for the elderly, whether or not 
they have capacity, would helpful. Factors to be considered should be the risk of the 
treatment and the benefit conferred by it, especially the improvement in the quality of the 
person's life, and not necessarily the number of extra years of life gained. For example, 
44 
Alien Maycock CA et al. Intermountain Heart Collaborative Study. Statin therapy is associated with 
reduced mortality across all age groups of individuals with significant coronary disease, including very 
elderly patients. JAm Coli Cardiology. 2002;49(1 0): 1777-85. "Older patients are less likely to receive 
statin therapy, but they receive greater absolute cardiovascular risk reduction than younger people." That is, 
if they receive statins they are less likely to have another heart attack than younger people. 
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giving the elderly access the same drugs for cardiovascular disease as younger people 
may mean that they have fewer heart attacks and enjoy better health, and possibly even a 
longer life than they would if not given access to these drugs. When considering the 
withdrawal or withholding of treatment the courts in both New Zealand and Britain tend 
to view the prolongation of life as being in the best interests of the patient unless the 
person is irreversibly ill and either permanently unconscious, or suffering a great deal of 
distress caused by the treatment being administered. There is evidence that the doctors 
treating the elderly do not use the same set of criteria when considering withholding some 
treatments from them, as many of their patients are not unconscious or likely to be 
distressed by the administration of an extra tablet a day. Such patients may enjoy better 
health in the years of life remaining to them and may live longer. 
In addition to enjoying better health, less tangible benefits such as the ability to enjoy 
relationships with others, may be conferred by access to medical treatment. Best interests 
tests also involve a number of non medical factors which contribute to ideas about quality 
of life and include factors described as "wider, less tangible considerations" in Bland. 45 
Non-medical factors involved in assessments of best interests include social, emotional 
and psychological factors, the views of the person's family, the person's own views, if 
known, and the relevant rights. 
(iv) Non medical best interests: who decides? 
When deciding best interests, the known views of the person and the views of their 
family should be taken into consideration, as well as the views of the treating clinicians. 
Doctors are not the sole arbiters of non-medical best interests and they have a duty to 
consult not only with the family, but with other professionals making up a 
multidisciplinary team. In re F the court acknowledged that some forms of decision 
making on behalf of the incapacitated were not confined to purely medical considerations, 
and that sometimes it was necessary to consult with not only the family, but other 
professionals, in order to decide the action necessary for the patient's health and welfare. 
There was little discussion on the exact nature of the interests which would necessitate 
45 Airedale NHS Trust v Anthony Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821 at 840 
35 
consultation with others. In Burke it was said that the evaluation of best interests would 
take into account " .. a wide range of ethical, social, moral, emotional, and welfare 
considerations ... " Although this decision of the lower court in Burke has been 
disapproved by the Court of Appeal, it echoes the "wider and less tangible factors" 
mentioned in Bland, and acknowledges that, despite the Court of Appeal, medical 
decision making does not take place in a vacuum, and that doctors really cannot "claim 
any special expertise on the many non-medical matters which go to form the basis of any 
decision of what is in the patient's best interests. "46 
In the recent English case of An NHS Trust v (l)A (2) SA47 it was held that "The 
principal of best interests extends beyond Bolam ... The judicial decision will incorporate 
broader ethical, social, moral and welfare considerations" In New Zealand hospital 
ethics committees are sometimes involved in decision making involving treatment 
withdrawal, and although they may not be completely impartial, they represent a body of 
both medical and non medical opinion. In both re G and Auckland Area Health Board v 
Attorney General the court heard evidence from ethicists as well as the treating clinicians. 
Best interests tests based on non-medical factors may involve some contortions on the 
part of the courts, especially when deciding on non-therapeutic treatment and procedures. 
The best interests of the person may not always be prominent. In Re Y (Mental Patient: 
bone marrow donation/8 the High Court considered the use of an intellectually disabled 
woman as a bone marrow donor for her sister, who had leukaemia. Presumably she had 
already given a blood sample for tissue typing and was known to be a suitable donor for 
her sister. No consent was sought from the courts for the blood sample to be taken for the 
purpose of tissue typing, which, while it posed little or no risk to Ms Y, had no obvious 
46 
R (Burke) v General Medical Council [2005} 2 WLR at 432 
47 
An NHS Trust v (1) A and (2) SA Lloyds Rep Med [2006] 29 at 44. The case concerned an 86 year old 
man with multi-organ failure who resisted insertion of intravenous lines and nasogastric tubes, and 
attempted to remove them. His family, for religious reasons, wanted treatment to continue despite the 
hopelessness of his situations. The treating clinicians were reluctant to continue to treat him, and after an 
interim order to continue to treat him, pending a full hearing, the court supported the clinicians' decision to 
withdraw active treatment such as ventilation and dialysis on the grounds that it was futile because he would 
not recover, and because he was obviously distressed by the treatment. 
48 
Re Y (Mental patient: Bone Marrow Donation) [1997] Fam 110 
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therapeutic benefit to her either. In considering the best interests of Ms Y, the court held 
that it would be in Ms Y's best interests to donate a litre of her bone marrow to her sister, 
because if she did not, and her sister died, then the family unit would be disrupted and 
their mother would have to care for the dead sister's child and would not be able to visit 
Ms Y in the institution in which she lived. Ms Y would benefit from her sister's gratitude 
if she donated her bone marrow, which would strengthen the bond between them. The 
benefit she would experience would be "emotional, psychological and social. "49 The risk 
to Ms Y was said to be minimal, even though bone marrow donation involves a general 
anaesthetic, a stay in hospital and the possibility of post operative complications such as 
pain, nerve, muscle, and bone damage, and fatigue for a variable length of time, 50 factors 
minimised in the judgment. The family was said to be a close knit one, although little 
evidence was presented of a particularly close bond between Y and her sister. A more 
cynical view would be that the Ms Y's best interests, particularly her medical best 
interests, were not considered in any depth. They were seen to be identical to the best 
interests of her sister, who would undeniably reap an enormous benefit from the 
transplant, while the benefits enjoyed by Ms Y who could not speak, and was confined to 
an institution, and who was not suffering from an illness other than her disabilities, were 
much less tangible, if they existed at all. There was little evidence that her physical or 
mental health would deteriorate if she were not used as a donor for her sister. Had she 
been competent she could have refused to be a donor, and the courts could not have 
compelled her to donate marrow. 
(v) Non-medical best interests and relevant rights 
Most discussion of best interests in relation to withdrawal of life sustaining treatment 
involves some reference to the right not to be deprived of life, or to the sanctity of life. 51 
There are, however, circumstances where other rights, such as the rights to dignity and 
49 
Re Y (Mental patient: Bone Marrow Donation) [1997] Fam. D at 112 
5° Confer DL, Leitrnan SF, Papadopoulus EB et al. Serious complications following unrelated donor 
marrow collection: experiences of the National Bone Marrow Donor Program. Biology of Blood and 
Marrow Transplantation. 2004;10:13 
51 
Auckland Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR at 244 
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respect come into play. These circumstances generally involve futile treatment which will 
not improve the patient's condition, or result in recovery, but prolong the process of 
dying, or merely maintain an existence. Anthony Bland's right to respect was violated by 
"therapeutically useless treatment contrary to good medical practice ... which would not be 
inflicted on those able to choose."52 The "constant invasions and humiliations to which 
his inert body is subject"53 were violations of his dignity. A patient who is very ill, like 
Anthony Bland, or Mr G, may have no awareness of pain or indignity, but the lack of 
awareness did not preclude an interest in the treatment given, a point discussed in Bland 
in its progress through the courts. It was said that: 
" ... the fallacy of this argument is that it assumes we have no interests except 
in those things of which we have conscious experience. But this does not 
accord with most people's intuitive feelings about their lives and 
deaths .... Most people would like an honourable and dignified death, and we 
think it wrong to dishonour their deaths, even when they are unconscious that 
this is happening. "54 
In discussing the withdrawal of treatment which would result in the person's death, the 
normal assumptions about the sanctity of life, and its paramountcy as a right to be 
enjoyed, 55 should be balanced against other rights and interests, which include rights to 
dignity,56 and respect,57 rights to refuse medical treatment,58 and not to be subjected to 
cruel treatment, 59 and the right to freedom from discrimination. 60 These rights may be 
invoked in order to override the right not to be deprived of life, if the life is one of 
unrelieved suffering with no prospect of recovery. Although suffering may have been 
involved in some of the cases, such as the case of baby L, there is little evidence that Mr 
52 
AiredaleNHSTrustvBland[1993] 1 AllER821 at848 
53 
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821 at 840 
54 
Airedale NHS Trustv Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821 at 853 
55 
Section 8 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
56 
Right 3 of the Code of the Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights 
57 
Right 1 of the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights 
58 
Section 11 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
59 
Section 9 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
60 
Section 19 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
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G, Anthony Bland, or the Auckland patient with Guillan Barre syndrome were able to 
experience pain or suffering because of their severe neurological damage. In all these 
cases the futility of treating them, their likely wishes not to be kept alive in their present 
state, and the affront to their dignity were invoked, rather than their actual physical 
suffering. Rights other than the right not to be deprived of life were therefore given more 
importance. There will be further discussion of the rights involved in medical decision 
making on behalf of the incapacitated elderly in Chapter 4. 
Summary 
From this discussion it can be seen that in deciding on a course of treatment for 
incapacitated adults the following general principles can be applied: 
There is both a common law and statutory duty to administer necessary medical 
treatment to incapacitated adults, including the elderly, even though they cannot consent 
to it, because if they do not receive it they are at risk of a deterioration in their health, 
possibly to the point of dying: the treatment is a necessity. Such treatment includes not 
only emergency treatment but also routine doctors' visits, administering medication and 
attention to personal hygiene. Such actions do not require the sanction of the courts. 
Decisions made by carers, doctors, family members and personal representatives 
should be in the best interests of the person, and the treatment administered should be 
accepted medical treatment. 
Doctors' ideas about patients' best interests are often related to their age rather than 
clinical factors, and may lead to the incapacitated elderly being deprived of treatments 
they would have access to if they were younger. Those deciding the best interests of the 
incapacitated elderly may not be objective. 
Decisions by the courts regarding medical treatment for incapacitated adults are usually 
made according to the best interests of the patient, with regard to accepted medical 
practice. Decisions may concern the following forms of treatment: 
(i) Non-therapeutic treatment such as sterilisation, termination of pregnancy, or organ 
donation. Only the latter is relevant to discussion of treatment of the incapacitated elderly, 
as they may be considered possible organ donors in the absence of other possible donors. 
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(ii) Withdrawal of treatment which may result in the death of the person. 
(iii) Novel treatment. 
In making a decision for an incapacitated adult the test applied by the courts, and others 
who can make such decisions, is the "best interests" test, although the likely wishes of the 
person, if known, may be taken into consideration in deciding what their best interests 
are. The type of treatment administered is normally the treatment which commands 
approval within a body of responsible medical opinion, and there may be more than one 
opinion available. Clinical guidelines published by professional bodies represent one 
form of medical opinion. Usually the treatment decided upon should be with the assent of 
the person's personal representatives, and perhaps the relevant ethics committee, but both 
may be dispensed with under some circumstances. Usually medical opinion is decisive. 
The patient's best interests may be medical or non medical. Medical treatment which is 
in the best interests of the patient is treatment which is: 
(a) lifesaving; or 
(b) improves health; or 
(c) prevents deterioration of health; and 
(d) does not expose the patient to risks which outweigh its benefits. 
These tests only apply to those who enjoy some quality of life discernable to the 
decision-maker and no longer apply if the person has no discernable quality of life, and 
has no prospect of improvement or recovery, such as those in persistent vegetative states, 
or other very severe illness with no prospect of recovery. Normally the patient's best 
interests lie in remaining alive, but the very seriously incapacitated may have their right 
not to be deprived of life overridden by other rights such as the right to dignity and 
respect, even if that means that treatment is withdrawn and they die. Their deaths are not 
ascribed to withdrawal of treatment but to the underlying disease process. 
Non-medical factors such as social, emotional and psychological factors may also be 
considered as part of an evaluation of the patient's best interests, as well as other sets of 
rights. Deciding non-medical best interests necessitates collaboration and discussion with 
those who know the patients, and those caring for them, as well as other professionals. 
Doctors should not try to determine these non-medical issues without proper consultation. 
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Some judgments such as re Y suggest that the common law confers insufficient 
protection on incapacitated adults generally, and others such as Auckland Healthcare Ltd 
v Attorney-Ge11eral suggest there is more concern for the fate of those administering the 
treatment than those receiving it. 
The common law confers considerable powers on clinicians to decide on the best 
interests of the incapacitated elderly, and therefore the treatment they will receive. These 
powers may not be used appropriately because of biased and inaccurate perceptions of the 
elderly, leaving the incapacitated elderly who have no-one to advocate on their behalf 
particularly vulnerable. 
The next chapter deals more fully with the role of the New Zealand Family Court and 
High Court in medical decision making on behalf of incapacitated adults, in interpreting 
both the common law, and legislation. 
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Chapter3 
The role and powers of the courts in New Zealand 
Making medical decisions on behalf of incapacitated adults may create conflict 
between family members, carers, and medical staff which may not easily be resolved. 
This chapter deals with the kinds of conflicts which may arise and the ways in which the 
courts in New Zealand may be used to resolve them. 
Conflicts may arise in the following ways: 
(a) Between various family members regarding who should make decisions on behalf of 
the incapacitated person. 
(b) Between family members about the kind of treatment the person should or should not 
receive. 
(c) Between family members and medical staff about the kind of treatment the person 
should or should not receive. 
(d) Between family members, carers, and medical staff about the use of novel treatments 
such as stem cell therapy, or off-label use of drugs. 
If informal attempts at mediation fail there are a number of legal approaches to the 
resolution of these conflicts. They fall into two main categories: 
(i) Appointment of proxy decision makers (welfare guardians) which solves the problem 
of who will make decisions on behalf of the person if there is an ongoing need for 
decisions to be made. 
(ii) Direct decision making by the courts. 
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Decision making by the courts 
Decision making by the courts in New Zealand may be: 
(1) by the Family Court; 
(2) by the High Court after transfer from the Family Court;1 
(3) by the High Court through use of its declaratory powers;2 
( 4) by the High Court through use of its parens patriae powers. 3 
(1) Decision making by the Family Court 
In New Zealand the primary piece of legislation dealing with the protection of 
incapacitated adults is the Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 (PPPR 
Act), which is administered by the Family Court. The Family Court is able to appoint 
proxy decision makers (welfare guardians) or make decisions on behalf of incapacitated 
adults by means of personal orders and directions. 
The authority to make such decisions is said to be a statutory reflection of the parens 
patriae powers of the High Court.4 The High Court's powers have not been subsumed by 
the Family Court, however, and its parens patriae powers continue to operate 
independently of the Family Court. 
(a) The PPPR Act 1988: principles 
The PPPR Act is an Act to ''provide for the protection and promotion of the personal 
and property rights of persons who are not fully able to manage their affairs." 
There are two aspects of the Act: the protection of incapacitated adults and the 
promotion of their rights. Those making decisions on behalf of the incapacitated elderly 
1 
Section 14 Family Courts Act 1980 
2 
For example Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 235 
3 
For example Re G [1996] NZFLR 362 
4 
In Re H [1993] NZFLR at 228 it was said that the Family Court's exclusive originating jurisdiction under 
the Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act is a modem statutory expression of the ancient parens 
patriae jurisdiction over those whose capacity is limited by intellectual disability. Under the parens patriae 
jurisdiction it is the duty of the Crown to protect the persons and property of those unable to do so for 
themselves. 
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may not ascribe equal importance to each aspect. Incapacitated adults may be protected 
by being confined to a nursing home, with decisions concerning medical and other 
treatment made on their behalf by others, but this only protects their physical person. It 
does not necessarily promote their right to make such decisions as they are capable of, to 
visit or receive visits from friends and family, and to have family and friends consulted 
about their welfare. The Act acknowledges that incapacitated adults have rights which 
must be protected, but has been criticised for the lack of statutory safeguards for those 
confmed to institutions and who have others making decisions on their behalf. 5 
Although the purpose of the Act is to provide for the protection and promotion of the 
personal and property rights of incapacitated adults, it contains different instructions to 
the Family Court and welfare guardians about how to achieve this. 
(i) Principles to be observed by the Family Court 
The principles to be observed by the Family Court are contained in s.8 of the Act 
which says: 
Primary objectives of the Court in exercise of jurisdiction under this Part 
- The primary objectives of a Court on application for the exercise of its 
jurisdiction under this part of the Act shall be as follows: 
(a) To make the least restrictive intervention possible in the life of the person 
in respect of whom the application is made, having regard to the degree of 
that person's incapacity: 
(b) To enable or encourage that person to exercise and develop such capacity 
as he or she has to the greatest extent possible. 
The primary objectives do not mention tests of best interests, although the underlying 
purpose of the Act, to protect and promote the personal and property rights of 
incapacitated adults, would involve some considerations of best interests. In this respect 
the PPPR Act departs from the common law principles it mirrors, and begins to reflect a 
more rights- based approach to decision making on behalf of incapacitated adults. 
Both the Family Court and the High Court have discussed the principles in s.8 in 
5 
NZLC Report no 80. 2002 Protections some disadvantaged people may need 
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relation to medical treatment. In Re S> and Re H7, the discussions represent divergent 
views of the way in which the Family Court should interpret the PPPR Act. In Re S, 
which concerned an application for a personal order authorising a novel treatment, it was 
held that the Family Court did not have to apply tests of best interests when interpreting 
the Act. It was said that the intervention should be the least restrictive intervention. The 
Court could not authorise the treatment because it was not the least restrictive 
intervention. 8 This interpretation of the Act leaves the welfare or best interests of the 
person out of the deliberations of the Family Court, and adheres very strictly to the 
principles enunciated in s.8. 
In Re H it was held that the instruction to welfare guardians that the first and 
paramount consideration in the exercise of their powers was the welfare and best interests 
of the person, contained in s.18(3), also applied to the Family Court, and that the test to 
be applied was the "best interests" test.9 The Act does not explicitly direct the Family 
Court to make decisions which are in the best interests of the person. The overall purpose 
of the Act is the protection and promotion of the personal and property rights of 
incapacitated adults, but the Act gives directions as to how this should be done by the 
Family Court, in order to promote as well as protect the rights of incapacitated adults. The 
interpretation of the Act in Re His incorrect because although the best interests or welfare 
of the person are important, the judgment places too much emphasis on the protective 
aspect of the Act rather than promotion of the rights of the incapacitated adults. 
In KR v MR, 10 which was heard in the High Court, reference was made to the "welfare 
principle", rather than best interests, but the two are similar in meaning. It was said that: 
" ... the welfare principle is capable of being viewed from a range of 
perspectives. It is susceptible to prevailing social norms and the personal 
values of the decision maker. It is not an objective test and its workability 
6 
ReS (electric shock treatment) [1992] NZFLR 208 
7 
Re H [1993] NZFLR 225 
8 
ReS [1992] NZFLR 208 at 213-214 
9 
Re H [1992] NZFLR 225 at 234 
10 
KR v MR [2004] 2 NZLR 847 at 860 
45 
depends on informed fact finding and the wise exercise of discretion .... 
Nonetheless ... the principal objectives are a surer guide to the exercise of the 
decision maker's discretion than is a general appeal to the welfare principle." 
The High Court uses the terms "welfare principle" and "best interests" interchangeably, 
but recognises that different people, including Family Court judges, may have differing 
views about the welfare or best interests of the individual. The High Court's interpretation 
of the Act clarifies the situation for the Family Court, directing it to interpret the PPPR 
Act in this way. 
The principle of the least restrictive intervention should be the principle considered by 
the Family Court if s.8 is to conform with the underlying purpose of the Act, to protect 
and promote the personal and property rights of incapacitated adults. 
In In the matter of A,11 which was also heard in the High Court it was said: 
"The Act has made it clear that in considering the welfare and best interests of 
A, the Court must put at the forefront the objectives of s.8." 
The Family Court must consider the rights of the person when making decisions in 
relation to medical treatment, adhering to the principle of the least restrictive intervention 
infringes those rights as little as possible, and allows the person to exercise as much 
capacity as is possible under the circumstances. 
Section 11 the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 says: "Everyone has the right to 
refuse to undergo medical treatment." The situation of an incompetent adult who 
protested against the proposed medical treatment was considered in Re CMC. 12 An 
application was made for a personal order authorising the feeding of a woman with 
anorexia nervosa by nasogastric tube. The Family Court recognised that under most 
circumstances an adult had the right to refuse medical treatment, but that the provisions 
of the PPPR Act contained a statutory exception to the right affirmed in the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act. In granting the order it was said that: 
11 
" ... there is still residual discretion vested in the Court as to whether or not to 
make the order sought. That residual discretion is clear from s.9 (2) and 
In the matter of A [1996] NZFLR 372 
12 
Re CMC [1995] NZFLR 538 
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directs the Court in exercising the discretion to: 
(a) make the least restrictive intervention possible ... 
(b) to enable and encourage the person concerned to exercise and develop 
such capacity as he or she has to the greatest extent possible. 
Had CMC not expressed a wish to live, to recover fully ... then in exercising 
the discretion it may perhaps have been appropriate to decline to make the 
order. But having regard to her stated wishes I was satisfied that the proposed 
treatment was the least restrictive ... that was available and that it might enable 
CMC to ultimately exercise and develop her own capacity to overcome her 
illness. "13 
The Court may decide to order treatment for incapacitated adults using these powers, but 
must be guided by the relevant principles if it is to exercise its residual discretion in 
favour of the treatment. 
On some occasions the person may suffer such severe cognitive impairment that they 
are unable to make or exercise any choices, and ideas about the ability to exercise 
capacity recede in favour of decisions relating to the person's best interests, or welfare, 
then become important. While making these decisions on behalf of a severely 
incapacitated adult the Family Court must still make the least restrictive intervention 
which is compatible with their well being. 
(ii) Principles to be observed by welfare guardians 
When appointing a welfare guardian the Family Court must be satisfied that there is no 
other satisfactory alternative available. Appointment of a welfare guardian must be the 
least restrictive intervention under the circumstances. 
Section 18 of the PPPR Act describes the powers and duties of welfare guardians who 
are appointed as proxy decision makers by the Family Court. This section does not 
contain a specific instruction to make a decision which is the least restrictive for the 
person. The primary consideration of the welfare guardian is described in s.l8 (3). It is: 
" ... the promotion and protection of the welfare and best interests of the 
13 
Re CMC [1995] NZFLR 538 at 543 
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person for whom the welfare guardian is acting, while seeking at all times to 
encourage that person to develop and exercise such capacity as that person 
has to understand the nature and foresee the consequences of decisions 
relating to the personal care and welfare of that person, and to communicate 
such decisions." 
Welfare guardians should encourage the person to act on their own behalf as much as 
possible;14 seek to integrate the person into the community as much as possible;15 and 
consult with the person, and those who are interested in the person's welfare.16 
There are also various limitations on the powers of welfare guardians and these will 
be discussed in a later chapter. 
(b) Direct decision making: personal orders 
The Family Court may issue a personal order under s.l 0 of the PPPR Act, authorising 
certain courses of action, for instance medical treatment/ 7 or make an order for living 
arrangements. 18 A personal order is often the least restrictive intervention available, and 
may be used for discrete, short term problems. If there is an ongoing need for decision 
making on behalf of the person, a welfare guardian may be appointed. A personal order 
may be used if there is conflict between family members about the most appropriate 
course of treatment, or conflict between family members and medical staff about medical 
treatment, or conflict between an incompetent, but protesting person, and family members 
or medical staff. The personal order can direct that medical treatment takes place, but 
cannot be used to refuse treatment, according to Butterworth's Family Law. 19 It is still 
possible for the Court to reject some forms of treatment by either declining to make an 
order at all, or by making an order for another, less intrusive form of treatment such as 
palliative care. The situation in regard to refusal of some forms of medical treatment was 
14 
Section 18(4)(a) PPPRAct 1988 
15 Section 18(4)(b) PPPRAct 1988 
16 
Section 18(4)(c)PPPRAct 1988 
17 
Section lO(l)(f) PPPR Act 1988 
18 
For example, residence in a nursing or rest home under s.10(1)(e) PPPRAct 1988 
19 
See Butterworth's Family Law in New Zealand. Vol2. 9th edition p.1555-1556 
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briefly touched upon in Re H20 when the inability of a welfare guardian to refuse consent 
to standard medical treatment intended to save life was noted. If refusal were the 
appropriate course of action the Family Court could be approached for a personal order 
under s.lO(l)(f), or the welfare guardian could approach the Family Court for directions 
under s.(18)(6). The Family Court can give a welfare guardian "directions relating to the 
exercise of the powers of a welfare guardian ... as it thinks fit." 
It is unlikely that the Family Court would direct a welfare guardian to refuse a treatment, 
but could direct that the welfare guardian consent to another, more acceptable form of 
treatment. 
The Family Court has wider decision making powers than welfare guardians and 
donees of enduring powers of attorney, and can consent to a wider range of medical 
treatment than proxy decision makers. These issues will be discussed in chapter 5. 
(i) Who can apply for a personal order? 
People who can apply for personal orders include relatives and attorneys of the 
person, 21 social workers, 22 medical practitioners, 23 charities such as Age Concern, 24 
nursing home managers,25 and others who can show that they have an interest in the 
welfare of the person. 26 
(ii) Who can be the subject of a personal order? 
In granting a personal order the Family Court must be satisfied that the person is 
ordinarily resident in New Zealand;27 is 20 years old or more;28 and wholly or partially 
lacks the capacity to understand the nature and foresee the consequences of decisions 
20 
Re H [1992] NZFLR 225 at 232 
21 
Section 7(b) PPPRAct 1988 
22 
Section 7(c) PPPRAct 1988 
23 
Section 7(d) PPPRAct 1988 
24 
Section 7(e) PPPR Act 1988 
25 
Section 7(f) PPPR Act 1988 
26 
Section 7(h) PPPRAct 1988 
27 
Section 6(1) PPPR Act 1988 
28 Section 6(2) PPPR Act 1988 
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relating to his or her personal welfare;29 or is unable to communicate their decisions about 
welfare matters. 30 
(iii) Effects of personal orders 
A personal order directs that a certain course of action should take place. An order 
under s.lO(l)(f) may order that the person be provided with medical advice and treatment 
of the kind specified in the order, for example, an operation. A personal order for medical 
treatment allows the treatment to take place, and protects those administering the 
treatment from civil and criminal liability, so long as the treatment is lawful. The Court is 
here effectively providing consent for the treatment on behalf of an incapacitated adult. 
The effect of a personal order is not indefinite, and the Court may specifY a date for its 
expiry.31 If it does not, then the order expires after twelve months,32 or when the specified 
treatment has been administered, whichever is earliest?3 
c) Appointing proxy decision makers: welfare guardians 
The second solution which may be selected by the Family Court when arguments arise 
about the treatment of an incapacitated adult is the appointment of a welfare guardian. 
(i) Reasons for appointing a welfare guardian 
Because the appointment of a welfare guardian can restrict the person's liberty, the 
Family Court must be satisfied that the person wholly lacks the capacity to make or to 
communicate decisions relating to personal care and welfare, and that there is no other 
satisfactory way of ensuring that appropriate decisions are made on their behalf.34 Usually 
the Court can only appoint a welfare guardian for a person who is 20 years old or more. A 
welfare guardian may be given powers to make decisions in a certain area, such as 
29 Section 6(1)(a) PPPR Act 1988 
30 Section 6(1 )(b) PPPR Act 1988 
31 Section 17(1)(a) PPPRAct 1988 
32 
Section 17(1)(b)(i) PPPRAct 1988 
33 Section 17(1)(b)(ii) PPPRAct 1988 
34 
Section 12(1) PPPR Act 1988 
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medical treatment; or may be given wide powers of decision making concerning the 
personal care and welfare of the person. 
(ii) Selection of welfare guardians 
Welfare guardians may be selected from a limited pool of people who would be willing 
to perform the duties of a welfare guardian, 35 and could be considered suitable candidates. 
The welfare guardian must be an adult aged 20 or over and must be capable of carrying 
out their duties satisfactorily;36 must act in the best interests of the incapacitated person;37 
and there should be no conflict of interests between the guardian and the person.38 In New 
Zealand, unlike Australia or the US there is no institution or government department of 
public guardianship,39 and apart from a few who volunteer their services, welfare 
guardians are friends or family members of the incapacitated adult. It may be argued that 
friends and relatives knew the person when they had capacity, and are in a better position 
than strangers to know what the person would have wanted in relation to medical care. 
they may also be more familiar with the person's medical history than a stranger. 
On the other hand there may be the potential for conflicts of interest between the 
person and the guardian if they had a prior relationship: for example a sibling who 
became a welfare guardian may be a beneficiary of the person's will. Whether this would 
prevent the welfare guardian acting in the best interests of the person is a matter for the 
Family Court to decide when making the appointment. 
(iii) Powers and duties of welfare guardians 
The powers to be conferred on a welfare guardian are those " ... as may reasonably be 
required to enable the welfare guardian to make and implement decisions for the person 
35 
Section 12(5)(d) PPPRAct 1988 
36 Section 12(5)(a) PPPR Act 1988 
37 
Section 12(5)(b) PPPRAct 1988 
38 
Section 12(5)(c) PPPRAct 1988 
39 
Sclnnidt WC. Guardianship: Court of Last Resort for the Elderly Disabled Carolina Academic Press 
1995 
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for whom the welfare guardian is acting ... "40 and the effect of a welfare guardian's 
decisions "Shall have the same effect if it would have had if it were made ... by the person 
for whom the welfare guardian is acting and that person had full capacity ... "
41 A welfare 
guardian can validly consent to medical treatment, for example, if given authority in that 
area. 
The primary duty of a welfare guardian is to act in the person's best interests,
42 but the 
Act does not define best interests. In making a medical decision on behalf of the person a 
welfare guardian would be influenced by advice from those treating the person, as well as 
their knowledge of the person's beliefs and wishes when competent. The guardian should 
not be influenced by arguments made by others who may have their own, rather than the 
person's best interests at heart. This may place the guardian in a difficult position when 
dealing with medical professionals who may argue that aggressive treatment of the 
person's illness is not in their best interests, particularly when there may be some 
suspicion that the cost or complexity of the treatment is the issue, rather than the interests 
of the person. Welfare guardians, in properly performing their duties, may therefore be in 
conflict with doctors over the kind of treatment to be administered. Possibly a welfare 
guardian could use their powers to transfer the care of a patient to another doctor more 
sympathetic to their views, but failing that they could turn to the courts for help. The 
courts are, however, strongly influenced by medical opinion, and tend to be reluctant to 
order doctors to administer treatment they deem not to be in the best interests of the 
patient.43 
Welfare guardians have a duty to consult with the person, if that is possible,44 and to 
consult with others who have an interest in the person's welfare,45 and to integrate the 
person into the community as much as possible. 46 Some may be ignorant of these 
responsibilities, seeing their role as a parental one with an absolute right to make 
40 
Section 18(2) PPPRAct 1988 
41 
Section 19(1) PPPRAct 1988 
42 
Section 18(3) PPPRAct 1988 
43 
Short! and v North/and Health Ltd [1998] 1 NZLR 433 
44 
Section 18(4)(c)(i) PPPR Act 1988 
45 
Section 18(4)(c)(ii) PPPRAct 1988 
46 
Section 18( 4 )(b) PPPR Act 1988 
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decisions, including determining the person's best interests. Some may delegate all 
healthcare decisions to carers and doctors and do not advocate on behalf of the person.47 
There are restrictions on the powers of welfare guardians contained in s.l8 of the Act. 
In relation to medical treatment, a welfare guardian cannot refuse standard medical 
treatment intended to be lifesaving or to prevent serious damage to health, 48 and cannot 
consent to the person's participation in medical experiments.49 These issues are discussed 
in chapter 5. 
(iv) When welfare guardianship ends 
Welfare guardianship ends with the death of the person for whom the welfare guardian 
acts, 50 or the welfare guardian dies, or is bankrupt or becomes a special or committed 
patient under mental health legislation, or becomes subject to a property order, or is 
otherwise incapable of acting on behalf of the person.51 The Act contains no specific 
mechanism to formally strip the welfare guardian of their powers when these situations 
arise, and there is no mechanism to inform those caring for an incapacitated adult of the 
termination of the welfare guardian's powers. The Act does not further define the phrase 
"otherwise incapable of acting", but presumably the elderly spouse of an incapacitated 
adult who became ill with dementia or stroke would qualify, as might a sibling or adult 
child who became incapacitated by drug dependency or alcohol abuse. Some welfare 
guardians may be unaware that they have to apply for a review if they wish to continue as 
welfare guardians, and nursing home staff may be unaware that welfare guardianship, 
unlike enduring powers of attorney, 52 must be reviewed and renewed. In practice in such 
cases the former welfare guardian may be continue to make decisions on behalf of the 
person while no longer having the legal right to do so. Welfare guardians may be 
47 
Bray A, Dawson J, van Winden J. Who Benefits from Welfare Guardianship? A study of New Zealand 
law and people with intellectual disabilities. Rogan Print Dunedin 2000. 
48 
Section 18(1)(c) PPPRAct 1988 
49 Section 18(1)(f) PPPR Act 1988 
50 Section 22( a) PPPR Act 1988 
51 
Section 22(b) PPPR Act 1988 
52 
See Part IX PPPR Act 1988 
53 
appointed for an initial period of up to 3 years, 53 and in some circumstances up to 5 years 
on review. 54 
Summary 
When making a decision on behalf of an incapacitated adult the Family Court must 
make the least restrictive intervention possible, and enable the person, if possible, to 
exercise and develop their capacity to the greatest extent possible, while bearing in mind 
the importance of the person's welfare. 
If a welfare guardian is appointed their primary duty is to promote and protect the best 
interests and welfare of the person. The welfare guardian must consult with the person, if 
that is possible, and with others who are interested in the person's welfare, and must try to 
integrate the person into the community. There is no obligation to make the least 
restrictive intervention. 
(2) Transfer to the High Court 
The High Court has greater powers than the Family Court, and there is provision in the 
PPPR Act for appeal to the High Court55 after a Family Court decision. The Family Court 
may transfer proceedings to the High Court56 in order to use the greater power of the High 
Court to enforce orders and impose penalties for failure to comply. 57 
Those representing incapacitated adults, and those treating them, may also turn directly 
to the High Court for assistance in medical decision making when there is conflict 
between those treating the person and their family or personal representatives. When 
withdrawal of treatment means that the person will die, all parties, even if they are in 
agreement may turn to the High Court rather than the Family Court. 
53 Section 12(8) PPPRAct 1988 
54 
Section 86(8) PPPRAct 1988 
55 Section 83 PPPR Act 1988 
56 
Section 14 Family Courts Act 1980 
57 
See Elizabeth Margaret Dawson v Michael Douglas Keesing HC AK PPR 2003-092-2669, 25 May 
2004 
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(3) Declaratory powers of the High Court 
Those treating incapacitated adults may seek declarations from the High Court as to 
lawfulness of their actions. Such a declaration would then shield those treating the 
person, or withdrawing treatment from them, from liability. Hospitals may seek 
declarations that it would not be unlawful to withdraw ventilatory support from a patient 
who is seriously ill and has no prospect of recovery, and whose treatment merely prolongs 
the dying process.58 In New Zealand such declarations are primarily sought to shield the 
medical staff from criminal liability. In Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General 
declarations were sought that medical staff who withdrew ventilatory support from an 
adult with severe and irreversible neurological damage from Guillan-Barre syndrome 
would not be guilty of culpable homicide under s.151(1) or s.164 of the Crimes Act 1961. 
No declarations were sought that there would be immunity from common law actions 
against them, though that would appear unlikely as the man's family supported the 
decision to withdraw treatment. 
Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General included discussion of the ability of a 
civil court to make the declaration relating to a matter which could be subject to criminal 
proceedings, and it was held that the Court did have the ability to make the declaration. 59 
The power of a civil court to intervene in a criminal matter could only be used sparingly 
and was justified under the particular circumstances of the case. The Attorney-General 
had initially been a defendant in the proceedings because of the Court's impingement on 
the prosecutorial powers ofthe Crown, but was later heard as an intervener. 60 
In the English High Court in the case of Anthony Bland declarations concerning the 
lawfulness of withdrawal of treatment were sought, and it was held that the declarations 
would shield the treating clinicians from both criminal and civilliability.61 
The inability of an incapacitated adult to consent to the administration or withdrawal of 
treatment might form the basis of civil liability. In England a declaration can be used in 
relation to both civil and criminal liability because there is no possibility that the Court 
58 
Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 235. 
59 
Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 243-244 
60 
Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney General [1993] 1 NZLR 240 
61 
Airedale NHS Trustv Bland [1993] 1 All ER 880-884 
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can give consent on behalf of an adult under its former parens patriae powers: the power 
to do so no longer exists. In New Zealand the parens patriae power still exists and has 
been used to consent to treatment or its withdrawal on behalf of incapacitated adults. 
(4) Parens patriae powers of the High Court 
The term ''parens patriae" means parent of the country. It is a Latin term referring to 
the obligations of the state to protect its citizens, particularly vulnerable members of 
society such as children and the intellectually disabled who have no one to protect them. 
In Re F it was described as " ... an ancient prerogative jurisdiction of the Crown going back 
as far perhaps as the thirteenth century. Under it the Crown as parens patriae had both the 
power and the duty to protect the persons and property of those unable to do so for 
themselves, a category which included minors ... and persons of unsound mind ... "62 
In England the parens patriae jurisdiction over incapacitated adults no longer exists, 63 
but there are still powers over children. The parens patriae power of the English courts 
was revoked in 1960 when a new Mental Health Act came into force, and although there 
has been some dispute over whether this automatically revoked the parens patriae powers 
ofthe courts New Zealand, it appear not to have done so.64 In New Zealand s.17 ofthe 
Judicature Act 1908 gives ''jurisdiction and control over the persons and estates of 
idiots ... and over the managers of such persons and estates respectively ... " 
When discussing the parens patriae powers of the New Zealand courts it was said in Re 
W that " .... The source of the jurisdiction in New Zealand is s.17 of the Judicature Act 
1908, not the continued existence of the English legislation. The New Zealand legislation 
would be subject to any changes effected by statute in New Zealand, but not changes 
made by statute or other action in the United Kingdom. "65 
In Re G the High Court's parens patriae powers were used to consent to withdrawal of 
62 
Re F [1989] 2 All ER 552 
63 Re F [1989] 2 All ER 545 
64 
In Re W [1994] 3 NZLR 600, which concerned attempts to annul the marriage of a woman said to lack 
the capacity to consent to marriage because of intellectual disability, it was held that the New Zealand High 
Court retained its parens patriae powers. 
65 
Re W[1994] 3 NZLR604 
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treatment on behalf of a 69 year old man with severe brain injuries. The Court then issued 
a declaration to the effect that the withdrawal was lawful, and there would be no criminal 
liability on the part of the doctors because valid consent had been given. Mr G's family 
and the medical staff treating him all supported withdrawal of treatment, and the Court 
heard evidence from friends and family members that Mr G would not wish to be kept 
alive in his condition. Although there was acknowledgement that the decision to 
withdraw treatment was based in Mr G's likely wishes, the proper approach was to 
consider Mr G's best interests.66 The judgment touched on the right of a competent adult 
to refuse medical treatment, and if incompetent, the power of the court to assert this right 
on his their behalf. 
(5) Conclusions 
Most decisions made on behalf of the incapacitated elderly are made without the 
intervention of the courts under the common law doctrine of necessity. When matters are 
referred to the courts most decisions are made in the Family Court under the PPPR Act 
1988.67 These may take the form of personal orders under s.l 0 of the Act, or the 
appointment of welfare guardians with powers to make medical, and other decisions. The 
person, while competent, can donate an enduring power of attorney to another adult who 
can then make medical decisions on their behalf when they are no longer competent to 
make their own decisions. 
Some decisions which involve withdrawal of medical treatment might also involve 
issues of criminal liability if withdrawal of treatment results in the person's death. In New 
Zealand declarations as to the lawfulness of the action may be sought in the High Court in 
order to protect medical staff. 
The High Court's parens patriae powers may also be used to consent on behalf of the 
66 Re G [1997] 15 FRNZ 372 
67 
Numbers of cases are still relatively small. In 2004 there were 2,101 applications under the PPPR Act 
relating to 1,299 individual cases. 620 were applications to appoint a property manager, 789 were to 
appoint a welfare guardian and 118 applications were for a s.10 personal order. About 49% overall related 




person to withdrawal or administration of treatment if there is no one else able to give 
consent. 
In making declarations or exercising parens patriae powers the High Court considers 
the best interests of the person. A welfare guardian or attorney should also consider the 
best interests of the person, but the Family Court has a primary obligation to make the 
least restrictive intervention in the person's life while still considering their best interests. 
Only the Family Court is under this obligation, though both the High Court and the 
Family Court must consider the rights of the person. In the next chapter I will discuss the 
rights involved in medical decision making on behalf of the incapacitated elderly which 




In this chapter I discuss the rights which may be involved in medical treatment 
decisions on behalf of the incapacitated elderly. Some of rights to be considered are 
affirmed in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA). They are contained in 
Part IT, entitled life and security of the person, though other rights, such as the right to 
freedom from discrimination may also need to be considered. Some of the rights are 
contained in the Health and Disability Services Consumers' Code of Rights, which is 
largely a restatement of the common law, and some of them, like the rights affirmed in 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, reflect New Zealand's obligations under the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. 
The rights are: 
(a)The right not to be deprived oflife. 
(b) The right not to be subjected to torture or cruel treatment. 
(c) The right not to be subjected to medical or scientific experimentation. 
(d) The right to refuse to undergo medical treatment. 
(e) The right to freedom from discrimination. 
Before turning the individual rights, the first part of this chapter deals with the first part 
of the Act which describes the purpose of the Act; its application; its relationship with 
other legislation; its interpretation; and its limitations. 
1. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
The Bill of Rights Act 1990 is an Act 
(a) To affirm, protect, and promote human rights and fundamental.freedoms in New 
Zealand; and 
(b) To affirm New Zealand's commitment to the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
The Act largely affirms rights which already existed in New Zealand: it did not create 
new ones. It is rarely used to protect rights which may be infringed by medical decision 
making because those rights (for example the right not be deprived of life) are already 
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protected by other statutes such as the Crimes Act, and by the common law. 
(a) Relationship with other legislation 
In New Zealand, unlike countries such as Canada, the NZBORA is a statute which does 
not enjoy a higher status than other statutes. In some respects its status is lower because if 
the Act is inconsistent with another statute, that statute is not repealed. Section 4 of the 
Act states that other enactments are not affected-
"No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before 
or after the commencement of this Bill of Rights),-
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, 
or to be in any way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment-
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill 
of Rights. 
Since the enactment of the Bill of Rights any new legislation introduced should be 
consistent with the Bill of Rights in accordance with Ministry of Justice guidelines, 1 and 
all statutes should, if possible, be interpreted in a way consistent with the Bill ofRights.2 
The Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 was enacted before the Bill of 
Rights Act, and some of its provisions relating to medical decision making on behalf of 
incapacitated adults provide statutory exceptions to the rights contained in the NZBORA. 
For example, the right to refuse to undergo medical treatment may be overridden if the 
person is not competent and a section 10 personal order for medical advice and treatment 
is made. These apparent discrepancies, and the way the courts have interpreted them, will 
be discussed in a later section. 
1 The Guidelines on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990; A Guide to the Rights and Freedoms in the 
Bill of Rights Act for the Public Sector. www.justice.govt.nz/pubslreports/2004/bill-of-rights-guidelines 
2 
Section 6 Interpretation consistent with the bill of rights to be preferred- Wherever an enactment can 
be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that 
meaning shall be preferred to any other meaning. 
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(b) Applicability 
The provisions of the NZBORA can be applied to acts done by the government of New 
Zealand in its various guises, including the judiciary, or by individuals or bodies 
performing public functions which are conferred upon them by law.3 
(i) The judiciary 
Decisions made by courts, whether interpreting a statute, or making a decision based 
on the common law, must be compatible with the NZBORA. Some decisions made by the 
High Court in relation to incapacitated adults specifically consider the person's rights 
under the Act, for example Re G4 and Short land 5 Others, while not specifically alluding 
to a particular right consider issues such as the right not to be deprived of life. 6 The 
Family Court has considered rights such as the right to refuse to undergo medical 
treatment in Re CMC. 7 In making s.l 0 personal orders for medical treatment or residence 
in a nursing home, the Family Court should consider the person's rights as part of 
deliberations about the least restrictive intervention necessary. If it could be shown that 
the personal order was made without considering the NZBORA it might be possible to 
appeal against a personal order requiring that the person reside in a nursing home, for 
example. 
In New Zealand, where the incapacitated elderly are confmed to locked wards under the 
common law doctrine of necessity, there have been no cases analogous to Bournewoocf 
where the rights of the person not to be arbitrarily detained were considered. (In 
Bournewood the detention was in a psychiatric ward.) If the principles of Bournewood 
3 
Section 3 Application- This Bill of Rights applies only to acts done-
( a) By the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the Government ofNew Zealand; or 
(b) By any person or body in the performance of any public function, power, or duty conferred or imposed 
on that person or body by or pursuant to law. 
4 
Re G [1997) 15 FRNZ 373 at 380 considered s.11 of the NZBORA, the right to refuse to undergo medical 
treatment. 
5 
Short/and v North/and Health Ltd [1998] 1 NZLR 433 at 436 considered s.8 of the NZBORA, the right 
not to be deprived of life. 
6 
Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-Genera/[1993] 1 NZLR 235 
7 
Re CMC [1995] NZFLR 538 
8 
HL v United Kingdom (Bournewood) 5th October 2004 ECHR application no. 45508/99 
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were to be followed in New Zealand far fewer people could be confined to dementia units 
under the common law, and personal orders under s.1 0 of the PPPR Act would have to be 
sought if it could be shown that this was the least restrictive intervention possible, and no 
other alternatives, such as living in a supported environment in the community, were 
possible. 
Welfare guardians who are appointed by the Family Court would have a duty to 
consider the person's rights, and to make decisions that were compatible with the 
NZBORA. In many cases observance of the person's rights would result in decisions 
which were also in the person's best interests, but on some occasions their rights would 
have to be limited. For example an incompetent, but protesting adult could not refuse 
medical treatment deemed to be in his or her best interests, and the welfare guardian 
could consent to the treatment despite the person's objections. This could be seen as a 
justified limitation on the right to refuse medical treatment. 
(ii) Bodies performing public functions 
In relation to the incapacitated elderly, bodies which perform public functions 
conferred by law upon them, include public hospitals and District Health Boards (DHBs). 
The public function they perform is the provision of health services in accordance with 
the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000. 
Some other institutions and persons supplying medical services to the incapacitated 
elderly which may be seen as performing a public function imposed or conferred by law, 
and whose acts could be subject to the NZBORA, are rest homes and nursing homes, 
which are licensed and regulated by the Health and Disability Services (Safety) Act 
2001. The Act is administered by the Ministry of Health, in order to provide health and 
disability services to the public. In addition most rest homes and nursing homes receive 
funding from DHBs. The NZBORA could also apply to private hospitals who do not 
normally receive government funding, because of the government regulations they are 
subject to: 
(1) All hospitals, whether public or private are subject to the same regulations under the 
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Health and Disability Services (Safety) Act 2001, and can only perform their function of 
providing medical and surgical services if they comply with the Health and Disability 
Services (Safety) Act 2001. 
(2) Some private hospitals receive government funding to perform some procedures. For 
example ACC pays for some operations to be performed at private hospitals. 
The combination of government regulation and access to government funding would be 
factors to consider in deciding whether the NZBORA would be applicable to private 
hospitals and nursing homes. 
General practitioners are not normally considered to be employed by DHBs, but in 
most parts of New Zealand they are members of Primary Care Organisations which 
receive funding from the government via DHBs, and they have contractual obligations 
with the Ministry of Health to provide medical services for a population, so their GP 
members may be considered to be performing a public function when they treat the 
elderly, either in their own homes or in rest homes or nursing homes. 
In Short/and v North/and Health Ltcf the court chose to sidestep the issue of 
applicability of the Bill of Rights Act to a public hospital, but considered the possibility 
that s.8, the right not to be deprived of life, had been violated. The same principles of 
applicability may apply to the incapacitated elderly who are receiving medical services 
from hospitals, nursing homes, and general practitioners. 
(c) Limitations 
Section 5 of the Act places limitations on the rights affirmed in the Act: 
"Section 5 Justified limitations- Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and 
freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. " 
The limitations prescribed by law may be contained within the right affirmed, such as 
the right not to be deprived of life except on such grounds as are established by law, or 
the right may not be subject to any limitations, such as the right not to be subjected to 
torture, which is an absolute right protected by New Zealand's ratification of the 
9 Short! and v North! and Health Ltd [1998] 1 NZLR 433 at 444 
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Convention against Torture. Other rights pertaining to medical decision making have 
their own limitations, and can be considered in separate sections. 
Possibly in the event of an epidemic of a fatal disease, the right to refuse medical 
treatment in the form of vaccination could be suspended, on the grounds that 
unvaccinated persons could endanger others, and the utilitarian decision could be taken 
that it was in the interests of society as a whole to vaccinate the entire population. 
In Canada, the Supreme Court discussed the limitation on a right which would be 
reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society in R v Oakes. 10 
Oakes concerned the criminal courts' presumption of innocence, a right contained in the 
Canadian Charter. The presumption of innocence was not contained in the legislation 
concerning narcotics trafficking when mere possession of a narcotic resulted in a 
conviction for trafficking. The legislation was inconsistent with the presumption of 
innocence and was not a limitation which could be justified in a free and democratic 
society. In discussing this issue the Supreme Court said that: "The onus of proving that a 
limitation on any Charter right is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society rests on the party seeking to uphold the limitation". 11 
In Short/and, had there been discussion of the limitations contained in s.5, Northland 
Health might have had to show, not only that their refusal to provide dialysis was lawful, 
but that the legal basis of the decision was justifiable in a free and democratic society. In 
relation to incapacitated adults, who are said to need enhanced protection from the courts, 
it is unlikely that there would ever be much discussion of limitations because it would be 
very hard to justify limitations on the rights of such a vulnerable section of society, and it 
is more convenient to decide cases on other grounds. 
On the whole, the rights contained in Part II of the Act carry their own limitations and 
could not justifiably be limited further. 
10 
R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 
11 
R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 at 105 
64 
2. Part 11 Life and Security of the Person 
Part II of the NZBORA 1990 affirms various civil and political rights, and sections 8-
11, which are collectively headed "Life and Security of the Person", relate to, among 
other things, medical treatment. They are: 
(a)Section 8: Right not to be deprived of life. 
(b )Section 9: Right not to be subjected to torture or cruel treatment. 
(c)Section 10: Right not to be subjected to medical or scientific experimentation. 
( d)Section 11: Right to refuse to undergo medical treatment. 
Security of the person is not mentioned as a specific right in the Act, although it might 
be considered a general legal interest protected through the specific rights concerned. All 
of the rights enumerated in this section contribute towards the physical well being of the 
person, but the idea of security of the person, which has been discussed in the Canadian 
courts, has a much wider meaning than the rights to bodily integrity affirmed in s.8-11. 12 
In New Zealand security of the person does not extend beyond the rights to physical 
integrity contained in this part of the Act. The right to be treated with dignity, to privacy, 
to respect, including respect for differing cultural values, which might amount to rights to 
psychological integrity, are contained in the Code of Health and Disability Services 
Consumers' Rights Regulation 1996. 
In relation to the incapacitated elderly, the idea of personal autonomy and notions 
concerning treatment choices may have limited meaning. They may be unable to make or 
communicate decisions about healthcare, nor have any living family member or friend to 
speak on their behalf, nor have made any form of advance directive. This does not mean 
that an incapacitated adult cannot enjoy physical integrity, or personal dignity. Being 
unaware of the choices available due to unconsciousness or advanced dementia does not 
deprive a person of the right to be treated with dignity, 13 which is connected to notions of 
psychological integrity; or to bodily integrity. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act does 
not, in this context, discriminate between those who are and are not competent, but states 
12 
Rishworth P, Huscroft G, Optican S, Mahoney R. The New Zealand Bill of Rights. Oxford University 
Press 2003.p217-219 
13 
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821 
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that "Everyone has the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, degrading, or 
disproportionately severe treatmenr4 .... ,medical or scientific experimentation without 
consenr5 ... ," and "to refuse medical treatment16" and "No one shall be deprived of life 
except on such grounds are established by law and are consistent with the principles of 
fundamental justice "17 
The terms "everyone" and "no one" are intended to include all human beings in a 
population. When the rights are modified by the inability to consent, the courts, or other 
lawfully designated individuals, can give consent on behalf of the person. In re G18 it was 
held that, in relation to s.ll, the right to refuse medical treatment: 
"'Everyone' in this context means everyone who is competent to do so, and if 
persons are incompetent, then in certain cases consent can be given on behalf of 
that person by the Court." 
The courts have consented to medical treatment on behalf of incapacitated adults in New 
Zealand, 19 but they have never specifically refused treatment on behalf of an incapacitated 
adult in reliance on s.ll of the NZBORA. In re G consent was given on behalf of Mr G to 
withdraw medical treatment instead. The effect was the same for Mr G as if the Court had 
refused further treatment on his behalf, but there may be situations where it is necessary 
to refuse treatment before it is initiated, rather than consent to its withdrawal. The 
doctrine of administering treatment in an emergency on the grounds of medical necessity 
may mean that treatments which the person or their family would fmd objectionable are 
administered in an emergency, and consent to their withdrawal must be sought, because 
there is no time to ask the Court to refuse on the person's behalf before treatment is 
started. 
Possibly in some circumstances personal representatives may apply to the Court for 
refusal of planned treatment, such as chemotherapy, transfusion, or surgery, before it is 
14 
Section 9 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
15 
Section 10 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
16 
Section 11 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
17 
Section 8 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
18 
Re G [1996] 15 FRNZ 372 
19 
Re CMC [1995] NZFLR 538 which concerned an order for treatment of a woman with anorexia nervosa. 
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initiated. The decision in Re G suggests that refusal would not automatically be 
forthcoming because the court would also consider the right not to be deprived of life as 
well as the person's other interests described in sections 8-11. 
(a) Section 8. The right not to be deprived of life- No one shall be deprived of life 
except on such grounds as are established by law and are consistent with the principles 
of fundamental justice. 
The right not to be deprived of life is the first, and most important, right affirmed in the 
NZBORA 1990. The right not to be deprived of life is not the same as the right to life. In 
the medical context withdrawal or withholding of life sustaining treatment such as 
ventilation,20 21 and dialysis22 have been considered in relation to the s.8 right not to be 
deprived of life. Section 8 of the Act has the qualifying phrase "except on such grounds 
as are established by law and are consistent with the principles of fundamental justice", 
which echoes the s.5 provision that the rights may be "subject only to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society". The usual conclusion has been that when treatment is withdrawn and the 
decision to withdraw or withhold treatment is a lawful one, the person is said to have. died 
as a result of their underlying illness, not as a result of withdrawal oftreatment.23 
The grounds established by law in the medical context were discussed in Short/and v 
North/and Health Ltcf4 which involved Mr Williams, who was suffering from the 
complications of diabetes, including renal failure and dementia, who needed renal 
dialysis, and ultimately a kidney transplant if he were not to die of his renal failure. 
Because of his dementia he lacked the capacity to understand and cooperate with his 
treatment, and was assessed as being unsuitable for admission to a dialysis programme, 
and for transplantation, and dialysis was withdrawn. His family sought judicial review on 
the grounds that withdrawing dialysis was a breach of Northland Health's duty to Mr 
20 
Auckland Healthcare Services v L [1998] NZFLR at 1003 
21 
Auckland Health Board v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 235 at 244 
22 
Short/and v North/and Health Ltd [1998] 1 NZLR 433 
23 
Auckland Health Board v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 235 at 248-250 
24 
Short/and v North/and Health Ltd [1998] 1 NZLR 433 
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Williams under the Health and Disability Services Act 1993, or a wrong exercise of its 
statutory power of decision. They were unsuccessful, and appealed the decision on the 
grounds that the decision to withdraw dialysis was unlawful because it contravened s.8 of 
the NZBORA, and because it breached the requirements of good medical practice 
because of failure to consult with an ethical committee, and to obtain the informed 
consent ofMr W's family. 
When discussing a possible breach of the s.8 right not to be deprived of life, four issues 
were listed: 
(i) Were the actions ofNorthland Health actions which would deprive Mr Williams ofhis 
life? 
(ii) Whether s.8 could be applicable to Northland Health under s.3 of the Act. 
(iii) If so, did the actions ... fall within the exception "on such grounds as are established 
by law and are consistent with the principles of fundamental justice"? 
(iv) Or were the actions justified in terms of the justified limitation provisions of s.S of 
the Bill of Rights Act? 
However, the case was largely decided on the grounds that failure to provide treatment 
did not breach the requirements of good medical practice as the decision was a clinical 
one, made in accordance with clinical guidelines. There was no requirement to consult 
with an ethical body because the decision was a properly made and ethicists had 
contributed to the clinical guidelines. Furthermore, there was no requirement to obtain the 
informed consent of Mr Williams' family because the treatment proposed was clinically 
inappropriate. The Court discussed only one of the four issues relating to section 8: 
(i) Were the actions of North/and Health actions which would deprive Mr Williams of his 
life? 
The Court did not consider that the actions of Northland Health were actions which 
would deprive Mr Williams of life. His death would be a result of his illness, not a failure 
to act on the part of the state. The legal duty on Northland Health to supply Mr Williams 
with the necessaries of life25 (dialysis) could only be breached if N orthland Health failed 
25 
S.151 ofthe Crimes Act 1961 
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to perform its duty without "lawful excuse". The Court held that Mr Williams' suitability 
for treatment had been extensively assessed. Consultation had taken place between the 
treating clinicians and other healthcare professionals, and Mr Williams' family. There had 
been consultation with other renal specialists throughout New Zealand, and the 
conclusion reached was that Mr Williams was unsuitable for dialysis. This process of 
consultation, and the adherence to pre-existing clinical guidelines, in accordance with 
good medical practice, provided the lawful excuse for not providing further dialysis. The 
Court would not order further dialysis, and Mr Williams died shortly afterwards. 
The ruling suggests that ifNorthland Health did not follow the clinical guidelines, or if 
the clinical guidelines were flawed or discriminatory, then there would have been no 
lawful excuse for refusing to provide dialysis and the action might then have been viewed 
as depriving Mr Williams of his life.26 Observance of common law responsibilities, in 
this case, satisfied responsibilities under the criminal law and the Bill of Rights Act. 
(ii)Applicability to healthcare providers under s.3 
The Court did not consider the issue of applicability directly, but the NZBORA would 
be applicable to a public hospital. 
(iii) Did the actions of North/and Health fall within the exception in s.8: "on such 
grounds as are established by law and are consistent with the principles of fimdamental 
justice"? 
In deciding that the actions of Northland Health did not deprive Mr Williams of life 
because it had acted lawfully and had fulfilled common law, criminal law, and s.8 
obligations, the Court partially answered the question of whether the actions were lawful, 
and evaded discussion of the meaning of "principles of fundamental justice". 
The idea of principles of fundamental justice is found in the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, which heavily influenced the NZBORA. Rishworth has said that it 
26 
Rishworth P, Huscroft G, Optican S, Mahoney R. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Oxford University 
Press 2003. p225 
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is not a phrase capable of precise definition,27 but it has been discussed in the Canadian 
courts. The principles of fundamental justice were discussed in Rodriguez:28 
"The principles of fundamental justice in s. 7 of the Charter implies that there is 
some consensus that these principles are vital or fundamental to our societal 
notion of justice. They must be capable of being identified with some precision 
and applied to situations in a manner which yields an understandable result. 
They must also be legal principles. To discern the principles of fundamental 
justice governing a particular case, it is helpful to review the common law and 
the legislative history of the offence in question (here the criminalisation of 
assisted suicide) and the principles which underlie it. It is also appropriate to 
consider the state interest. Fundamental justice requires that a fair balance be 
struck between the interests of the state and those of the individual." 
In Shortland the underlying principle was the sanctity of life, and whether Northland 
Health owed a duty to Mr Williams to preserve his life by continuing to offer him 
dialysis. The question was whether failure to provide dialysis was a failure to provide the 
necessaries of life. As the court had decided that there was no failure to provide the 
necessaries of life because it was not clinically appropriate to offer dialysis, and because 
the process of arriving at that decision was lawful, it did not need to discuss whether the 
actions were consistent with fundamental justice. 
Mr Williams had an interest in staying alive, and had said that he wished to live. The 
state presumably has an interest in preserving the lives of its citizens, but it also has an 
interest in the costs incurred, and whether the money could be better spent elsewhere. 
N orthland Health had denied that the cost of treatment was an issue. The idea of rationing 
of access to treatment is not a legal principle, it is an economic principle which has been 
subsumed in the process of clinical decision making. The courts have been very reluctant 
to discuss the issue of rationing of treatment, and the issue is often sidestepped by 
27 Rishworth P, Huscroft G, Optican S, Mahoney H. The New Zealand Bill of Rights. Oxford University 
Press 2003 p229. 
28 Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney-General) [1993] 3 SCR 519 
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referring to "clinical criteria" ?9 The Health and Disability Services Code of Rights 
explicitly recognises the reality of resource constraints, but the High Court in New 
Zealand has yet to discuss it as a legal principle on a level with concepts such as the 
sanctity of life. 
Fundamental justice may have required that a fair balance be struck between Mr 
Williams' interests and Northland Health's interests, but fundamental justice cannot 
require that the state perform the impossible. In reality the state could not preserve the life 
of Mr Williams because he was unable to cooperate with the treatment. Forcing it upon 
him by restraining him in hospital for the duration of the treatment (which would occupy 
several hours at a time), and by preventing him touching or interfering with the catheter 
port, would not be practicable without the use of sedation or physical restraint, both of 
which would further impair his health and defeat the purpose of treatment, which was to 
prolong his life and enhance its quality. 
(iv) Justified limitations under s. 5 
Section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act sets limitations on the rights in the Act, saying that the 
rights and freedoms "may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as 
can be demonstrably justified in a .free and democratic society." 
The idea of limits prescribed by law are closely related to the limitation in s.8 " ... on such 
grounds as are established by law". In Short land it was established that there was nothing 
unlawful about the process by which Northland Health arrived at the decision not to offer 
dialysis. Some sections of the Act, like s.8, carry their own limitations, and discussion of 
this part of s.5 is unnecessary, unless the limitation can be shown to be unjustifiable. 
The importance of other rights 
The right not to be deprived of life can be overridden by other rights when it is clear 
that the kind of life which is being sustained by medical treatment is so painful and 
unpleasant as to be intolerable to the person. The treatment is futile if it will not cause an 
29 
Bloomfield A. Prioritising healthcare in New Zealand. Healthcare Review Online. May 2000 
http://hcro. enigma. co.nz/websitelindex. ifm?foseaction. accessed 3/5/06 
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improvement in the person's condition. Rights which take precedence over the s.8 right 
are the right to refuse medical treatment, and perhaps the more general rights to dignity 
and respect which are part of the concept of security of the person. Although it has never 
been discussed in New Zealand, the right not to be subjected to cruel treatment could also 
be invoked in discussing the administration of life sustaining treatment which is painful 
and unpleasant to an incapacitated adult. It is more usual to discuss such treatments in 
relation to the right to refuse to undergo medical treatment. 
(b) Section 9. Right not to be subjected to torture or cruel treatment-
Everyone has the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, degrading, or 
disproportionately severe treatment or punishment. 
This right is derived from the International Convention of Civil and Political Rights 
which forbids torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment without 
defining them further. Some commentators view torture and cruel, inhuman and 
degrading punishment or treatment as a spectrum of abuses with torture at the most 
severe end. In New Zealand torture is an offence under the Crimes of Torture Act 1989. 
The Crimes of Torture Act 1989 was passed as part of New Zealand's obligations under 
the United Nations Convention against Torture which was ratified by New Zealand in 
December 1989. Usually torture and its associated abuses are discussed in relation to state 
sanctioned punishment, but the NZBORA also mentions "treatment" which expands the 
scope of s. 9 to include those who are detained in hospitals as well as prisons?0 Whether 
the scope of "treatment" extends further has not been discussed in New Zealand.31 Both 
acts and omissions on the part of those caring for offenders, and incapacitated adults, may 
satisfy the requirements of s.9. Those who are mentally incapacitated, which includes 
elderly people suffering from dementia, have been said to be in a position of: 
"inferiority and powerlessness ... which calls for increased vigilance m 
reviewing whether the Convention (European Convention on Human Rights) 
30 
Herczegalvy v Austria [1992] 15 EHRR 437 
31 
Butler A, Butler P. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary. Lexis Nexis Ltd. Wellington 
2005. Chapter 10.9 
72 
has been complied with. While it is for the medical authorities to decide ... on 
the therapeutic methods used .... such patients nevertheless remain under the 
protection of Article 3 (right not to be subject to torture). "32 
(i) Torture 
Torture is defined in s.2(1) ofthe Crimes ofTorture Act 1989 as: 
" ... any act or omission by which severe pain and suffering, whether physical 
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person-
( a) For such purpose as-
(i) Obtaining from that person or some other person information or a 
corifession; or 
(ii) Punishing that person for any act or omission for which that person or 
some other person is responsible or is suspected of being responsible; or 
(iii) Intimidating or coercing that person or some other person; or 
(b) For any reason based on discrimination of any kind;-
but does not arise from any act or omission arising from, or inherent in, or 
incidental to, any lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." 
The possible circumstances under which a person can be tortured or subjected to cruel 
treatment include punishment, intimidation and reasons based on discrimination, as well 
as to extract information and confessions. The suffering inflicted may be either physical 
or mental (or both) and must be severe and intentionally inflicted. The torture must be at 
the instigation of a public official and must be unjustifiable. 33 
(ii) Cruel treatment and degrading treatment 
Cruel treatment has been described as that which is so excessive as to "outrage 
standards of decency".34 Degrading treatment is that which arouses feelings of fear, 
32
HerczegalvyvAustria [1992] 15 EHRR437 
33 
Taunoa v Attorney-General [2004] 7 HRNZ 379 at 440 
34 
R v Miller and Cockriell [1977] 2 SCR 680 
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anguish, and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing, and breaking physical and 
moral resistance. In Ireland v UK the use of continuous noise and sensory deprivation 
was held to be degrading and inhuman treatment, not torture. 35 The borderline between 
torture and forms of abuse labelled as cruel and degrading is a variable one, and would 
depend on the type and severity of the treatment, its duration, its physical and mental 
effects, and in some cases, the age, sex and state ofhealth ofthe person.36 The European 
Court of Human Rights has recently acknowledged that the differences between torture 
and other forms of ill treatment cannot be clearly defined, and vary according to the times 
and viewpoint of the Court: 
"Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic 
societies. Even in the most difficult circumstances ... the Convention prohibits 
in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.. . .In order to determine whether a particular form of ill treatment 
should be qualified as torture, the Court must have regard to the distinction 
between this notion and that of inhuman or degrading treatment. It appears 
that... the Convention should, by means of this distinction, attach a very 
special stigma to deliberate and inhuman treatment causing very serious and 
cruel suffering .... the Court considers that certain acts which were classified in 
the past as "inhuman and degrading treatment" could be classified differently 
in the future. "37 
(iii) Applicability 
No one has ever been convicted of torture in New Zealand, although there has been one 
case concerning allegations torture and violations of s.9 of the NZBORA. In Taunoa, 
which concerned the treatment of prison inmates it was held that although some of the 
treatment was unlawful, it did not constitute torture under s.9 of the NZBORA?8 This 
does not mean that acts which could amount to torture or cruel or degrading treatment 
35 
Ireland v UK [1979-80] 2 EHRR 439 
36 
Keenanv UK [2001] 33 EHRR437 
37 
Selmouni v France [1999] 29 EHRR p406-7 
38 
Taunoa v Attorney-Genera/7 HRNZ 379 (HC) 
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have never been committed. Private individuals who are not performing a public duty 
cannot be charged with torture in New Zealand, but are dealt with under the Crimes Act. 
Those who are performing a public function, including employees of hospitals and rest 
homes could, in theory, administer torture or cruel or degrading treatment, and this has 
been discussed in the European Court of Human Rights, especially in relation to those 
incapacitated by mental illness. The European Court of Human Rights has also said that 
the state has a duty to protect its citizens from such treatment from private individuals,
39 
and this might encompass private institutions which would be subject to inspection and 
regulation by the government, for example geriatric hospitals and rest homes. The 
incapacitated elderly form a vulnerable group because they suffer from disabilities which 
make it difficult, if not impossible, for them to effectively protest against their treatment, 
and they may be confmed to an institution such as a geriatric hospital, either under the 
PPPR Act, or under the common law doctrine of necessity. Examples of cruel or 
degrading treatment might include prolonged and unsupervised use of physical restraints, 
failure to seek medical help for injuries or pressure sores, or failure to provide clean, dry 
clothing for an incontinent patient. 
(iv) Medical treatment: failure of provision of treatment, or provision of inappropriate 
treatment 
Failing to provide medical treatment could amount to a violation of the right not to be 
subjected to torture or other forms of ill treatment. In Keenan v UK, it was held that lack 
of effective psychiatric monitoring of a mentally ill offender held in the punishment block 
of a prison could be regarded as inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. 
Providing inappropriate or negligent medical treatment might constitute cruel 
treatment, but normally measures taken out of therapeutic necessity would not meet the 
threshold for cruel or degrading treatment. In Herczegfalvy v Austria40 the Court 
commented: "The Court must satisfy itself based upon the evidence that that the medical 
39 A v UK [1998] 27 EHRR 611 
40 Herczegfalvy v Austria [1992] 15 EHRR 437 
75 
necessity has been convincingly shown to exist. In this case, according to psychiatric 
principles generally accepted at that time, medical necessity justified forcibly 
administering food and neuroleptics to a mentally ill offender. 
In Pretty, 41 it was said that: 
"The suffering which flows from naturally occurring illness, physical or 
mental, may attain a minimum level of severity so as to be covered by Article 
3, where it is, or risks being, exacerbated by treatment, whether flowing from 
conditions of detention, expulsion, or other measures, for which authorities 
can be held responsible ... " 
In the case of Diane Pretty, who sought a legal assisted suicide so she could be spared 
further suffering from her motor neuron disease, the Court held that there was no act or 
treatment on the part of the government of the UK which exacerbated her condition. The 
ruling suggests that therapeutic measures which were not generally accepted, for instance, 
treatment with experimental drugs administered without consent, or futile treatment 
which exacerbated her illness, could be seen as reaching the level of suffering covered by 
Article 3. 
Those who care for incapacitated adults have in the past been accused of cruel 
treatment administered as punishment for challenging behaviour, for example the use of 
electro convulsive therapy described in Janet Frame's book "An angel at my table", 42 and 
from time to time carers in nursing homes have been accused of abusing elderly patients 
in their care for infractions such as incontinence. 
Failure to provide appropriate treatment for an incapacitated adult's injuries might 
reach the threshold required in some circumstances. Examples might be forcing a person 
who had dislocated their hip to walk;43 and failing to seek specialist advice and treatment 
for an adult who slipped in the bath and suffered scalds, if it could be shown that the 
treatment was meted out as retribution for behaviour such as calling out frequently, or 
incontinence. In Price v UK the European Court of Human Rights considered the case of 
41 
Pretty v UK [2002] 35 EHRR 1 
42 
Frame J. An angel at my table. Random House, Auckland New Zealand 1984 
43 
See Case note 01HDC 12197 www.hdc.org.nz/casenotes.php?year2002 
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a disabled woman confined to a wheelchair who was imprisoned and who became 
dangerously cold because she could not reach her blankets and could not exercise to keep 
warm, and concluded that her treatment was degrading: 
"There is no evidence in this case of any positive intention to debase or 
humiliate the applicant. However the court considers that to detain a seriously 
disabled person in conditions where she is dangerously cold, risks developing 
sores because her bed is too hard, or unreachable, and is unable to go to the 
toilet or keep clean without the greatest difficulty, constitutes degrading 
treatment. "44 
Those who are detained in nursing homes or geriatric hospitals may also suffer from 
cold because of inadequate heating or inability to keep warm because they are too frail to 
exercise or are unable to dress themselves warmly, if they are not cared for appropriately. 
In Price there was no intention to treat the prisoner badly, but rather an absence of 
recognition that she was more vulnerable than others due to her disability. 
It is unlikely that medical decisions made on behalf of the incapacitated elderly would 
amount to torture, but the lack of understanding of their special needs might lead to a 
situation where they be considered to suffer degrading or cruel treatment. Imposing a 
particularly painful and debilitating treatment on a person which has very little chance of 
success might constitute cruel treatment. The idea that treatment which is painful or 
intrusive, and prolongs the dying process, is cruel or degrading to the person, may be used 
as a justification for withdrawal of treatment, overriding the right not to be deprived of 
life. 
(v)The Health and Disability Services Consumers' Code of Rights 
The rights enumerated in the Health and Disability Services Consumers' Code of 
Rights are framed more positively than the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel or 
degrading treatment. They include the right to services of an appropriate standard (Right 
4), the right to dignity and independence (Right 3), and the right to freedom from 
discrimination, coercion, harassment and exploitation (Right 2). A number of cases 
44 
Price v United Kingdom [200 1] 34 EHRR 1285 
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reported to the Health and Disability Commissioner (HDC) pertain to standards of care in 
rest homes and nursing homes, in particular the administration of adequate pain relief to 
patients, 45 failure to document procedures, and timely and appropriate referral to hospital 
for treatment of ongoing conditions.46 The scenarios are similar to those discussed in the 
European Court of Human Rights in relation to degrading or cruel treatment, but are 
couched in the language of the Code, and result in fmdings of breach of a particular right 
under the Code (or no breach as the case may be). 
The right which appears to be infringed most often is the right to receive treatment of 
an appropriate standard. Failure to provide appropriate treatment is not likely to result in 
any fmdings under the NZBORA because the HDC is more readily accessible, and 
because there is very little recognition in New Zealand of the possibility that the treatment 
of the incapacitated elderly in institutions may amount to a violation of their rights. The 
Human Rights Commission, when considering torture, cruel and degrading treatment and 
punishment, has not devoted any specific discussion to those confmed to nursing homes 
and geriatric hospitals, although it devotes considerable discussion to those confined to 
prisons, young offenders' institutions, and mental hospitals.47 
(c) Section 10. Right not to be subject to medical or scientific experimentation-
Every person has the right not to be subjected to medical or Sfientijic experimentation 
without that person's consent. 
The rights not to be subject to medical experimentation and to refuse medical treatment 
are complementary to the right not to be subject to torture or cruel or degrading treatment. 
The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights includes medical and 
scientific experimentation alongside torture and cruel treatment, but the NZBORA lists 
the right not to be subject to medical experimentation as a separate right. 
Section 10 of the NZBORA would appear to forbid any form of medical experiment 
45 
See case 03HDC17242 on the website at www.hdc.org.nz 
46 
Case 02HDC18190, a man with old rib fractures and chest infection. www.hdc.org.nz 
47 
See Action Plan for Human Rights- Priorities for action 2005-2010. New Zealand Human Rights 
Commission. www.hrc.eo.nz/report/actionplan accessed June 2nd 2006 
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involving those unable to consent. In this section I will discuss the kind of procedures 
which can be called "experimental", and the application of s.lO of the NZBORA to the 
incapacitated elderly. It may be that very strict interpretation of the Bill of Rights Act, 
with no exclusions, would deprive some of the incapacitated elderly of treatment which 
may benefit them. 
(i) Origins of s.l 0 
The right not to be subjected to medical experimentation without consent arose after 
the second war as details of the Nazis' use of prisoners for medical and scientific 
experiments were revealed at the Nuremberg trials. It was said that certain basic 
principles (ten in all) should be observed in order to satisfy ethical, moral, and legal 
objections to the use of humans in medical experiments, the first of which was: 
"1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This 
means that the person involved must have the legal capacity to give consent; 
should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without 
the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, 
or any ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient 
knowledge and comprehension of the subject matter involved as to enable 
him to make an understanding and enlightened decision .... "48 
This first principle has continued to be used, both in New Zealand and overseas,49 until 
the present day. According to this principle those who do not have the capacity to give 
consent due to age or disability cannot be subjected to medical experimentation. 
The Declaration of Helsinki, which was formulated by the World Medical Association, 
enunciates 12 basic principles and divides medical research using human subjects into 
clinical research and non-therapeutic research. Section 10 of the NZBORA refers to both 
medical and scientific experimentation without defining either term, but presumably 
medical experiment has some kind of therapeutic goal, while scientific experiments have 
48 The Nuremberg Doctors' Trial: Judgement, Aug 20 1947. Reproduced in Mann M, Gruskin S, Grodin 
MA, Annas GJ Health and Human Rights, Routledge New York 1999 p 292-300. 
49 
World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki. www. wma.net/elpolicylb3/htm. Accessed June 2 
2006 
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no therapeutic goal. The Declaration of Helsinki allows clinical research involving those 
who cannot give consent because of lack of capacity if consent can be obtained from a 
legal guardian or responsible relative "in accordance with nationallegislation."50 In New 
Zealand welfare guardians and donees of enduring powers of attorney cannot consent to 
the person's participation in medical experiments unless the procedure is one which will 
save the person's life or prevent serious damage to their health.51 The person's physician 
may have a common law duty to administer an experimental treatment if they believe that 
the treatment is in the best interests of the person, and may save their life. If this were the 
case, no consent would be required. 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, like the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights uses the word "experimentation".52 The PPPR Act 1988 also uses the 
word "experiment",53 unlike the Code and the Declaration of Helsinki which use the word 
"research". The rights in the Code extend to those occasions when the person IS 
participating in teaching or research. 54 Two main themes emerge from section 10: 
What is a medical or scientific experiment? 
Who can consent? 
(ii)Medical and scientific experiments and research 
The Oxford English Dictionary (QED) defines "experiment" as: 
"(1) The action of trying something or putting it to the test; a test; a trial. 
(2) An action or procedure undertaken to make a discovery, test a hypothesis, 
or demonstrate a known fact. 
(3) A procedure or course of action tentatively adopted without being sure it 
50 
Article 11 Declaration of Helsinki 
51 
Section 18(1)(±) PPPRAct 1988 
52 
Article 7 of the ICCPR: "No one shall be subject to torture or to cruel and inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. In particular no-one shall be subject without his free consent to medical and 
scientific experimentation." 
53 
Section 18(1)(±) No Court shall empower a welfare guardian, and no welfare guardian shall have 
power .... To consent to that person's taking part in any medical experiment other than one conducted for the 
purpose of saving that person's life or of preventing serious damage to that person's health. 
54 
Right 9. Rights in respect of teaching and research. 
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will achieve its purpose."55 
An experiment, then, could be undertaken both to demonstrate a known fact, and to 
discover new ones. The experimenter may or may not be sure of the outcome, depending 
on the kind of experiment undertaken. The term "experiment" contains the concept of 
trial or test, for example a trial of drug therapy, and also contains the elements of 
"research." This is defined by the OED as: 
"A search or investigation undertaken to discover facts and reach new 
conclusions by the critical study of a subject or by course of scientific 
enquiry. "56 
The term "experiment" has, since the Second World War, had some very negative 
connotations, and conjures up images of Nazi atrocities, as well as more recent ones of 
the "unfortunate experiment" conducted at the National Women's Hospital in Auckland. 
A wider range of procedures can be termed "experimental" rather than "research", and 
s.l 0 appears to ban both in attempt to protect vulnerable groups from the consequences of 
ill- conceived experimental treatment. Medical or scientific experiments may take many 
forms. 57 The Declaration of Helsinki divides them into two main categories: 
(a)Use of experimental treatment with a therapeutic, as well as scientific goal. 
(b)Use of procedure or substance with purely scientific goals and no benefit to 
participants. 
(a) Use of experimental medical treatment which has a therapeutic as well as scientific 
goal. 
Some patients may be enrolled in clinical trials of new drugs or treatments, or 
comparisons of standard treatments which, it is hoped, will provide safer and more 
effective treatment for their condition. During the trial, and sometimes afterwards, if they 
have benefited, drug companies provide the drugs, and monitor the patient's response. For 
some people this provides early access to innovative treatments which may not become 
55 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 5th edition. Oxford 2002 p 894 
56 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 5th edition. Oxford 2002 p 2453 
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generally available for several years. There may be evidence of the efficacy of the drug 
from animal trials, or the use of chemically similar drugs already on the market, or from 
clinical trials in other centres. In Simms58 there had been no human trials on the drug in 
question, but there was some evidence from animal trials in Japan, that the drug was 
effective against variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease(variant CJD). In New Zealand such 
trials would require approval from an Ethics Committee. 
(b) Purely scientific research where the participants do not gain any clinical benefits 
from the procedure or substance administered. 
In some scientific experiments there is no therapeutic benefit to participants, but the 
information gained may have long term therapeutic benefits to others. An example of this 
is the use of healthy volunteers who ingest varying forms of the same drug to establish 
which form of the drug is most easily absorbed and produces fewer side effects. The safer 
and more easily absorbed drug is offered to patients who will benefit from its use. The 
Declaration of Helsinki permits only healthy volunteers, or those whose illness is 
unconnected with the purpose of the experiment, to be used for this category of 
experiments. The incapacitated elderly would not be unable to volunteer, even if they 
were healthy enough to participate. 
(iii) Consent and the meaning of"every person" 
Section 10 of the NZBORA says that "every person" has the right not to be subjected to 
medical and scientific experimentation without their consent. The right extends to every 
living person regardless of their ability to consent. If they lack the ability to consent they 
should not be the subject of an experiment. The right not to be involved in a medical 
experiment is designed to protect the most vulnerable members of society, including 
children and incapacitated adults. It protects their dignity and autonomy. Even those who 
are unable to experience any distress because of severe brain damage are entitled to the 
protection of the NZBORA. 
58 
Simms v Simms and Another [2004] Lloyds Rep Med 236 
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(a) Experiments which do not require consent 
Not all forms of medical experimentation require consent, because they do not infringe 
the person's liberty, privacy or security. Such "experiments" include the review of results 
obtained for other purposes, audits of treatment, or epidemiological studies. In New 
Zealand most of these experiments require the approval of research ethics committees, 
but not the consent of the people involved. Other, more intrusive forms of experiment 
require the informed consent of the participants. 
Butler concludes the s.l 0 of the NZBORA protects patients against the use of even 
non-intrusive research without the consent of the person if the information is used to gain 
new scientific knowledge or test a hypothesis. 59 
Section 10 of the NZBORA has never been invoked in relation to the use of 
information obtained from "experiments" that do not require consent. 
(b) Experiments with minimal risk and possible benefits 
Incapacitated adults cannot give informed consent, so strict interpretation of s.l 0 would 
prevent their participation in any form of medical experiment, even one which may confer 
benefit upon them, and which would involve minimal risk. In such circumstances it may 
be possible for others to consent on their behalf. 
Section18(1)(f) of the PPPR Act would permit welfare guardians and attorneys to 
consent to some kinds of experiment which could save the person's life or prevent serious 
damage to their health. The PPPR Act does not authorise welfare guardians and attorneys 
to consent to participation in medical experiments for any other reason, which is in 
keeping with the NZBORA. 
It may be possible for those giving emergency treatment to the incapacitated elderly to 
use an experimental procedure without consent on the grounds that it was an emergency, 
and invoking the common law to protect themselves from liability. 
The Family Court could consent to experimental treatment on behalf of the 
59 
Butler A, Butler P. The New Zealand Bill ofRights Act: A Commentary. NexisLexisLtd Wellington 
2004 Chapter 11.6.13 
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incapacitated elderly, although in the case of Re S (electric shock treatment)
60 which 
concerned an incapacitated young adult, it declined to issue the necessary orders, and did 
not discuss the question in relation to s.l 0 of the NZBORA. Possibly the Family Court 
could consent to the administration of experimental treatment if evidence could be 
offered that the proposed treatment was life saving or could confer benefit upon the 
person, such as reversing the effects of dementia. 
The High Court, exercising it parens patriae powers, could consent to experimental 
treatment on behalf of an incapacitated adult, although such consent has never been 
sought on behalf of an incapacitated adult or adults in New Zealand. The applicants 
would have to produce some evidence that the person would benefit from the proposed 
treatment. The NZBORA protects the incapacitated elderly from exploitation by those 
conducting medical or scientific experiments, but does not allow them easy access to 
novel treatment. In Re G it was said in relation to s.ll of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act, that if the person was not competent, the Court could consent (to withdrawal of 
treatment) on their behalf. Possibly this would also be true of s.lO, and the High Court 
could consent to participation in an experiment.61 
The English case of Simms is the only case where the High Court has consented to 
experimental treatment, and the decision was made on the basis of the common law, and 
best interests, rather than on the basis of European Convention rights. 
Summary 
The terms "experiment" is a wide ranging one, and a very strict interpretation of s.l 0 of 
the NZBORA could lead to the conclusion the incapacitated elderly should be excluded 
from all forms of treatment which could be regarded as experimental because they are 
unable to consent. This may be detrimental to them. A small number of treatments 
deemed to be experimental may be administered to the incapacitated elderly if it is in 
their best interests to receive them. 
60 ReS (shock treatment) [1992] NZFLR 208 
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Consent may be given by welfare guardians and attorneys if the proposed treatment is 
lifesaving or will prevent damage to health,62 by the Family Court,
63 or High Court. These 
alternatives are possible because s.18 of the PPPR Act and the Code of Health and 
Disability Services Consumers' Rights are not revoked or repealed by the existence of 
s.10 ofthe New Zealand Bill ofRights Act. 
No consent at all can be sought or obtained if the situation is an emergency and there 
is no one to give consent. 64 This approach may be seen as a justifiable limitation on s.1 0 
under s.5 of the NZBORA. There has been very little discussion of experimental 
treatment in relation to incapacitated adults, but slightly more about the related right to 
refuse medical treatment. 
Some forms of non intrusive experiments do not require consent from the person but 
will require the approval of ethics committees. There has been no discussion about the 
relevance of s.1 0 to this type of experiment involving incapacitated adults in New 
Zealand. Important .considerations would include the lack of risk to the person, the 
possible benefits, and the use made of the knowledge obtained. Balanced against this 
would be the danger that the person's privacy and dignity were not being respected. 
(d) Section 11 Right to refuse to undergo medical treatment-
Everyone has the right to refuse to undergo medical treatment. 
All competent adults have the right to refuse medical treatment even if it is lifesaving 
and the grounds for refusal appear to observers to be irrational. 65 Section 11, the common 
law and the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights all uphold the 
right of competent adults to refuse medical treatment. The incapacitated elderly may 
protest against their treatment but they cannot refuse it. Treatment which is deemed to be 
in their best interests can be administered without their consent, even if they are 
protesting. The term "everyone" means everyone who is competent. If the person is not 
competent to refuse medical treatment, others may be able to make the decision on their 
62 
Section 18(1)(f) PPPRAct 1988 
63 
By means of a personal order under s.1 0 of the PPPR Act 1988 
64 
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behalf by the following means: 
(i) by valid advance directive made by the person's earlier, competent self. 
(ii) by welfare guardians or attorneys appointed to make medical decisions on behalf of 
the person. 
(iii) by the Family Court 
(iv) by the High Court using its parens patriae powers. 
(i) Valid advance directive 
An advance directive made when the person was competent, which is relevant to the 
circumstances of the patient, allows refusal of medical treatment such as antibiotics, 
transplantation, ventilation, and dialysis even if refusal of treatment would lead to the 
person's death. 
(ii) Refusal of treatment by welfare guardians and attorneys 
Welfare guardians and attorneys may be appointed to make medical decisions on 
behalf of an incapacitated adult. They are able to refuse some forms of treatment which is 
not in the best interests of the person, but s.l8 of the PPPR Act 1988 does not allow them 
to refuse treatment which is intended to be lifesaving or prevent serious damage to the 
health of the person. The limitations imposed by s.18 are discussed in the next chapter. 
(iii) Refusal of treatment by the Family Court 
The Family Court may consent to some forms of treatment by means of a s.l 0 personal 
order for medical treatment. 66 The Court may refuse to make such an order if the 
treatment is deemed to be too restrictive an intervention, 67 or may opt to consent to a 
particular form of treatment such as palliative care, effectively refusing more aggressive 
forms of treatment. 
66 
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(iv) Refusal of treatment by the High Court 
Re G was the only case in New Zealand where the High Court, on behalf of an 
incapacitated adult, ordered withdrawal of medical treatment on the grounds that 
everyone has the right to refuse medical treatment "Everyone in this context means 
everyone who is competent to do so, and if persons are incompetent, then in certain cases 
consent can be given on behalf of that person by the court. "
68 In arriving at the decision 
the court received affidavits from friends and family members ofMr G, to the effect that 
he would not have wanted to be kept alive in his present condition, but based the decision 
on Mr G's best interests. It could more properly be said that the Court could, in certain 
cases refuse consent on behalf of an incapacitated adult, but this case referred to consent 
to withdrawal of treatment. 
The incapacitated elderly are more likely to face problems in gaining access to 
treatment than problems of withdrawal of treatment already commenced. One of the 
reasons for this is that they may face discrimination on the grounds of age or disability, 
and I now turn to discussion of discrimination. 
(e) Section 19. Freedom from Discrimination- Everyone has the right tofreedomfrom 
discrimination on the grounds of discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1993. 
The Human Rights Act 1993 lists the kinds of discrimination which are unlawful and 
are prohibited. 69 The discrimination may already have occurred or it may be assumed that 
it will occur in the future. In the context of medical decision making on behalf of the 
incapacitated elderly two categories may apply: discrimination on the grounds of 
disability, and on the grounds of age. 
(i) Discrimination 
Discrimination is not defined in the Act, but the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission says that discrimination is: 
"Any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference which is based on any 
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
68 
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69 Part 11 s. 21 Human Rights Act 1993 
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opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status, and which 
has the purpose or effect of nullifYing or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment, or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and 
freedoms ..... Freedom from discrimination is not just the formal recognition 
of equal rights, but means substantive equality and ensuring that everyone 
has the opportunity to enjoy rights equally. It follows that not all distinctions 
or different treatment constitute discrimination, and equality does not mean 
treating everybody the same. "70 
Discrimination may be direct or indirect. Some forms of discrimination are not 
unlawful, for example affirmative action programmes. Direct discrimination can involve 
treating people differently who are the same, or treating people the same who are 
different. 71 
(ii) Direct discrimination 
Direct discrimination includes: 
(i) Not being given access to a place or a service. 
(ii) Being treated less favourably. 
(iii) Being subject to detriment. 
The incapacitated elderly may be subject to direct discrimination in all of the above 
categories. In terms of healthcare, discrimination may mean lack of access to services, 
such as dialysis because of age, 72 or lack of access to specialist units such as ICU or 
specialist stroke units because of age or disability, such as pre existing dementia. Lack of 
access to specialist units can result in being treated less favourably during an illness than 
a younger person, or one without pre-existing disabilities. 73 Excluding some people from 
70 
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treatment programmes on clinical grounds is not discriminatory if it can be shown that the 
grounds are based on clinical criteria, such as absence of certain diseases such as heart 
disease, neurological disease, or stroke, not just age. Mr Williams was excluded from 
Northland Health's dialysis programme because he was too cognitively impaired to 
understand and cooperate with the treatment. If he had been excluded just because he was 
over a certain age, the clinical guidelines would have been discriminatory. In some cases 
the presence of an illness or disability will mean that a person cannot enter certain 
treatment programmes on clinical grounds. Older people are more likely to suffer from 
illness such as heart disease and stroke and will be excluded because of this rather than 
their age. This is a form of indirect discrimination but it is not usually regarded as 
unlawful, if the clinical criteria are widely accepted and follow good medical practice 
guidelines. 
In Price v United Kingdom74 the European Court of Human Rights considered the 
nature of Ms Price's disability and the discrimination she suffered: 
"The applicant's disabilities are not hidden or easily overlooked. It requires no 
special qualification, only a minimum of ordinary human empathy, to 
appreciate her situation and to understand that to avoid unnecessary hardship-
that is, hardship not implicit in the imprisonment of an able bodied person-
she has to be treated differently from other people because her situation is 
significantly different." 
Ms Price's disability led to her suffering detriment because she was not treated 
differently to other prisoners, despite being different to able bodied prisoners. In the 
context ofthe incapacitated elderly, treatment which is not different to that administered 
to those with capacity may be discriminatory. Such treatment includes failure to ensure 
-Physical illness, such as diabetes or heart failure. 
-Psychiatric illness. 
-Intellectual or psychological disability or impairment including dementia. 
-Any loss or abnormality of psychological, physiological, or anatomical structure or function, such as loss 
of short term memory experienced by those suffering from Alzheimer's, or deformity and weakness of a 
limb due to severe arthritis. 
-Reliance on a guide dog, wheelchair, or other remedial means such as hearing aids. 
-The presence in the body of organisms capable of causing illness, such as HIV or hepatitis B virus. 
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that a person with dementia, and who cannot feed themself, is fed, rather than merely 
presented with food. 
Discrimination against the elderly, especially the incapacitated elderly, ,may occur in 
many forms in relation to healthcare. Direct discrimination on the grounds of age is one 
of the prohibited grounds listed in the Human Rights Act, but indirect discrimination on 
the grounds of age-related clinical conditions is not unlawful. Failure to take account of 
the vulnerability imposed by disabilities which lead to incapacity, such as stroke or 
Alzheimer's may result in discriminatory practices on the part of hospital or nursing home 
staff caring for the person. 
Summary 
The NZBORA affirms rights already protected, and while it may establish a basic 
standard for those providing public services such as medical care, is rarely used to protect 
the incapacitated elderly in relation to medical treatment, even though they may suffer 
discrimination in this area. 
In some respects, such as access to novel treatments, the NZBORA, if strictly 
interpreted, limits the choices available to those making decisions on their behalf. 
Medical decision making on behalf of the incapacitated elderly can be seen as regulated 
by the interplay of the NZBORA, other statutes, and the common law. The common law 
confers wide decision making powers on healthcare professionals, with the emphasis on 
"best interests" decisions which depend on the philosophy and experience of the decision 
maker, rather than any objective test. The NZBORA could be used to restrict the common 
law powers of health professionals in the area of access to medical treatment, but is rarely 
invoked successfully. 
The PPPR Act 1988 acknowledges that incapacitated adults have rights, and in some 
respects, reflects the rights enumerated. It more closely reflects the common law than the 
NZBORA, and the "common law" thinking in relation to medical decision making on 
behalf of the incapacitated elderly tends to take precedence over a rights based approach. 
In succeeding chapters I will review the legislation relating to medical decision making 
on behalf of the incapacitated elderly in New Zealand, England, and New South Wales. 
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Chapter 5. 
Section 18 of the Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 
Those appointed as welfare guardians or attorneys have obligations under s.18 of the 
Protection of Personal and Property Rights (PPPR) Act 1988. This lists the powers and 
duties of welfare guardians and the limits of those powers. Donees of enduring powers of 
attorney have the same limitations on their powers.1 This chapter discusses those parts of 
s.l8 referring to refusal of standard medical treatment and consent to experimental 
treatment. The Act places special limits on welfare guardians' powers in relation to two 
forms of medical treatment which are termed "standard" and "experimental", and two 
forms of psychiatric treatment, ECT and psychosurgery, which will not be considered 
here. 
Section 18(1 )(c) of the PPPR Act 1988 says: 
"No Court shall empower a welfare guardian, and no welfare guardian shall 
have power,-
.... To refuse consent to the administering to that person of any standard 
medical treatment or procedure intended to save that person's life or to 
prevent serious damage to that person's health. .. " 
Section 18(1)(f) of the PPPR Act 1988 says: 
"No Court shall empower a welfare guardian, and no welfare guardian shall 
have power,-
.... To consent to that person's taking part in any medical experiment other 
than one to be conducted for the purpose of saving that person's life or of 
preventing damage to that person's health. .. " 
There has already been some discussion of the Family Court and the powers of welfare 
guardians and attorneys in chapter 3. In this chapter I will confme myself to discussion of 
these provisions of the PPPR Act in relation to refusal of standard medical treatment and 
consent to experimental treatment on behalf of the incapacitated elderly, and the problems 
which arise from these provisions, which largely reflect, but do not clarify common law 
duties. 
1 
Section 98(4) PPPR Act 1988 
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(1) Best interests 
Welfare guardians' and attorneys' main duty in relation to the persons they represent is 
to act in their best interests? The provisions of s.18(1 )(c) of the Act reflect the common 
law duty owed to the person by their personal representatives, and under normal 
circumstances it would not be in that person's best interests for their personal 
representatives to refuse medical treatment which would be life saving or prevent 
deterioration in their health. Those caring for the person, including medical and nursing 
staff, owe a similar duty to deliver care which is in the best interests of the person. The 
common law description of medical treatment which is in the best interests of 
incapacitated adults, is contained in Re F. It is: 
" ... the operation or treatment will be in their best interests if, but only if, it is 
carried out in order to save their lives or to ensure the improvement or to 
prevent deterioration of their physical or mental health. "3 
Such treatment can be administered without the need for consent to an incapacitated 
person who has not left a valid advance directive refusing it. Section 18(1 )(c) contains 
similar provisions, and mentions treatment which is intended to save that person's life or 
prevent serious damage to that person's health, but does not expressly mention best 
interests, which is covered by s.18(3). 
Medical decision making on behalf of the incapacitated elderly consists of ascertaining 
both their best interests, medical and non-medical, and their likely wishes in relation to 
treatment. Those who have not made an advance directive may still have had discussions 
with family and friends about their views of treatments such as CPR and blood 
transfusion. Treatment which is deemed to be medically in the person's best interests may 
not be in their social or psychological best interests, or what they wanted when 
competent. For these reasons welfare guardians and attorneys may wish to refuse medical 
treatment, or request certain kinds of medical treatment on behalf of the person. A person 
who had been a devout Jehovah's Witness would not have wanted transfusion when 
2 
Section 18(3) PPPR Act 1988 " ... the first and paramount consideration of a welfare guardian shall be the 
promotion and protection of the welfare and best interests of the person ... " 
3 Re F [1989] 2 All ER 545 at 551 
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competent, and personal representatives may wish to refuse the offer of a transfusion on 
their behalf. Section 18 provides, however, that an attorney or welfare guardian could not 
refuse transfusion if the treating clinician deemed it the appropriate treatment to save the 
life of the person. Although welfare guardians and attorneys must act in the person's best 
interests and promote and protect their welfare, treating clinicians are required to act in 
the patient's medical best interests. Section 18(1 )(c) allows the treating clinician, who 
may have a very limited acquaintance with the person, to override the wishes of attorneys 
and welfare guardians, and perhaps even the likely wishes of the person if they consider 
the person's medical best interests are served by doing so, and no valid advance directive 
to the contrary has been made. 
Section 18(1)(c) and s.18(1)(f) express in very broad terms the duties of welfare 
guardians and attorneys in relation to medical treatment. The issues of consent and refusal 
of consent to standard and experimental treatment may be in accord with the common law 
position described above, but are confusing for both welfare guardians and those treating 
the incapacitated elderly, as are the meaning of standard and experimental treatment, and 
the role of the intentions and purposes of those administering treatment, which may be 
unknown and unknowable to proxy decision makers. 
The issues to be discussed are: 
(1) Consent and refusal of consent by welfare guardians and attorneys. 
(2) The meaning of medical treatment, standard medical treatment, and medical 
experiments. 
(3) Treatment which is lifesaving or prevents damage to health. 
(4) Treatment which is intended to save life. 
(2) Consent and refusal of consent. 
The ability to refuse consent to medical treatment implies there is a corresponding 
ability to consent, and that there is a choice. The element of choice is absent if there is no 
possibility of refusing consent to some types of treatment. Options available to welfare 
guardians and attorneys in relation to standard lifesaving treatment intended to save life 
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are to consent, or to make no response if they do not agree to the treatment proposed, or 
to turn to the courts. If the welfare guardian or attorney makes no response because a true 
choice is unavailable, it is likely that the person will undergo the recommended treatment 
anyway, because lifesaving treatment can be administered to incapacitated adults without 
the need for consent. 
The kind of choice which can be made in relation to lifesaving treatment, or treatment 
to prevent serious damage to health, may lie in choosing from a variety of drugs or 
procedures which may be offered, all of which are designed to achieve the aim of saving 
life or preventing damage to health. There may be circumstances under which welfare 
guardians and attorneys would wish to refuse treatment because they know that the person 
would not have wanted to be subjected to it. For example, the person may have had a 
strongly held belief that certain kinds of treatment should not be inflicted on the 
incapacitated elderly, and that death in such circumstances would not hold any particular 
terrors. 
The effect of s.18 is to restrict the type of medical decisions made by welfare guardians 
and attorneys to those which do not involve treatment which is life saving or prevents 
serious damage to health. The effect of Act is to leave those decisions either to the 
medical professionals dealing with the person, or to the courts. The powers of welfare 
guardians and attorneys in relation to decisions about lifesaving treatment or treatment to 
prevent serious damage to health, are, in effect, less than the powers conferred on medical 
practitioners by the common law. While this may have certain advantages to both 
healthcare professionals and to incapacitated adults whose wishes are unknown, it is less 
advantageous to welfare guardians and attorneys who feel that the person's best interests 
are served by refusal of some forms of treatment, and those incapacitated adults who had 
appointed attorneys to make end of life decisions on their behalf. A person who had 
donated an enduring power of attorney to a friend or relative in the belief that that person 
could make medical decisions for them in the event of their incapacity, may be 
disappointed to learn that the kind of medical decisions they would most want to 
influence, for instance refusal of artificial hydration and nutrition, are precisely the kind 
of medical decisions that cannot be made by a proxy. In England the Mental Capacity Act 
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2005 recognises that some people would want attorneys to make decisions to refuse life 
saving treatment for them, and allows them to donate an ·enduring power of attorney 
which includes the ability to refuse lifesaving treatment, but in New Zealand the PPPR 
Act does not confer the power to refuse life saving, or life prolonging treatment, upon 
either attorneys or welfare guardians. 
The nature of the treatment proposed is important: if it is standard medical treatment it 
cannot be refused by welfare guardians or attorneys, but if it is experimental and requires 
consent it can be refused by welfare guardians and attorneys, unless it will save life or 
prevent serious damage to health. These restrictions may be designed to protect the 
incapacitated adult, but they may also be disadvantageous, especially as the person may 
be deprived of access to novel treatments which may be beneficial, and to which they may 
have consented when competent. 
(3) Medical treatment, standard medical treatment, and medical experiments. 
(a) Medical treatment 
The PPPR Act does not define medical treatment, whether standard or experimental. 
Medical treatment encompasses a wide variety of procedures, both diagnostic and 
therapeutic. The Guardianship Act 1987 ofNew South Wales defmes medical treatment 
in s.33(1)(a) as: 
"medical treatment (including any medical or surgical procedure, operation 
or examination and any prophylactic, palliative or rehabilitative. care) 
normally carried out by or under the supervision of a medical practitioner". 
This defmition of medical treatment includes diagnostic procedures, but limits the range 
of treatment to that normally carried out by or under the supervision of a medical 
practitioner, and raises the question of whether treatment carried out by alternative 
practitioners such as chiropractors or acupuncturists would qualify as medical treatment. 
In New Zealand, legislation such as the Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 
refers to health services, rather than medical treatment, and refers to providers and 
consumers of health and disability services. But whether, in the context of the PPPR Act, 
"medical treatment" should have a very narrow meaning, confmed to that normally 
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administered by medical practitioners, or a much wider meaning, is open to debate. A 
wider interpretation of "medical treatment" would include nursing and physiotherapy 
procedures with therapeutic aims, such as wound dressing and passive exercises to 
prevent muscle wasting. Medical treatment does not cease to be medical treatment if it is 
performed and supervised by a health care professional other than a medical practitioner. 
(b) Standard medical treatment 
Section 18(l)(c) refers to any standard medical treatment, suggesting that the PPPR 
Act refers only to orthodox, rather than alternative practices, although it may not 
necessarily be confined to treatments carried out by doctors, and could include treatments 
carried out by other healthcare personnel such as physiotherapists and nurses who can 
also administer a range of "standard" treatments recognised within their profession and 
which can be viewed as medical treatment which it might be in the best interests of the 
person to receive. 
Most discussion in the courts from Bolam onwards has referred to the standard of 
medical treatment, rather than what constitutes standard medical treatment. The concepts 
are related but not identical. "Good medical practice" was a phrase used in the New 
Zealand Courts to describe approved forms of treatment, but other phrases such as 
"proper medical standards ... "4 were just as useful. Good medical practice was said in 
Auckland Area Health Board v Attomey-Generaf to be in the best interests of the patient 
and "encompass the prevailing medical standards, practi~ procedures and traditions 
which command general approval within the medical profession." Good, or standard 
medical practice consists of knowi:Jl& and being able to administer,. treatments which a 
number of doctors approve of, and which are widely used. 
Professional bodies such as the Royal Colleges may publish treatment guidelines 
which are a consensus of what constitutes best practice in the diagnosis and treatment of a 
particular condition. Different bodies may have dilferent ideas about the treatment of the 
same condition. For example, the New Zealand Guidelines Group and the UK National 
4 
AucklandArea Health Boardv Attorney-General[l993J I NZLR. 235 at250 
5 
Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] I NZLR 235 at 25 I 
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Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) both recommend a thiazide diuretic and then, if 
necessary, a beta blocker, for the treatment of hypertension, but the British Hypertension 
Society recommends the use of another, more expensive category of drugs, ACE 
inhibitors, as a first line treatment for hypertension, especially in younger, non-black 
people. A recent study into the effectiveness of these, and other drug regimes, was halted 
when it was discovered that those on the standard, cheaper regime of diuretics and beta 
blockers were severely disadvantaged by their treatment, suffering higher blood pressure 
and more diabetes than those on the ACE inhibitors and calcium channel blockers.6 The 
evidence base upon which guidelines are based changes, sometimes rapidly, and different 
countries have different criteria regarding treatment. Expensive treatments may not be 
recommended in some countries (like New Zealand) because they are expensive, not 
because they do not work or because their use is contrary to good practice. 
In New Zealand there has been little discussion of what constitutes standard medical 
practice in relation to treatment administered to incapacitated adults. In Re S (electric 
shock treatment/ which concerned the application of electric shocks as aversion therapy, 
it was noted that such treatment was "by no means standard" and was "controversial". In 
Short/and, Re G, and Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General, reference was 
made to practices which were approved of within the medical profession, but this was in 
relation to withdrawal of medical treatment, not its administration. 
Many different treatments may be regarded as standard treatment depending on the 
time and place, the needs of individual patients, their financial resources, and the views 
and preferences of their doctors. The idea of standard medical treatment, like the idea of 
an appropriate standard of medical treatment is one largely driven by the prevailing views 
within the medical profession, with some treatments being endorsed enthusiastically by 
professional bodies and individual practitioners, only to be discarded later. Defining 
standard medical treatment as that which a body of medical opinion regards as standard 
leaves medical decision making on behalf of the incapacitated elderly in the hands of 
practitioners who may have very different ideas about what constitutes standard medical 
6 
McDougaii c. Brady AJB. Petrie JR. ASCOT: a tale of two treatment regimens. BMJ 2005: 331; 859-860 
7 
ReS (electric shock treatment) [1993] NZFLR 208 
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treatment to those held by welfare guardians or attorneys, particularly in relation to the 
effectiveness and acceptability of various procedures. 
Studies of the range of treatments offered to all patients indicate that there is 
considerable variation in practices between hospitals and regions, and between individual 
practitioners, who may all claim that their approach is "standard", but which is coloured 
by their perceptions of their patients. One clear fact that emerges is that the elderly, the 
economically disadvantaged, and those belonging to ethnic minorities tend to have poorer 
access than younger, richer people to commonly available medical services, for a variety 
of reasons. 8 9 
The term "standard medical treatment" cannot be precisely defmed, other than that it is 
treatment which is not experimental, and is approved by a body of medical opinion. This 
may cause problems for the small numbers of attorneys and welfare guardians who may 
have a clear idea of what the person would have wanted, and may wish to refuse some 
treatments on their behalf, such as artificial hydration and nutrition, transfusion or 
surgery. A clearer statutory definition of the kind of medical treatment that welfare 
guardians and attorneys may refuse is required. In New South Wales, for example, 
medical treatment is defined and divided into categories according to its impact on the 
person (see chapter 7), and most treatments cannot be administered without appropriate 
consent. 
(c) Medical experiments 
The PPPR Act does not define "medical experiment", and the only case before the New 
Zealand courts to discuss experimental treatment, Re S (shock treatment), alludes to a 
form of experimental treatment and describes it as "controversial" and "by no means 
standard." 10 
8 
Milner PC, Payne JN, Stansfield RC, Lewis PA, Jennison C, Saul C. Inequalities in accessing hip joint 
replacement for people in need. Eur J Public Health. 2004; 14(1):58-62 
9 
Bond M, Bowling A, McKee D, Kennelly M, Banning AP, Dudley N, Elder A, Martin A. Does Ageism 
affect the management of ischaemic heart disease? J Health Serv. Res. Policy 2003;8(1); 40-47: "Age per se 
causes older patients to be treated differently in relation to investigation and treatment of ischaemic heart 
disease." 
10 
ReS (electric shock treatment) [1992] NZFLR 208 at 213 
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Like the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, the PPPR Act uses the rather emotive 
term "experiment" rather than "research" used by the English Mental Capacity Act 2005, 
or "clinical trial" used by the Guardianship Act 1987 of New South Wales. The term 
"experiment" has a somewhat different meaning than "research" or "clinical trial", and 
encompasses a variety of procedures. Experiment means: 
"The action of trying something or putting it to the test; a test; a trial" and 
"An action or procedure undertaken to make a discovery, test a hypothesis; or 
demonstrate a known fact." 11 
Research means: 
"A search or investigation undertaken to discover facts and reach new 
conclusions by the critical study of a subject or by course of scientific 
enquiry." 12 
The meaning of research and experiment appears similar, but experiments include testing 
hypotheses and demonstrating known facts, so have a slightly different meaning than 
research. 
The New South Wales Guardianship Act recognises and describes a number of 
categories apart from clinical trials, while the Mental Capacity Act only discusses 
research. The term "experiment" covers a number of different types of procedures13 with 
both therapeutic and non-therapeutic (or purely scientific) aims. Most forms of medical 
experiment are those with a therapeutic aim but uncertain outcome, conducted to benefit a 
particular group of people. Medical experiments involving humans can be divided into 
the following categories, some of which overlap: 
(i) Therapeutic trials of treatment which are already standard and non-controversial when 
used for other purposes 
(ii) Administration of treatments which are not yet regarded as standard, but have limited 
support in the medical profession (novel treatments). 
(iii) Randomised controlled studies of drugs or procedures. 
11 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. p894 5th edition. Oxford 2002 
12 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. p2543 5th edition Oxford 2002 
13 
Deutsch E. Medical experimentation: International rules and practice. [1989] 19 VUWLR 1-10 
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(iv) Comparative studies of new and established treatments, or two forms of established 
treatments. 
(v)) The use of experimental treatment in an emergency. 
A wide definition of experiment might include epidemiological studies, observational 
studies, audits, and longitudinal studies involving review of notes and results, which 
would not normally require consent. Some such studies are research, for example 
epidemiological studies using anonymised data, which are undertaken to discover new 
facts, and may also be experiments in that they may test hypotheses, or demonstrate 
known facts. Longitudinal studies involving review of notes and laboratory results could 
be both research and experiment, but do not normally require consent by individuals. 
Some forms of experiment require the patient's consent, and some do not. Most forms 
require ethical committee approval. Some forms require neither ethical committee 
approval nor consent. Clinical audits undertaken to discover whether or not all eligible 
patients are receiving a certain kind of treatment are a kind of medical experiment, but do 
not require either consent or ethical committee approval, and are part of the process of 
quality control. 
(i) Therapeutic trials of treatment 
Most types of medical treatment administered to a particular patient for the first time 
are a form of experiment because although they are known to work in most cases there is 
always an element of uncertainty in all forms of treatment, and there is no way of 
knowing if a particular form of treatment, however well established, will work for that 
particular patient. These "experiments" are part of the uncertainty experienced in 
everyday clinical practice and do not require ethical committee approval, and under some 
circumstances such as emergency, do not require consent. As the treatment used is 
standard, consent can be sought from guardians. This type of treatment has an uncertain 
outcome, but there is nothing controversial about the method of treatment. For the 
purposes of the PPPR Act such treatment should not be considered an experiment. 
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(ii) Novel treatments 
Unlike the New South Wales Guardianship Act, the PPPR Act does not recognise a 
category of novel treatments. These are treatments which are in the early stages of 
development and have a measure of support among a small group of specialists, but no 
general support within the medical profession. They are not considered standard 
treatments, but may, in time, become standard. In England the case of Simms14 considered 
the use of a novel treatment, and the High Court declared that its administration was not 
unlawful. 
The PPPR Act refers to treatment for the purpose of saving that person's life or 
preventing serious damage to that person's health. A novel treatment could fall into that 
category, and it would be possible for a welfare guardian or attorney to consent to it if 
there was evidence to show that the treatment was likely to save the person's life or 
prevent damage to their health, and there was no other treatment available. If the evidence 
was not available, or was equivocal, the person's welfare guardian or attorney could turn 
to the Family Court for directions, or to the High Court. 
(iii) Randomised controlled studies. 
Randomised controlled studies are often large in scale and may be conducted at a 
number of centres. The drug or treatment in question is compared with administration of 
a placebo, or a standard form of treatment if there is one available. The researchers may 
or may not know which patient is receiving the treatment in question and which patient is 
receiving a placebo or standard treatment until the end of the trial. The nature of such 
trials would at once create difficulties for welfare guardians and attorneys as the grounds 
on which they could consent, that the treatment provided was administered for the 
purpose of saving the life, or preventing damage to the health of that person, would be 
unknown. The person might be receiving standard treatment; an experimental treatment; 
or a placebo, but this information would not be available to the welfare guardian or 
attorney. 
If the person was receiving standard treatment that they would be receiving anyway, 
14 
Simms v Simms and Another [2004] Lloyds Rep Medical236 
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there would be no problem with consent to the treatment, but s.18(1 )(f) could still be an 
impediment to enrolment in the trial because the participation in that particular form of 
medical experiment would not save the life or prevent damage to the health of that 
person. In fact it would not affect the health of the person either way, as they would be 
receiving standard treatment that they would normally receive. The Act would prevent 
consent to the information gained being used to benefit others. Those without a welfare 
guardian or attorney could be enrolled in the standard arm of a randomised controlled trial 
if ethical committee approval could be obtained. 
If the person was receiving the experimental treatment neither the welfare guardian nor 
researchers would know, and the purpose of administering it would not be to save the 
person's life or prevent damage to their health. 
If the person was receiving a placebo they would not be receiving any treatment and 
this would, in effect deny them standard medical treatment. Welfare guardians must act in 
the best interests of the person, and cannot refuse consent to standard medical treatment. 
Even if there were some way of knowing the kind of treatment the person would receive, 
welfare guardians could not consent to the administration of a placebo. 
It would appear that the PPPR Act does not envisage incapacitated adults participating 
in large scale randomised controlled trials of treatment. Randomised controlled trials are 
not conducted for the purpose of conferring benefits on individuals, but with the long 
term aim of conferring benefits on other individuals in the future (and on the researchers 
and the companies that employ them and market the treatment). This does not mean that 
other avenues in the High Court or Family Court are not open to researchers and personal 
representatives if they want an incapacitated adult to participate in research. 
In New Zealand there has never been an application to enroll a number of incapacitated 
adults in a large scale clinical trial. The elderly, in particular the incapacitated elderly, are 
unpopular with researchers for a number of reasons, apart from the difficulties with 
consent.15 This reluctance to conduct research involving the elderly may mean that the 
15 
McMurdo M, Witham MD, Gillespie ND. Including older people in clinical research. BMJ 
2005;331:1036-1037 
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elderly cannot benefit from research. In particular, it means that research into those 
conditions which afflict the elderly and lead to incapacity, such as dementia, is severely 
limited. 
The Mental Capacity Act 2005, by contrast, specifically recognises that some forms of 
research into the causes of incapacity can only be conducted upon those with the 
condition that causes incapacity. It is the only kind of research that the MCA permits. 
(iv) Comparative studies 
Comparative studies are those comparing a standard form of treatment with either 
another standard form of treatment, or a new form of treatment, to see which is the most 
effective. Welfare guardians and attorneys are able to consent to standard medical 
treatment, but not to "that person's taking part in any medical experiment other than one 
to be conducted for the purpose of saving that person's life or preventing serious damage 
to that person's health." This means that although the welfare guardian or attorney could 
consent to the treatment if it were a standard treatment, they could not consent to the 
person being enrolled in a comparative study because it would not be conducted for the 
purpose of saving the person's life or preventing damage to their health. It would be a 
study conducted for the purpose of deciding which treatment might, in the future, be most 
efficient at saving life or improving health, or preventing damage to health. There would 
be no obstacle to the person receiving a standard treatment so long as they did not take 
part in an experiment. Incapacitated adults who do not have welfare guardians or 
attorneys may, with ethical committee approval, be enrolled in standard arms of such 
studies if the treatment they receive is the treatment they would be receiving anyway, and 
issues of privacy are respected. 
(v) Studies which do not require consent. 
Some studies do not require consent, but will require ethical committee approval. 
These include some epidemiological studies using anonymised data which has already 
been obtained, for example, by review of medical notes, and some observational studies 
which are non-intrusive. Some studies, such as audits of treatment, can be conducted 
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without ethical committee approval or consent, as they are part of the quality assurance 
procedures of institutions such as hospitals and nursing homes. Although welfare 
guardians, and others interested in the welfare of the patient may be informed of the 
outcome of such studies, no consent is required, so limitations on the guardians' or 
attorneys' power to give consent does not pose an obstacle. 
(vi) Emergencies 
In an emergency it would be permissible to administer experimental treatment to an 
incapacitated adult in order to save their life, just as standard treatments can be 
administered in an emergency without waiting for consent. The Health and Disability 
Services Consumers' Rights Code says that those participating in research and teaching 
have the same rights16 as others using health and disability services, and the Code allows 
healthcare professionals to administer treatment to those who lack the capacity to consent 
if it is the person's best interests to receive it. 17 Presumably if the person were suffering 
from a life threatening·illness and their doctor had access to an experimental drug which 
had shown promising results in treating that particular condition, they could administer it 
in order to save the person's life even if no one was available to consent to it, or if the 
person's welfare guardian or attorney did not consent to it. 
The involvement of the incapacitated elderly in clinical research in New Zealand is 
contentious, and it has been suggested that there is an absolute ban on the participation of 
incapacitated adults in any form of clinical research.18 This is untrue as some types of 
experimental treatment do not require consent, welfare guardians can consent to some 
kinds of experimental treatment, and, in theory the Family Court could authorise an 
experimental form of medical treatment if it was thought to be the least restrictive 
available intervention, and in the best interests of the person. In addition the High Court, 
using its parens patriae powers, could authorise an incapacitated adult's participation in a 
medical experiment if it were in that person's best interests to receive it, or make a 
16 
Right 9 of the Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights Code 
17 
Right 7 ( 4) of the Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights Code 
18 
Kennedy I and Grubb A. Medical Law. Chapter 14 p1736 (Butterworth's, London, 3rd edition, 2000) 
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declaration that the treatment was not unlawful, as the High Court in England did in 
Simms. 
Some researchers argue that "best interests" is too stringent a test and that research that 
is not harmful or detrimental should be permitted. 
The use of the term "clinical research" may be preferable to the term "experiment" and 
more detailed guidelines in the Act would clarify the situation for those who make 
decisions on behalf of the incapacitated elderly, and other incapacitated adults. In some 
circumstances it should be possible for welfare guardians and attorneys to consent to 
participation in research, and clear guidance would be helpful concerning: the kind of 
research contemplated and its possible benefits and risks; the protections given to those 
who lose capacity during the research; the protection given to those who do not benefit 
from the research: and access to the drug once the research is completed. 
(4) Saving life and preventing serious damage to health 
The PPPR Act does not differentiate between treatment which is intended to save life, 
and which has a good chance of being successful, and treatment which is intended to save 
life and which has a very poor chance of success. Welfare guardians are unable to refuse 
treatment which is intended to prevent serious damage to the person's health, but the Act 
does not define "serious damage". Many treatments, for instance some forms of 
chemotherapy, will inflict serious damage on the health of the person to which they are 
administered and may have only a very slight chance of curing the underlying disease or 
saving life. Some treatments may prolong life, and the PPPR Act does not differentiate 
between those treatments which may save life, such as an appendicectomy, and those 
which sustain or prolong life, such as ventilation. The PPPR Act contains only the 
broadest guidance for welfare guardians in that it instructs them to promote and protect 
the welfare and the best interests of the person, and contains no guidance about what 
constitutes best interests. It may not always be in the best interests of an incapacitated 
older adult to receive treatment which might save or prolong that person's life for an 
unknown period of time, and which would almost certainly be painful and unpleasant, 
and which results in poorer health than before, even if successful. If such treatment were 
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recommended a welfare guardian or attorney could not refuse, but would have to turn to 
the Family Court for directions, and the necessary orders. Although such conflicts 
between welfare guardians and medical practitioners are rare, they may happen. A 
competent patient can, if properly informed, make their own assessment of risks and 
benefits and consent to treatment or refuse it, a welfare guardian cannot refuse if the 
treating clinician has determined that a certain course of treatment is in the best interests 
of the patient. 
More guidance about acceptable levels of risk involved might be helpful to welfare 
guardians. The PPPR Act is silent on the subject, but cases involving children whose 
parents refuse treatment on their behalf have discussed acceptable levels of risk. In such 
cases the courts have held that consent to treatment can be given if the treatment is: 
-necessary to treat the condition, 
-known to be effective in some cases 
-known not to cause substantial harm to the patient; 
- no acceptable alternative is available.19 
The chance of success has a bearing on the decision to consent. In Healthcare Otago 
Ltd v Williams-Hollowa/0 it was held that the Family Court could consent on the child's 
behalf to chemotherapy which had a 50% chance of success. Presumably consent would 
be forthcoming for a procedure or treatment with a greater than 50% chance of success, 
but not necessarily for a treatment with a less than 50% chance of success. When a period 
of time had elapsed during which the child's cancer had progressed, and he had not 
received treatment, the order was rescinded because the chance of the chemotherapy 
being successful at that stage was very much less than 50%. 
Welfare guardians making medical decisions on behalf of the incapacitated elderly do 
not have the luxury of such calculations, as the doctor's intention to deliver treatment 
which is lifesaving or prevents serious damage to health is all that is required. If the 
doctor's recommendation is made in good faith, the welfare guardian cannot refuse the 
19 
Re J [1996] 2 NZLR 134, which concerned the child of Jehovah's witnesses who required a blood 
transfusion. 
20 
Healthcare Otago Ltd v Williams-Holloway [1999] NZFLR 804 
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treatment, and in effect it is the doctor, not the welfare guardian who makes the treatment 
decision. Many forms of treatment such as some types of surgery have much less than 
50% chance of success even under optimal conditions, but if offered, welfare guardians 
are unable to refuse them provided the requisite intention is there. Not all welfare 
guardians would want to refuse treatment offered, but those who have reason to do so, for 
instance because the person is already suffering from a serious underlying illness, cannot 
refuse on behalf of the person if the course of treatment is recommended by the treating 
clinician. Most treating clinicians would not recommend such an action, but a few may do 
so. The welfare guardian would then have to turn to the courts for a declaration that the 
treatment was not in the person's best interests. 
(5) Intention and medical treatment 
The PPPR Act uses the phrase "intended to save that person's life" in relation to 
standard medical treatment, suggesting that a decision to offer treatment with the 
intention of saving the person's life or health is all that is necessary. The intention to save 
life arises in the mind of the medical practitioner offering treatment. Treatment is usually 
offered with the intention of saving life or conferring some benefit, but the practitioner 
may foresee that it is very unlikely to do so because their knowledge of medicine and 
illness allows them to make that calculation. If they intend that the treatment will save the 
person's life they can offer the treatment, and the welfare guardian cannot refuse it. The 
treating clinician may think that a course of treatment with a slim chance of saving life is 
preferable to not treating where there is no chance of saving life. In such a situation the 
clinician's intentions could more properly be characterised as hopes. The welfare guardian 
or attorney may have known the person for many years and know that the type of 
treatment and the quality of life that might result from it would be unacceptable to the 
person, and they might wish to refuse it. Section 18(1 )(c) confers wide powers on treating 
clinicians because the treatment depends on their intention, not any defmable outcome. 
Although they have a duty to act in the patient's best interests, their ideas about best 
interests may not be the same as those of welfare guardians or attorneys, who are 
prevented from refusing treatment whose outcome may be calamitous, even if the 
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intention of the treating clinician is good. 
Unlike the New South Wales Guardianship Act, the PPPR Act makes no comment on 
the liabilities of clinicians administering treatment to incapacitated adults; and unlike the 
MCA it makes no comment on the duties of researchers towards incapacitated adults. 
In relation to medical experiments s.18(1)(f) uses the phrase ''for the purpose of saving 
that person's life" and the intentions of those delivering the treatment are not mentioned. 
The purpose of the experiment must be to save life or prevent serious damage to health. 
In relation to medical treatment of any kind the best interests of the person are more 
likely to be served by relating consent to the likely consequences of the treatment, rather 
than to the intentions or purposes of those administering treatment. Standard medical 
treatment should be administered where there is a realistic prospect of saving life or 
preventing damage to health. If there is no realistic prospect of saving life, the welfare 
guardian or attorney should be able, in conjunction with the treating clinician, to decide 
whether or not the treatment should proceed. Part of the decision making process depends 
on their knowledge of what the person would have wanted when competent. If a welfare 
guardians or attorney has been given powers to make medical decisions, they should be 
able to consent to, or refuse, any procedure that a competent person could consent to, 
with perhaps some exceptions such as discontinuation of ventilation or artificial hydration 
or nutrition. If consent to the commencement of a procedure was withheld by a welfare 
guardian or attorney, medical personnel would have the option of turning to the Family 
Court of the High Court if there was disagreement about the appropriate course of action. 
Summary 
Sections 18(1) (c) and (f) of the PPPR Act 1988limits the powers of welfare guardians 
and attorneys in relation to medical decision making on behalf of incapacitated adults. 
Welfare guardians and attorneys have the same limitations on their powers, although 
they might have had different relationships with the person. A welfare guardian is 
appointed by the Family Court; an attorney is appointed by the person while they still 
have capacity. 
Welfare guardians and attorneys must act in the person's best interests but there is no 
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checklist of factors to be considered in deciding best interests. 
Medical best interests may not be the same as other kinds of best interests. 
A treatment is in the medical best interests of a person if it saves their life or prevents 
serious damage to their health. 
The PPPR Act does not differentiate between treatments which prolong or sustain life, 
but does not influence the underlying illness, and those which save life and are curative. 
The PPPR Act does not defme standard or experimental medical treatment. 
Standard medical treatment is that which medical practitioners or other healthcare 
professionals deem to be standard. There is a wide variation between regions and 
individuals as to what constitutes standard medical treatment. 
Experimental treatment has been said to be treatment which is not standard, but the Act 
does not clearly state what might be considered a medical experiment, or what kind of 
experiment an incapacitated adult might participate in, other than one which will save 
their life or prevent serious damage to health. 
Welfare guardians and attorneys cannot refuse life saving treatment recommended by 
the treating clinician if it is standard treatment. 
Their consent to the treatment may be desirable but it is not essential, just as the 
consent of the family is desirable but not essential in the decision to withdraw lifesaving 
or life prolonging treatment. 
The opinion of the treating clinician is likely to be decisive in the event that there is a 
dispute over treatment options. 
Welfare guardians and attorneys cannot override such a clinical decision to administer 
treatment, even if there is only a slim chance of a successful outcome, but must turn to the 
courts for a decision to refuse treatment 
In relation to refusal of medical treatment, welfare guardians' and attorneys' powers 
under the PPPR Act are less than the common law powers of medical practitioners. 
The PPPR Act imposes no duties or liabilities on medical practitioners, or others 
delivering care to incapacitated adults. Only welfare guardians have a positive duty to act 
in the person's best interests. Attorneys are expected to act in the person's best interests 
but are not specifically instructed to do so by the Act. 
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When delivering standard medical treatment doctors only need intend it to be 
lifesaving, or prevent serious damage to health, even if they foresee that it will not save 
the person's life or prevent damage to their health. 
The next two chapters of this thesis will examine the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) 
and the Guardianship Act 1987 (New South Wales) and compare their fairly detailed 
provisions in relation to medical treatment, research, and life saving and life prolonging 
treatment, with the provisions of the PPPR Act. Before doing so I now turn to the role of 
welfare guardians and attorneys in refusing treatment. I use cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
(CPR) as my example. When elderly people are admitted to nursing homes they are asked 
if they wish to be resuscitated in the event of cardiac arrest. If the person is not competent 
personal representatives are asked to make a decision regarding CPR. Some managers of 
nursing homes have concerns about the validity of refusal of CPR on behalf of the 
incapacitated elderly, because of the provisions of s.18( 1 )(c) of the PPPR Act, however 
given the circumstances surrounding the administration of CPR in the community, it may 
be permissible for welfare guardians and attorneys to refuse on behalf CPR on behalf of 
an incapacitated older adult. The situation may be different in a hospital. 
CPR and PPPR Act: refusal of resuscitation in the setting of community nursing 
homes. 
Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) is a technique involving chest compressions and 
some form of ventilation administered to a person whose heart has ceased to beat and 
who is not breathing (cardio-respiratory arrest). Medical personnel may also administer 
drugs and electric shocks, and other forms of treatment to the person, depending on the 
reason for the cardiac arrest. In the setting of hospital intensive care and coronary care 
units between 15% and 20% of those who have suffered a cardiac arrest can expect to 
leave hospital and be alive three months later.21 Some may be fully recovered, others may 
suffer neurological damage as a result of the interruption of an adequate supply of oxygen 
to the brain. The reason for this poor success rate even for those who are being constantly 
21 
Kent H. Hospital's DNR guidelines 2 years in the making. Canadian Med Ass Journ 1998; 159;11 
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monitored and who have access to immediate skilled treatment is that not all forms of 
illness leading to cardiac arrest are amenable to treatment. A person who has suffered a 
cardiac arrhythmia such as ventricular fibrillation, if treated promptly with a DC electric 
shock, has a much greater ch$1ce of survival than a person whose heart simply ceases to 
function as a result of metabolic disorders, organ failure, haemorrhage or stroke. 22 A 
person who suffers a treatable arrhythmia will only benefit if that treatment (CPR plus 
electric shock and drugs), especially the DC shock, is administered within a few minutes 
of the cardiac arrest. 23 Those who stand the best chance of survival are: 
-Those who suffer a cardiac arrest due to a treatable arrhythmia. 
-Those whose cardiac arrest is witnessed. 
-Those who receive CPR and DC shock in the few minutes following a cardiac arrest. 
- Those who do not have other serious underlying disease. 
(a)Cardiac arrest in the setting of nursing homes and rest homes 
Those who have a cardiac arrest in rest homes and nursing homes, especially those who 
are already suffering from illnesses such as cancer, diabetes, stroke, heart failure and 
Alzheimer's have a very poor prognosis if attempts at resuscitation are made. In one study 
of cardiac arrest and resuscitation attempts in nursing home patients less than 5% 
survived to hospital discharge and many were seriously neurologically impaired?4 No one 
over the age of 80 survived out of hospital cardiac arrest.25 
Age itself is not considered a factor in survival after cardiac arrest, but pre-existing 
illness, the length of time between cardiac arrest and initiation of CPR, and the reason for 
the arrest are all important factors in determining the outcome.26 
In elder care facilities in New Zealand patients are not continuously monitored, and 
22 
Herlitz J, Engdahl J, Svensson 1, Young M, Angquist KA, Romberg S. Can we define patients with no 
chance of survival after out of hospital cardiac arrest? Heart 2004;90( 1 0): 1114-8 
23 
Varon J, Marik PE. Treatment of cardiac arrest with automatic external defibrillation: impact on 
outcomes. Am J Cardiovascular Drugs. 2003;3(4):265-70 
24 
Kerr D. Reappraisal ofDNR orders in long term care institutions. JAMA 1989;261:1582-1583 
25 
Engdahl J, Bang A, Lindquist J, Horlitz J. Factors affecting long and short term prognosis among 1069 
patients with out of hospital cardiac arrest and pulse less electrical activity. Resuscitation 2001; 51 ( 1 ): 17-25 
26 
Herlitz J, Eek M, Engdahl J, Holmberg M, Holmberg S. Factors at resuscitation and outcome among 
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their cardiac arrests may not be witnessed. Very few rest homes and nursing homes have 
resident doctors, and although staff are able to administer CPR, they are unlikely to have 
access to a defibrillator or be able to site intravenous infusions in order to administer 
drugs. They must commence chest compressions and administer oxygen while they wait 
for doctors or ambulances to arrive. Chest compression alone is very unlikely to restore 
function to the heart, and the longer the period of time which elapses between cardiac 
arrest and the administration of drugs and/or DC shocks, the worse the prognosis?7 
Those in elder care facilities who suffer a cardiac arrest have a very small chance of 
being resuscitated because: 
-They have unwitnessed cardiac arrests. 
-Their cardiac arrests may be due to serious underlying disease which is not amenable to 
treatment. 
- They are unlikely to receive adequate treatment even if their cardiac arrest is witnessed. 
(b)Consent, refusal and the PPPRAct 
Those entering an elder care facility and who are competent to do so may request or 
refuse CPR. Some people may have made an advance directive in writing refusing CPR, 
or they may have made their wishes clear to their family members, and in refusing CPR 
family members ate passing on a verbal advance directive. Those who are not competent 
and have attorneys or welfare guardians may or may not have made their wishes known 
while competent. Attorneys and welfare guardians are often asked to sign a form 
requesting or refusing CPR when the person is admitted to a nursing home. If they do not 
refuse, some institutions fall back on a default position of administering CPR to those 
whose hearts have ceased to beat, regardless of the circumstances. Some institutions 
make it clear that they do not normally offer CPR and personal representatives must 
request it. There is some disquiet among nursing home managers about the ability of 
attorneys and welfare guardians to refuse CPR on behalf of the incapacitated elderly, as 
patients suffering out ofhospital cardiac arrest in relation to age. Resuscitation 2003; 58(3):309-17. 
27 
DeMaio VJ, Stiell IG et al. Ontario Prehospital Advanced Life Support (OPALS) Study Group. CPR-
only survivors of out of hospital cardiac arrest: implications for out of hospital care and cardiac arrest 
research methodology. Ann Emerg Med. 2001;37(6):602-8 
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CPR is seen as life saving treatment. There is considerable ignorance among both the 
general public28 and elder care facility staff about the effectiveness of CPR in the 
elderlr9, or even among the general hospital population, with both groups regarding CPR 
as much more effective than it really is. 
Most GPs and geriatricians caring for the elderly in nursing homes, geriatric hospitals, 
and rest homes do not offer CPR as a treatment option. Their intentions are not an issue, 
as CPR cannot be regarded as a standard treatment for cardiac arrest in the setting of rest 
homes and community geriatric hospitals. CPR is not a standard treatment for the 
incapacitated elderly, largely because it is ineffective: it will not save life. Those who do 
survive often suffer profound neurological damage, so it cannot be regarded as a form of 
treatment which will prevent serious damage to a person's health, and it may well worsen 
the person's health. If CPR is offered to the incapacitated elderly in a community setting it 
is perfectly permissible for attorneys and welfare guardians to refuse it on their behalf, as 
it is not a standard treatment. 
28 
Jones GK, Brewer KL, Garrison HG. Public expectations of survival following cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation. Acad Emerg Med 2000;7:48-53 
29 
Ghusn HF,Teasedale TA, Skelly JR. Limiting treatment in nursing homes: knowledge and attitudes of 
nursing home medical directors. J Amer Geriatr Soc. 1995;43:1131-4 
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Chapter 6. 
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 
Table 1 






Directions relating to 
restraint 







Court decision making 
Refusal of lifesaving 
treatment by other proxy 
Appointment of independent 
advocates 
Consent to research by 
proxy decision maker 
Oversight of proxy decision 
makers 




Directions for deciding best 
interests 
Applies to age 16 and over 
Yes 
Statutory protection for carers 
making day to day decisions 
Yes 
Lasting power of attorney 
Yes, if given that power 
by donor 
s.16 order or deputy 
No 
Yes s.35-41 
Yes with some restrictions 
Yes, Public Guardian 




Applies to age 20 and over 
No specific directions 
Least restrictive intervention 
No statutory protection; 
common law protection 
No 
Enduring Power of Attorney 
No power to refuse 
s.1 0 personal order 
or welfare guardian 
No 
No. Counsel appointed 
No with some exceptions 
No Public Guardian. 
Review by Family Court 




The Mental Capacity Act 
The recent Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2005, which applies to England and Wales, 
deals with the protection of incapacitated adults in those countries. Although the Act 
received Royal assent in 2005 it will not come into force until 2007. There are some 
similarities to the PPPR Act 1988, but its scope is wider. This chapter compares some of 
the welfare provisions of the MCA with the PPPR Act, with particular emphasis on the 
provisions relating to refusal of treatment, and consent to experimental treatment. Table 1 
summarises the welfare provisions in the MCA and compares them with the PPPR Act. 
(I) Administration of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
The MCA will be administered by the Court of Protection, which will deal with both 
property and welfare matters. The Court will have the power to make declarations of 
capacity; declarations regarding the lawfulness of an act or proposed act in relation to 
personal welfare or property; to make orders for treatment or residence; to appoint 
deputies to make decisions on behalf of incapacitated adults, and to define their powers; 
and to make decisions concerning Lasting Powers of Attorney (LP As). The Court will be 
able to make decisions and declarations in relation to serious healthcare matters which 
were formerly made by the High Court. These include decisions about withdrawing or 
withholding artificial hydration and nutrition from those in persistent vegetative state, non 
therapeutic sterilisation operations, and: 
"in any case where there is doubt or dispute about whether a particular 
treatment will be in the patient's best interests, the Court of Protection will 
have jurisdiction to resolve that doubt or dispute." 1 
The guiding principles of the MCA are described in s.1 of the Act and include a 
rebuttable presumption of capacity;2 a commitment to the autonomy of the individua1;3 
1 
Mental Capacity Bill draft Code ofPractice. Sept 2004. p 47. www.dca.gov.uklmenincap/legis.htm 
accessed June 2nd 2006 
2 
Section 1(2) MCA 2005 
3 
Section 1 (3) MCA 2005. A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all practicable 
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the primacy of the best interests of the incapacitated adult;4 and the importance of the 
least restrictive intervention. 5 In these respects it is similar to the PPPR Act, but it lists 
some of the matters which must be taken into consideration in deciding best interests, and 
gives a statutory framework to the common law doctrines of necessity and emergency 
which govern day to day medical, and other, decision making on behalf of incapacitated 
adults. 
(2) Best Interests 
Ideas about the best interests of an incapacitated adult are derived from the common 
law, and the MCA builds on these ideas and gives them statutory form, unlike the PPPR 
Act which requires welfare guardians and attorneys to act in the best interests of the 
person, but does not further discuss best interests. It is difficult to formulate a single "best 
interests" test which would be applicable to every circumstance, and the Act does not 
attempt to do that. Section 4 of the Act provides a list of factors which must be 
considered when making a decision about the person's best interests. According to 
explanatory notes accompanying the Act, no factor listed is more or less important than 
any other factor, 6 which may result in confusion on the part of the person making the 
decision. The person who is making the decision may, however, give some factors more 
weight than others. The person's known views on the subject of resuscitation (refusal), for 
example, would normally be given more weight than the views of medical professionals 
treating him, if he had made those views known. This section of the Act asks the decision 
maker to consider both the known views of the person, 7 and those caring for him, 8 which 
would presumably include those providing medical treatment, as to what would be in the 
person's best interests. The Act itself does not explicitly say that all factors are equally 
steps to help him to do so have been taken without success, and: 
Section 1(4) MCA 2005. A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he 
makes an unwise decision. 
4 
Section 1(5) MCA 2005 
5 
Section 1(6) MCA 2005 
6 
Explanatory notes to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 .28. www.opsi.gov.uklactslen200512005en09.htm 
accessed June 2nd 2006 
7 
Section 4(6) MCA 2005 
8 Section 4(7) MCA 2005 
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important, only that the decision maker should consider them. The person's own wishes, 
if they were known, would often be of greater importance in making a decision than the 
desires of those caring for them. Decisions made by the courts on behalf of incapacitated 
adults stress the importance of the views held by the person when they had capacity,9 and 
the affront offered to their dignity and integrity by imposing medical treatment that they 
would have refused if they had capacity.10 The principles enunciated in s.l uphold the 
right of a competent person to make an (apparently) unwise decision, which includes an 
advance directive refusing treatment for some conditions. In assessing best interests it is 
desirable to consult with others who know the person, and ascertain the beliefs and 
wishes of the person when they had capacity, but it is undesirable to give each factor the 
same weight, as part of the decision making process involves giving greater weight to 
some factors than others in order to make a decision. 
Section 4 opens with factors which a person making a decision on behalf of another 
adult must not use as a basis for decision making. They are the person's age or 
appearance, 11 or a condition, or an aspect of their behaviour which might lead to 
unjustified assumptions about what might be in their best interests. 12 The explanatory 
notes suggest that the presence of a disability should not lead to an assumption that the 
disability precludes the person from enjoying a good quality of life, and that they should 
not receive treatment because of this. 13 The person who is making a decision in relation 
to life sustaining treatment must, if making a decision in the best interests of the person, 
"not be motivated by a desire to bring about his death" 14 because a desire to bring about 
the death of the person is unlikely to be in their best interests, and reflects the desires of 
the person making the decision, not the best interests of the person.15 A desire to act in 
the best interests of the person by preventing further suffering inflicted by futile medical 
9 Re G [1996] NZFLR 362 
10 
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] All ER 821 
11 
Section 4(1)(a) MCA 2005 
12 
Section 4(1 )(b) MCA 2005 
13 
Explanatory notes to the Mental Capacity Act 2005. www.opsi.gov.uklactslen2005/2005en09.htm 
14 
Section 4(5) MCA 2005 
15 
Explanatory notes to the Mental Capacity Act 2005. www.opsi.gov.uk/actslen2005/2005en09.htm 
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treatment would, under some circumstances, be entirely appropriate. This motivation 
plays an important part in the decision to refuse medical treatment and will be discussed 
later on in the chapter. 
The person making a decision should "consider all the relevant circumstances ... " 
Section 4(3) encourages the decision maker to consider whether or not the person will 
regain capacity, 16 and when that will beY It may be in the best interests of the person not 
to make a decision on their behalf if there is a reasonable prospect of their recovering 
capacity in the near future, and being able to make a decision for themselves. 
Like the PPPR Act, 18 the MCA directs those making decisions on behalf of others to 
encourage the participation of the person in decision making, 19 if that is possible, and to 
consult with others interested in the welfare of the person, including donees of lasting 
powers of attorney, and court appointed deputies. 20 
(3) Emergency, necessity, day to day care, and restraint 
(a) Emergency 
In an emergency, medical treatment may be administered without the consent of the 
incapacitated person or their personal representatives, if the treatment is intended to save 
the person's life or prevent damage to their health. Failure to provide such treatment on 
the part of a doctor could be both a crime and a tort. Emergency treatment could include 
the administration of drugs, surgery, or artificial ventilation. 
(b) Necessity and day to day care. 
The common law doctrine of necessity is often invoked to protect those caring for 
incapacitated adults from liability for acts done in the course of their duties, and to ensure 
that incapacitated adults receive the help or treatment required for their continued well 
being. The help or treatment given must be properly performed and appropriate under the 
16 
Section 4(3)(a) MCA 2005 
17 
Section 4(3)(b) MCA 2005 
18 
Section 18(3) and s.l8(4) ofthe PPPRAct 
19
section 4(4) MCA 2005 
20 
Section 4(7) MCA 2005 
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circumstances. In both the UK and New Zealand day to day care of the incapacitated is 
administered by family members, carers, nurses, doctors, and dentists because it is 
necessary and no specific consent from the courts or another person is sought, or required. 
In New Zealand welfare guardians and attorneys, or the courts, may consent to specific 
forms of treatment, or consent to the person being admitted to a hospital or rest home 
where day to day cares may be administered. In England and Wales the MCA attempts to 
provide a statutory basis for all these activities. 
Section 5 concerning Acts in connection with care or treatment provides protection for 
carers from criminal or civil liability for acts done in connection with the care of 
incapacitated adults. The person ("D") providing care and treatment for an incapacitated 
adult ("P") must first take "reasonable steps" to ensure that that person lacks capacity in 
relation to the matter in question. If, when doing the act or providing the care D 
"reasonably believes" that P lacks capacity and "that it will be in P's best interests for the 
act to be done" then he or she will not incur any liability. 
Detailed guidelines in relation to this section of the Act are being prepared, but are not 
yet available. There is no definition of "reasonable steps" and "reasonably believes" and 
only the explanatory notes guiding best interests. Many forms of care and treatment could 
be regarded as actions which are convenient for the carers rather than in the best interests 
of those receiving care. These could include rigid schedules for washing, dressing, meals; 
or the administration of sedatives to patients who are perceived as "wanderers", rather 
than the allocation of appropriate numbers of trained carers, and there have been some 
concerns that this part of the Act will give more protection to carers than to the 
incapacitated adults they care for. 
Section 5( 4) does not affect the operation of advance decisions to refuse treatment, as a 
valid advance directive takes priority over the rules in s.5. 
(c) Restraint 
Section 6 deals with limitations on the powers conferred by s.5, and deals with 
restraint, which must be both necessary to prevent harm to the person, 21 and proportionate 
21 
Section 6(2) MCA 2005 
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to the seriousness of the harm and the likelihood that the person would suffer harm in the 
absence of the restraint?2 Many of those caring for the mentally incapacitated, but 
physically mobile, may have to restrain them from walking across a stream of traffic on a 
busy road; or from burning themselves while attempting to cook. The response to these, 
and similar situations, is to restrain the person because it is necessary to do so if they are 
not to suffer harm. The restraint should be proportionate to the harm, for example pulling 
the person's hand away from a flame, or taking their arm and preventing them from 
crossing the road until it is safe to do so. Of more concern is the deprivation of freedom 
associated with restraints such as the admission to locked dementia units or wards. 
In New Zealand elderly people suffering from dementia may be placed in locked units 
because if they are allowed to leave unsupervised they will be unable to care for 
themselves and may suffer harm. The majority of these people are not under s.l 0 personal 
orders and have no welfare guardian or attorney to consent to their restraint, but carers, 
family members and medical and nursing staff can argue that it is necessary to ensure 
their well being. They are mostly compliant with the care offered but are unable to 
consent to it. There is another body of people, originally admitted to nursing homes under 
s.l 0 personal orders, who remain in the institution after the expiry of the order, because 
they have become compliant, possibly having no clear memory of any other way of life. 
The extent to which the concept of necessity applies in the absence of a clear legal 
authority for the prolonged restraint of an incapacitated adult in an institution has not 
been discussed in the courts in New Zealand. Various institutions, such as the Kimberley 
Centre, caring for the intellectually disabled, have tried to avoid this situation by 
promoting applications for welfare guardianship for most of their patients. 23 The situation 
is far less clear cut in the numerous nursing homes and geriatric hospitals in New 
Zealand, some of which are owned by large organisations such as Presbyterian Support, 
or private individuals and companies of varying sizes. 
In England this situation came before the courts before the inception of the Mental 
Capacity Act, and was eventually decided in the European Court of Human Rights 
22 
Section 6(3)(a) and (b) MCA 2005 
23 
See In the matter of A G Wand B [1996] NZFLR 840 
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(ECHR). The case of HL v United Kingdom (Bournewood)24 was the culmination of a 
series of hearings concerning the informal detention of a young man with autism in a 
psychiatric unit. No application was made under mental health legislation for his 
detention or treatment on the grounds that his detention was necessary and he was 
compliant with the treatment. He was unable to give consent due to his disability, and 
could not leave the unit. In the House of Lords it was held that he had not been detained, 
and that in any event his detention was lawful under the common law doctrine of 
necessity because it was in his best interests. The European Court of Human Rights held 
that he had been deprived of his liberty and that the detention was unlawful under Article 
5(1) ofthe European Human Rights Convention which says that: 
"Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No-one shall be 
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with 
procedure prescribed by law .... 
5(1 )(e) lawful detention of persons for the prevention of spreading of 
infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics, drug addicts, or 
vagrants." 
The ECHR held that the common law did not adequately protect him from arbitrary or 
mistaken detention, and there were insufficient remedies available to his carers (habeas 
corpus or judicial review) when they attempted to obtain his release. He should have been 
guaranteed the right to a hearing by a court with jurisdiction to decide whether or not he 
was of unsound mind. 
Following Bournewood the Mental Capacity Bill was amended and s.6, which deals 
with,··limitations on the ability to restrain the person, says: 
"But D does more than merely restrain P if he deprives him of his liberty 
within the meaning of article 5(1) of the Human Rights Convention ... " 
This means that, except in an emergency, incapacitated adults cannot be removed to a 
hospital or nursing home, and prevented from leaving, unless appropriate legislation, such 
as the Mental Capacity Act or the Mental Health Act, has been complied with. The Court 
of Protection will have jurisdiction to decide whether or not the person has capacity, and 
24 
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to issue appropriate declarations or orders if the Mental Capacity Act is used. Donees of a 
lasting power of attorney, and deputies, are subject to the restrictions on restraint in the 
same way as other carers are. As an extra safeguard, those about to be admitted to a 
nursing home or hospital, or who require serious medical treatment such as major 
surgery, must have an independent mental capacity advocate appointed for them,25 if they 
have not nominated another person to be consulted about their best interests, including 
the donee of a lasting power of attorney, or a deputy has not been appointed by the courts. 
The advocate cannot consent to treatment, or placement, but must represent the patient 
and their best interests, and may challenge treatment decisions. 
(4) Advance decisions, lasting powers of attorney, and deputies 
The MCA, unlike the PPPR Act, specifically provides for the creation of an advance 
directive refusing medical treatment;26 and like the PPPR Act allows the appointment of 
attorneys,27 and deputies,28 who are similar to welfare guardians. 
(a) Advance Decision 
In Britain the ability to refuse some forms of treatment in advance is called an advance 
decision. In New Zealand and the US, the phrase used is "advance directive" which 
suggests that the person's decision has some effect on those treating them. It suggests a 
much more active role in deciding appropriate treatment, than the more passive decision 
to refuse it. 
A patient may make an advance decision refusing treatment which is offered, but may 
not demand that treatment be administered. This is in accordance with the Court of 
Appeal's ruling in Burke29 which struck down the original ruling that it was possible to 
make an advance directive demanding a certain treatment: 
25 
Sections 35-41 MCA 2005 
26 
Section 24 - 26 MCA 2005 
27 
Section 9- 14 MCA 2005 
28 
Section 16, s.19 and s.20 MCA 
29 
R (Burke) v GMC [2005] Lloyds Rep Med 403-422 
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Section 24(1) "Advance decision" means a decision made by a person (P) 
after he has reached the age of 18 and when he has the capacity to do so, that 
if-
(a) at a later time and in such circumstances as he may specify, a specified 
treatment is proposed to be carried out or continued by a person providing 
health care for him, and 
(b) at that time he lacks capacity to consent to the carrying out or 
continuation of the treatment, the specified treatment is not to be carried out 
or continued 
If there is doubt about the existence, validity, or applicability of an advance decision 
concerning life sustaining treatment, healthcare professionals can administer the 
treatment until a ruling is obtained from the court.30 The decision to refuse life sustaining 
treatment must be written, signed and witnessed, and must contain a statement to the 
effect that the refusal of treatment applies even if life is at risk.31 Those making decisions 
on behalf of an incapacitated adult must respect an advance decision if it is valid and 
applicable to the circumstances. Donees of lasting powers of attorney cannot make 
decisions inconsistent with the terms of an advance decision. 32 
(b) Lasting powers of attorney 
A competent adult can donate lasting powers of attorney to one or more people in 
relation to both welfare and property under the MCA. The donees must be adults and, in 
the case of those dealing with property, not bankrupt. These requirements are similar to 
the requirements in Part IX of the PPPR Act, but in New Zealand the donee must be 20 
years old or more, and in England the donee must be 18 years old or more. In New 
Zealand under the PPPR Act it is not normally possible to appoint more than one person 
to act in relation to personal care and welfare, but the MCA allows the appointment of 
more than one person. Unlike the PPPR Act the MCA allows the revocation of a lasting 
power of attorney if a marriage or civil union between donor and donee is dissolved, 
30 
Section 26(5) MCA 2005 
31 
Section 25(5) and (6) MCA 2005 
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unless the donor specifies otherwise. There is no specific statement that powers are 
revoked if the donee becomes incapable of acting:33 for example, if he or she loses 
capacity due to mental illness. The Court of Protection has powers to give directions, and 
if necessary revoke the powers of donees who do not act in the person's best interests. 34 
(c) Deputies 
A deputy is a person appointed by the Court of Protection and given some powers to 
make welfare and/or property decisions on behalf the person.35 In making an order or 
appointing a deputy the Court must act in the person's best interests and observe the other 
principles described in s.l of the M CA. It is preferable for the court to make a decision, 
rather than appoint a deputy,36 but if it is in the best interest of the person to appoint a 
deputy the powers conferred on the deputy should be as limited in scope and duration as 
is practicable:37 the least restrictive intervention should be preferred. The deputy can 
consent or refuse treatment or continuation of healthcare treatment, 38 but cannot refuse 
consent to life sustaining treatment,39 or make a decision which is inconsistent with a 
decision made by a donee of a lasting power of attorney. If the donee has made a decision 
to refuse life sustaining treatment, and has been given that power, then a deputy cannot 
consent to the treatment. Cases involving some dispute about the appropriateness of 
treatment can be referred back to the Court of Protection. 
(5) Life sustaining treatment 
The MCA uses the term "life sustaining" treatment rather than the term "standard 
medical treatment intended to save that person's life"40 used in New Zealand, and defines 
life sustaining treatment as " ... treatment which in the view of the person providing health 
32 
Section 11(7)(b) MCA 2005 
33 Section 1 06(1 )(d) PPPR Act 1988 
34 
Section 22(3) and (4) MCA 2005 
35 
Section 16 MCA 2005 
36 
Section 16(4)(a) MCA 2005 
37 Section 16(4)(b) MCA 2005 
38 Section 17(1 )(d) MCA 2005 
39 Section 20(5) MCA 2005 
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care for the person concerned is necessary to sustain life. ,rf.J 
Both the MCA and the PPPR Act allow the treating clinician to decide if the treatment 
qualifies as life sustaining or lifesaving. The PPPR Act refers to treatment intended to 
save life, while the MCA refers to treatment which "in the view" of the clinician is 
"necessary to sustain life". The clinician must have formed the opinion that the treatment 
is required, and will presumably have some basis for that opinion. Only the person 
administering the treatment can decide whether it qualifies as life sustaining treatment. If 
there is doubt, presumably the Court of Protection would have to be consulted. Deputies 
cannot require the treating clinician to step aside in favour of another one, but the Court 
of Protection does have that power. The Act does not comment on the range of opinions 
which exist within the medical profession as to the meaning of "treatment necessary to 
sustain life". 
Treatment which will sustain life and treatment which will save life may be identical in 
many respects, but some treatment to some people may not save life, because they will 
eventually die of their illness, but it may sustain or prolong life for a variable period of 
time. The patient in a persistent vegetative state will not be saved by the administration of 
artificial hydration and nutrition: they will still be in a persistent vegetative state and as a 
result will die of infection or organ failure at some stage, but the artificial hydration and 
nutrition sustain life. A patient who is unconscious and dying of blood loss may be saved 
by transfusion which sustains life, and surgery to stop the bleeding, which saves life. 
The decision to withdraw life sustaining, or life prolonging treatments from those in a 
persistent vegetative state is, in the UK, usually one for a court to make, and the MCA 
reflects this, but other patients who are not so severely disabled have their treatment 
needs decided by those caring for them, including when to withdraw or withhold 
treatment such as ventilation, dialysis, artificial hydration and nutrition, and antibiotics. 
In the MCA only life sustaining treatment is considered, not treatment which may 
prevent serious damage to health. Refusal of treatment which may prevent damage to 
health would not usually be in the best interests of the person, but some treatments, such 
40 
Section 18(1 )(c) PPPR Act 
41 
Section(4)(10) MCA 2005 
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as some forms of radiotherapy or chemotherapy, might be so unpleasant that their ability 
to prevent further deterioration of a cancer would be secondary to their detrimental effect 
on the person's quality of life. Refusal of these treatments could be justified, and there is 
nothing in the MCA which would prevent a deputy or donee refusing them. 
Summary 
The MCA differs from s.l8 of the PPPR Act in that it allows donees of lasting powers 
of attorney to refuse life sustaining treatment if they have been given that power, but does 
not allow deputies to do so. Decisions to refuse some forms of life sustaining treatment 
(artificial hydration and nutrition for those in PVS)42 must be referred to the Court of 
Protection, even if the treating clinicians are in agreement. The MCA leaves a decision as 
to what constitutes life sustaining treatment in the hands of the treating clinicians, who 
already have both a common law, and a statutory duty43 to act in the patient's best 
interests. 
(6) Research· 
Unlike the PPPR Act which uses the phrase "medical experiment", the MCA refers to 
research and devotes sections 30 to 34 to research involving incapacitated adults. The Act 
relates to restrictions on intrusive research, which is research for which consent would 
normally be required. 44 It does not restrict research involving review of notes or results or 
anonymised medical data or tissue samples obtained in the course of medical treatment. 
The MCA acknowledges that the "interests of the person must be assumed to outweigh 
those of science and society",45 but instead of making this statement at the beginning of 
the sections on research, buries it in the middle. 
The MCA limits research carried out on those who lack capacity to research which has 
been approved by a Research Ethics Committee which has been designated by the 
Secretary of State as being a body which is able to give approval. Such a body can only 
42 
AiredaleNHSTrustvBland[1993] 1 AIIER821 
43 
Section 5(1 )(b )(ii) MCA 2005 
44 
Section 30(2)MCA 2005 
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give approval if the research is connected with a condition which is impairing the person, 
or its treatment.46 This limits research to studies on dementia, brain injury or other 
physical and mental disorders which lead to the person's incapacity. It would not be 
appropriate to authorise research into diabetes, for example, because there are already 
numbers of diabetics in the community who have the capacity to give consent to research 
into their condition. The Committee must also have reasonable grounds for believing that 
the research cannot be carried out on persons who have capacity, or that it would not be 
so effective if it were confined to those who had capacity.47 The risk to the person 
participating in the research should not be disproportionately greater than the possible 
benefits to him or her, or the research, while imposing negligible risks on the person, 
must be intended to ''provide knowledge of the causes or treatment of or of the care of 
persons affected by, the same or a similar condition. "48 In addition the research must not 
be unduly invasive or restrictive, and there must be reasonable arrangements in place for 
consultation with those caring for the person, and interested in their welfare. This may 
include deputies or donees of lasting powers of attorney or a person, but should not 
include paid carers.49 The researcher, if they cannot identify such a person, must (with 
guidance from an Ethics Committee) nominate a person who is prepared to be consulted, 
but has no connection with the project. 5° The researcher must inform that person of the 
purposes of his or her research,51 and ask for advice as to whether the incapacitated adult 
should take part in the project, and what their wishes would have been if they had 
capacity. 52 Those acting on behalf of the incapacitated person can decline entry to the 
trial, or request that the person be withdrawn at any time. 53 If they are receiving some 
form of treatment which benefits them, the person may continue with the treatment 
45 
Section 33(3) MCA 2005 
46 
Section 31(2) MCA 2005 
47 
Section 31(4) MCA 2005 
48 
Section 31(5) and (6) MCA 2005 
49 
Section 32 (2) MCA 2005 
50 
Section 32(3) MCA 2005 
51 
Section 32(4) MCA 2005 
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Section 32(4) MCA 2005 
53 
Section 32(5) MCA 2005 
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outside the trial, 54 even after the trial has ended. 55 The continued access to treatment is 
dependant on the researchers' perceptions of benefit to the person, not those caring for 
him or her. If the interests of the person truly did outweigh the interests of science or 
society, it would be more appropriate for the decision to continue treatment to lie with the 
person's carers and doctors, rather than with those doing the research, who are employed 
by those paying for the treatment. 
The ability to nominate a person to make the decision could be open to abuse, as there 
appears nothing in the Act to prevent the researcher nominating a person who has no 
particular knowledge of, or interest in, the incapacitated adult. Guidelines for researchers 
have not yet been issued, but it would seem more appropriate to exclude a person from 
research if he or she neither has the capacity to consent, nor has a relative, friend, attorney 
or deputy to consent on his behalf. 
The Act recognises that some research, such as that carried out in relation to head 
injury or stroke, may be carried out in emergency situations where there is no time to 
identify a person with whom the researcher may consult. Researchers may proceed if they 
have the agreement of a doctor who is not involved in the project, for example the 
Emergency Room physician treating the patient. 56 If the doctor, whose primary duty is to 
the patient, does not agree then the researcher cannot proceed. Examples of research 
under these conditions may include measurements of blood pressure, or blood sampling 
to detect the presence of metabolites produced by the particular condition. 
The person cannot be subjected to research if they have made an advance decision, 
while competent, not to participate, or they had made some other statement refusing to 
participate in research, or if they appeared to object to the treatment received. 57 The 
recognition that even those who lack capacity are able to object to treatment they find 
unpleasant is also found in the Guardianship Act of New South Wales, but not in the 
PPPRAct. 
In order to protect a person who loses capacity during the course of research project, 
54 
Section 32(6) MCA 2005 
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56 
Section 32 (8) and (9) MCA 2005 
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the MCA allows the person conducting the research to "take such steps as may be 
prescribed for the purpose of protecting him. "58 These steps are to be prescribed by 
regulations which have not yet been published. The onus is on the researcher to take steps 
to protect the person, although researchers may find themselves facing a conflict of 
interests when faced with a subject who loses capacity during a trial, and may be tempted 
to continue to use the person in their trial without regard for his or her best interests. 
Regulations may force the researcher to stop the trial on that person, unless there are 
compelling reasons for continuation, and negligible risk to the person. Regulations should 
also impose a duty on the medical attendants of the person to inform researchers when the 
person loses capacity. 
The MCA allows limited research of a less intrusive nature on those who lack capacity, 
and attempts to set out procedures for their protection. It allows consent to some research 
by proxy decision makers, so long as the person is able to benefit, and suffers negligible 
harm during the course of the research. It also prevents researchers withdrawing 
beneficial treatment from the person, either at the end of the trial, or after withdrawal 
from the trial. The imposition of responsibilities on researchers is absent from the PPPR 
Act which deals solely with the ability (or inability) to consent to experimental treatment 
on behalf of incapacitated adults. The MCA is an attempt to allow incapacitated adults to 
benefit from research while attempting to protect them from exploitation and harm. The 
PPPR Act attempts to prevent incapacitated adults from harm by restricting consent by 
welfare guardians and attorneys to experimental treatment to treatment which will save 
their lives or prevent damage to their health, without discussion of risks and benefits. 
(7)Summary 
The MCA 2005 is an Act to protect incapacitated adults in England and Wales. It has a 
number of features in common with the PPPR Act, and a number of unique features, 
particularly regarding day to day care, restraint, best interests, and research. 
The MCA is administered by a special court, the Court of Protection, which deals only 
with questions relating to incapacitated adults, like the New South Wales Guardianship 
58 
Section 34(2)( c) MCA 2005 
129 
Tribunal, and unlike the Family Court in New Zealand. 
The MCA describes factors which should and should not be taken into consideration 
when deciding best interests. 
The MCA provides statutory guidance and protection for carers administering 
treatment under the common law doctrine of necessity to incapacitated adults, a provision 
absent from the PPPR Act. 
The MCA has specific guidance in relation to the restraint of incapacitated adults, 
especially in relation to their detention on locked wards or units, removing the common 
law defence of necessity for prolonged restraint or detention. 
The MCA provides, in statutory form, the common law right to make an advance 
decision regarding the refusal of medical treatment, unlike the PPPR Act which does not 
contain any provisions for advance treatment decisions or directives. 
Like the PPPR Act the MCA allows the donation of lasting powers of attorney while 
the person has capacity. The donor can confer upon the donee the power to refuse life 
sustaining medical treatment, a power which cannot be conferred on the donee of an 
enduring power of attorney in New Zealand. 
The Court of Protection may appoint a deputy who has similar powers to a welfare 
guardian in New Zealand. Like a welfare guardian, the deputy cannot refuse consent for 
life sustaining treatment, and the scope of a deputy's powers, are generally more limited 
than an attorney's. 
The MCA recognises and upholds the power of the treating clinician to decide the 
medical best interests of the patient as does the PPPR Act. 
The MCA contains specific provisions for the enrolment of incapacitated adults in 
research projects. They are: 
(i) The provisions relate only to intrusive research which would normally require 
consent. 
(ii) The only research which can be carried out is research into conditions which cause the 
person to be impaired, and cannot be carried out with people who have capacity. 
(iii) The research must be approved by an Ethics Committee, and the person must suffer 
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negligible risk ofharm. 
(iv) Even if the Ethics Committee gives its approval there must be consultation with those 
acting on behalf of the person, and they must consent. 
(v) If the patient has benefited from the treatment they must continue to have access to it 
after the trial has ended. 
The MCA has a provision for the appointment of a Public Guardian to oversee the 
activities of proxy decision makers and to act on behalf of incapacitated adults who have 
no other person to advocate for them. 
The MCA recognises certain common law principles such as best interests and 
necessity and gives them statutory form, while limiting their application in relation to 
restraint and detention in order to confer greater protection on incapacitated adults. The 
Act upholds doctors' rights to decide medical best interests, but, in relation to refusal of 
treatment the patient has a statutory right to make an advance decision to refuse, or can 
donate a lasting power of attorney to another person who can then refuse treatment on 
their behalf. The MCA recognises that incapacitated adults may benefit from participation 
in research, but that the well being of the person is paramount. Only research approved by 
an Ethics Committee, concerning a small number of conditions, which is not harmful to 
the person, can be undertaken if appropriate consent is sought. 
The PPPR Act could be improved by the addition of provisions allowing the person to 
make an advance directive regarding medical treatment, allowing those who have been 
appointed to do so to refuse medical treatment, and allowing incapacitated adults to 
participate in some clearly defmed types of research. The appointment of a Public 
Guardian, to advocate on behalf of incapacitated adults, would also be helpful. 
The provisions regarding research and the protection of incapacitated adults in the New 
South Wales Guardianship Act 1987 may also be of interest, and I now turn to them. 
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Table2 





Appointed for person 
Medical treatment 











Plenary, limited, temporary 
or Public Guardian 
Major, minor, special, special 
experimental, clinical trials 
Tribunal, guardians, persons 
responsible 
All kinds require Tribunal approval 
Yes if approved ; 
some require tribunal consent 
None required in emergency 
Consent required otherwise 
Yes 
PPPRAct 
Persons lacking capacity 
Family Court 
Enduring power of attorney 
Welfare Guardian 
Standard and experimental 
treatment 
Family Court, welfare 
guardians and attorneys 
No categories specified. 
No with some exceptions 
Not specified 
No refusal by proxies 
Yes, for WGs and attorneys 
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Chapter 7 
The New South Wales Guardianship Act 1987 
The Guardianship Act 1987 is an Act to protect people with disabilities in New South 
Wales who are aged 16 years or over. Like its counterparts in England and New Zealand 
it contains provisions relating to both the welfare and property interests of people with 
disabilities, but it is administered by a tribunal, rather than the Family Court. Like the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005, but unlike the PPPR Act 1988, the Guardianship Act and its 
associated regulations contains detailed sections relating to medical treatment. It contains 
a definition of medical treatment, and divides medical treatment into major, minor, and 
special treatment, detailing the categories of persons who may consent to each category. It 
refers to "clinical trials" rather than research or experimental treatment, but recognises 
categories of experimental and novel treatments. Unlike the PPPR Act it does not refer to 
refusal of consent, but lists categories of people who may consent to medical treatment on 
behalf of an incapacitated adult, describes penalties for those who administer treatment 
without consent, and lists the circumstances where no consent for medical treatment is 
required. 
The first part of this section deals briefly with the objectives and administration of the 
Act. The second part deals with the sections of the Act and its associated regulations 
dealing with medical treatment, whether standard or not, and compares it with the PPPR 
Act and the Mental Capacity Act. 
1. Objectives and administration. 
The Guardianship Act is administered by a Tribunal with the right of appeal to the 
Supreme Court. The Tribunal deals solely with matters relating to the well being of 
people with disabilities, and matters such as divorce and the care of children are dealt 
with elsewhere. In New Zealand the PPPR Act is administered by the Family Court which 
deals with a variety of issues, including divorce and the care of children. 
The Guardianship Act, like the PPPR Act, allows competent adults to nominate 
another person as a proxy decision maker in the event of their incapacity. Those 
nominated to make welfare decisions, including medical decisions, are called Enduring 
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Guardians. 1 
There is no checklist of best interests like that found in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, 
but s.4 lists the general principles which those exercising functions under the Act should 
observe. Both the Tribunal and persons appointed are required to observe these principles 
when dealing with people with disabilities. They are: 
s.4(a) the welfare and interests of such persons should be given paramount 
consideration, 
s.4(b) the freedom of decision and freedom of action of such persons should 
be given as little restriction as possible, 
s.4( c) such persons should be encouraged, as far as possible, to live a normal 
life in the community, 
s.4( d) the views of such persons in relation to the exercise of those functions 
should be taken into consideration 
s.4( e) the importance of preserving the family relationships and the cultural 
and linguistic environments of such persons should be recognised, 
s.4(f) such persons should be encouraged, as far as possible, to be self reliant 
in matters relating to their personal, domestic and financial affairs, 
s.4(g) such persons should be protected from neglect, abuse and exploitation, 
s.4(h) the community should be encouraged to apply and promote these 
principles. 
Some of these principles are contained in s.l8 of the PPPR Act but the specific 
requirements to recognise the importance of family relationships and cultural and 
linguistic environments are not mentioned, and neither is the duty to protect the person 
from neglect, abuse and exploitation, though it is contained in the more general duty to 
promote and protect the welfare and best interests of the person. The Guardianship Act 
1987 requires both the Tribunal and others exercising powers under the Act to encourage 
others who have no powers under the Act ("the community") to apply and promote the 
principles, a duty not imposed on the Family Court or welfare guardians or attorneys 
1 
Appointed under Part 2 s.5-s.6N of the Guardianship Act 1987 
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under the PPPR Act in New Zealand. 
(a) Those to whom the Guardianship Act applies 
In s.3(2) the Guardianship Act 1987 refers to people over the age of 16 with disabilities 
severe enough to restrict one or more of their "major life activities to such an extent that 
he or she requires supervision or social habilitation". This recognition that a disability 
does not necessarily mean that the person is rendered completely unable to make their 
own decisions or express an opinion is reflected in other parts of the Act, for instance, the 
principles in s.4. Guardianship can be tailored to the needs of the individual, so that 
someone who did not have the capacity to make decisions concerning a particular area of 
their life could have a limited guardian appointed to help them with that particular issue. 
Like the Guardianship Act, the PPPR Act allows the Family Court to appoint a guardian 
with limited or temporary decision making powers. 
Guardianship applies to welfare and lifestyle matters, including medical decision 
making, and if there is no suitable person available, the Public Guardian may be 
appointed. 
(b) Those who can make decisions on behalf of an adult with disabilities 
Those who can make medical decisions on behalf of people with disabilities include, in 
descending order: 
The Tribunal (and the Supreme Court, if applicable). 
Enduring Guardians, and plenary, temporary, or limited guardians appointed by the 
Tribunal. 
A hierarchy of persons 'responsible for another person' defined in s.33A( 4) who include, 
in descending order: 
-the spouse of the person 
-a person who has the care of the person 
-a close friend of relative of the person. 
These persons are all able to consent to some kinds of medical treatment. Those lower 
down the hierarchy are empowered to make certain decisions so long as no one higher up 
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the hierarchy has the power to make that particular decision. 
The Guardianship Act allows those with a close personal relationship with the person 
some decision making powers in relation to medical and dental treatment if there is no 
guardian of any kind, and if the Tribunal has not made a decision on the person's behalf. 
The person's spouse (or de facto partner) can make some medical decisions so long as the 
spouse is not under guardianship2 (and therefore too disabled to make decisions for 
another person), and so long as the relationship is close and continuing, that is they are 
not estranged or separated. 3 
A person who has the care of the person is someone who: 
(a) provides domestic services and support to the other person, or 
(b) arranges for the person to be provided with services and support,4 
and does not receive any remuneration for their action, either from the person, their 
family, or the state, or any other source. They provide their services freely because of a 
close personal relationship. Those who are cared for in a nursing home or some other 
institution are not, for the purposes of the Act, in the care of a person at that institution 
because of the financial relationship that exists between them. Those who are in hospitals 
or nursing homes remain in the care of the person who had their care before they were 
admitted to the institution. 5 
A close friend or relative means someone who maintains a close personal relationship 
with the person through frequent contact, and who has a personal interest in their welfare, 
but is not receiving payment for any services he or she performs. 6 The President of the 
Tribunal is able to decide if such a relationship exists if there is any doubt. 7 A close friend 
or relative may also be the person who has the care of the person. 
This section of the Guardianship Act recognises, in statutory form, that many people 
making day to day decisions about the well being of incapacitated adults, and giving the 
2 
Section 33A(4)(b)(ii) Guardianship Act 1987 
3 
Section 33A(4)(b)(i) Guardianship Act 1987 
4 
Section 3D Guardianship Act 1987: Circumstances in which a person "has the care of the other person" 
5 
Section 3D(2) Guardianship Act 1987 
6 Section 3E(l) Guardianship Act 1987 
7 
Section 3E(2) Guardianship Act 1987 
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care required, have not been appointed by the courts, but are friends or relations acting 
under the common law. The Act recognises that spouses commonly make welfare 
decisions for each other, and are commonly consulted about medical care of incapacitated 
adults by doctors and nurses. This recognition, and the ability of family members to make 
medical decisions, is absent from the PPPR Act. It means that in New Zealand those who 
have not been appointed by the courts must turn to the High Court or Family Court in the 
event of conflict between carers and family members, while in New South Wales, in the 
absence of a guardian there is a clear hierarchy of people able to make decisions on behalf 
of an incapacitated adult. In the event of conflict there is still an option to turn to the 
Tribunal or the Supreme Court for directions, and for decisions concerning some forms of 
treatment. 
2. Types of treatment and consent 
The objects of Part 5 of the Act, which relate to medical treatment, are to ensure that 
people who cannot consent to medical treatment are not deprived of necessary treatment 
because of their lack of capacity,8 and that any treatment carried out on those who are 
unable to consent is carried out ''for the purpose of promoting and maintaining their 
health and well being. "9 
The Guardianship Act and its regulations define medical and dental treatment and divide 
it into different categories according to the possible impact on the person. Different types 
of proxy decision maker have different powers to consent to treatment. The Tribunal has 
the power to consent to all categories of treatment. The Act does not mention refusal of 
consent, but sets out penalties for those who administer treatment to an incapacitated 
adult without the appropriate consent, 10 and lists circumstances under which no consent is 
required. 
8 
Section 32(a) Guardianship Act 1987 
9 
Section 32(b) Guardianship Act 1987 
10 
Section 35 Guardianship Act 1987 
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(a) No consent required 
Section 3 7 (1) states that medical treatment may be administered without consent if the 
medical practitioner "considers the treatment is necessary, as a matter of urgency" to 
save the patient's life, prevent serious damage to the patient's health, or to prevent the 
patient suffering significant pain or distress. The first two phrases are echoed in the PPPR 
Act, but unlike the PPPR Act the treatment is only permitted without consent if it is 
necessary, as a matter of urgency. This allows the administration of emergency measures 
such as pain relief and emergency surgery, for example fracture reduction, and the 
commencement of measures such as ventilation, pending the appropriate consent. 
Decision making in these extreme circumstances is left to the treating doctor or dentist, 
but their decisions must be justifiable and they are not shielded from liability if their 
decisions are not the same as they would have been if the patient was capable of 
consenting.11 If the matter is not urgent then consent must be sought. Treatment which is 
merely necessary but not urgent can be given with the consent of one of the persons 
responsible, if they are available. If that consent is not given then treatment cannot 
proceed until consent has been obtained. 
(b) When the patient objects 
The Guardianship Act does not discuss refusals of treatment by, or on behalf of the 
patient, but, like the Mental Capacity Act, mentions objections to treatment by the patient. 
A refusal of treatment implies that the patient is competent to consent or refuse consent, 
and the Act would not apply to such persons, but many people who are incapacitated by 
their disabilities object to medical treatment. This may be because they fear being touched 
by strangers, and find procedures such as injections or blood sampling painful and 
intrusive, or may be because they are so severely incapacitated that they cannot 
understand what is being done to them, and react with fear and suspicion. The patient 
objects if "he or she indicates (by whatever means) that he or she does not want the 
11 
Section 37(4) Guardianship Act 1987 
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treatment to be carried out," 12 or has previously indicated under similar circumstances 
that he or she objects to the treatment.13 The Act does not specify the means by which the 
person might have indicated that he or she objected, but a valid written advance directive, 
verbal refusal or objection to the treatment, or a verbal or written instruction to an 
Enduring Guardian or other person responsible for the patient, would all qualify. The 
PPPR Act does not specifically mention objections by the patient, but instructs those 
making decisions on behalf of incapacitated adults to consult with the person if that is 
possible, 14 and to consult others such as family and friends, who are able to advise 
decision makers on welfare matters. As the person may have no, or limited capacity to 
consent, the welfare guardian or attorney, or the Family Court, may validly consent 
despite their objections and medical practitioners administering treatment are protected 
from liability. 
Under the Guardianship Act consent is not valid if it is given when the patient objects 
to the treatment, and the medical practitioner knows that the patient objects.15 The 
medical practitioner, not the person giving consent, is then subject to penalties for 
administering treatment without proper consent. 
In an emergency the Guardianship Act allows treatment to be given to the person 
despite their objections if the treatment is necessary to save life or prevent serious damage 
to health, and in other circumstances the Tribunal may consent to treatment, or empower 
a guardian to consent to treatment/6 or the person's objections may be disregarded if they 
so disabled that they are unable to understand the treatment, and treatment is not 
distressing to them.17 This allows day to day treatment like attention to personal hygiene, 
and administering medication, to proceed, even for those who are most severely impaired, 
without recourse to the courts or proxies for consent. 
12 
Section 33(3)(a) Guardianship Act 1987 
13
section 33(3)(b) Guardianship Act 1987 
14 
Section 18(4)(c) PPPR Act 1988 
15 
Section 46(2)(a) Guardianship Act 1987 
16 
Section 46(3) Guardianship Act 1987 
17 
Section 46(4) Guardianship Act 1987 ... An objection by the patient to the carrying out of proposed 
medical or dental treatment is to be disregarded if: (a) the patient has minimal or no understanding of 
what the treatment entails ... 
139 
The onus for ensuring that consent is valid, and seeking appropriate consent, is on the 
person administering the treatment, and they must ensure not only that proper consent is 
obtained, but also that the treatment is for the purpose of promoting the health and well 
being of the patient. The responsible person, or guardian, cannot validly consent to 
treatment which is not for the purpose of promoting the health and well being of the 
patient, 18 that is, they cannot consent to treatment which is contrary to the patient's best 
interests. 
(c) When consent is required 
If the treatment is not urgent, and would normally require consent, application must be 
made to the Tribunal, guardian, or other person responsible for the patient. 
19 The 
Tribunal can consent to all categories of medical treatment, and can empower guardians 
to consent to the continuation of some kinds of treatment. 
The categories of medical treatment are: 
(i) minor treatment 
(ii) major treatment 
(iii) special treatment 
(iv) experimental special treatment 
(v) clinical trials 
( d)Medical treatment 
Medical treatment is defmed in Section 33(1)(a) as: 
"medical treatment (including any medical or surgical procedure, operation, 
or examination and any prophylactic, palliative or rehabilitative care) 
normally carried out by or under the supervision of a medical practitioner .... 
(c) any other act declared by the regulations to be treatment for the purposes 
ofthis Part. 
18 
Section 46(40(b) Guardianship Act 1987 
19 
Section 42 Guardianship Act 1987 
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Medical treatment does not include non-intrusive examinations such as visual 
examination of the mouth, ears, eye, throat or nose;
20 first aid treatment;21 the 
administration of normal doses of non-prescription drugs which are normally self 
administered;22 and any other form of treatment declared by the regulations as not being 
medical treatment. 23 A patient who is given a placebo during the course of a clinical trial 
is, however, deemed to have received medical treatment.
24 
(i) Minor treatment 
Minor treatment is defined in s.33 as any medical treatment which is not major nor any 
form of special treatment, nor treatment administered in the course of a clinical trial. It 
would include the administration of many forms of medication appropriately used to treat 
a medical condition the person may have, such as insulin for diabetics or 
antihypertensives for people with high blood pressure. Any of the persons responsible for 
the patient, or the Tribunal, can consent to minor treatment.25 If no one is available to 
consent, or the responsible person is unwilling to consent, the doctor or dentist treating 
the person can proceed with minor treatment, but must record in the patient's notes that 
the treatment is necessary and is the form of treatment which is most likely to benefit the 
patient, 26 and that the patient does not object. 27 If the patient is too severely incapacitated 
to understand what is being done, and why, minor treatment can proceed despite their 
objections. 
(ii) Major treatment 
Major medical treatment is defined in the regulations as: some treatments which affect 
20 
Section 33(1)(d) Guardianship Act 1987 
21 
Section 33(l)(e) Guardianship Act 1987 
22 
Section 33(l)(t) Guardianship Act 1987 
23 
Section 33(l)(g) Guardianship Act 1987 
24 
Section 33(l)(c) Guardianship Act 1987 
25 
Section 36(l)(a) Guardianship Act 1987 
26 
Section 37(3)(a) Guardianship Act 1987 
27 
Section 37(3)(b) Guardianship Act 1987 
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female fertility (which will not be discussed here); any treatment involving the use of a 
general anaesthetic and some sedatives, for example most operations, and some drugs 
which affect the central nervous system other than those used to control epilepsy, 
vomiting, allergic reactions, fever, pain, and Parkinson's disease. Major medical treatment 
also includes treatment which involves some risk to the patient,
28 a consideration not 
present in the PPPR Act, which does not differentiate between different forms of standard 
treatment. The risk must be "substantial (that is, a risk that involves more than the mere 
possibility) of 
(i) death, or 
(ii) brain damage, or 
(iii) paralysis, or 
(iv) permanent loss of function of any organ or limb, or 
(v) permanent and disfiguring scarring, or 
(vi) exacerbation of the condition being treated, or 
(vii) an unusually prolonged period of recovery, or 
(viii) a detrimental change of personality, or 
(ix) a high level of pain or stress, and 
(g) any treatment involving testingfor ... HIV'' 
Those who can consent to major treatment are any of the persons responsible for the 
patient, or the Tribunal, but consent to these forms of treatment would normally be 
required. The treating doctor cannot override the decision not to consent by the 
responsible person, although the Tribunal could do so. 
(iii) Special medical treatment 
Special medical treatmenf9 is that which involves: 
-the administration of a drug of addiction (such as morphine or diazepam) for more than 
10 days out of a 30 day period, so long as the drug is not being given as part of a 
treatment regime for a patient with cancer or as palliative care for a terminal illness; 
28 
Part 3, clause 10 of the Guardianship Regulations 2005 
29 
Clause 8 of the Guardianship Regulations 2005 
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- treatments carried out for the purpose of terminating pregnancy or operations to sterilise 
either male or female patients; or 
-treatments involving aversive stimuli. 
Other forms of special treatments defined in s.33A are those which are intended to render 
a person permanently infertile; and those "which have not yet gained the support of a 
substantial number of medical practitioners" (novel treatments), but are not part of a 
clinical trial. This recognises that some successful treatments start with only a few 
proponents, but may still be useful. Because the outcome may be unknown, the Tribunal, 
rather than guardians or other persons responsible for the patient, must make the decision 
to consent to treatment, after hearing the evidence. The Guardianship Act therefore 
recognises novel treatments as a special category of treatment, separate from clinical trials 
and experimental treatment, which require the most careful consideration. 
The Tribunal may consent to a special treatment, or may empower a guardian to 
consent to continuation of that treatment, but other categories of person are not able to 
consent to special treatments. 
(iv) Experimental special medical treatment 
Two categories of experimental medical treatment are recognised in the Regulations, both 
distinct from clinical trials.30 They are: 
-the administration of unusual doses of restricted substances for the purpose of affecting 
the central nervous system of the person, and 
-the use of medical treatment to manipulate levels of male hormone in order to modify the 
person's behaviour (the use of"chemical castration" for example). 
Only the Tribunal can consent to this category of treatment. 
(v) Clinical trials 
A clinical trial means "a trial of drugs or techniques that necessarily involves the 
3° Clause 10 Guardianship Regulation 2005 
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carrying out of medical or dental treatment on the participants in the trial. "
31 
Unlike the PPPR Act the Guardianship Act sets out specific circumstances under 
which clinical trials may be undertaken with incapacitated adults, although it is not as 
detailed as the Mental Capacity Act and does not set out the required response on the part 
of proxies and researchers if the person loses capacity during a trial, rules governing 
withdrawal from clinical trials, or continued access to treatment once the trial is over. 
The Tribunal can approve clinical trials32 for incapacitated adults under certain 
circumstances, but approval of the trial does not mean that an incapacitated adult who has 
a proxy decision maker can automatically be included: consent must still be sought from 
the decision maker, or from the Tribunal on an individual basis. 
The circumstances under which the Tribunal may approve a clinical trial are: 
-the treatment being tested is intended to cure or alleviate a particular condition from 
which the patients suffer, and 
-the trial does not involve any known substantial risk to the patients, or will not involve 
greater risk than existing treatments, and 
- the development of the treatment has reached a stage where it is safe and ethically 
appropriate to make the treatment available to those suffering from the condition, even if 
they cannot consent, and 
-having regard to potential benefits and risks, it is in the person's best interests to take part 
in the trial, and 
-the trial has had ethical committee approval and complies with relevant research 
guidelines. 
Before considering an application the Tribunal must be satisfied that the person making 
an application, such as a medical researcher, or the person's proxy, has a sufficient 
interest in the person's health and well being. The treatment itself must be the most 
appropriate form of treatment for promoting and maintaining the person's health and well 
being. 
If the treatment falls into the category of special treatment the Tribunal can only give 
31
Section 33 Guardianship Act 1987 
32 
Section 45AA Guardianship Act 1987 
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consent if it is satisfied that the treatment is "necessary to save the patient's life or 
prevent serious damage to the patient's health." 
The Act therefore differentiates between novel treatments, experimental treatments and 
clinical trials. It makes access to such treatments possible if it is in the best interests of the 
patient to receive them, but the consent or approval of the Tribunal is required, after 
ethical committee approval has been obtained. 
Table3 












No consent required 
Responsible person, guardians 
or Tribunal. 
Dr can treat without consent. 
Responsible person, guardians, 
or Tribunal. 
Tribunal. Guardian if empowered. 
Tribunal 
Tribunal approval + consent 
Tribunal approval + consent by tbe 
person responsible 
The New South Wales Guardianship Act 1987 reflects and builds upon the common 
law position in relation to medical treatment for incapacitated adults. It allows urgent 
treatment to proceed without consent, so long as the treating doctors can justify their 
actions. It does not accord them any extra protection if their actions are not justifiable, nor 
are they protected if they proceed with some other forms of treatment without appropriate 
consent. The day to day medical necessities, such as administration of prescribed 
medication, and general nursing care, can be give with the consent of those with a close 
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personal relationship with the person, if there is no guardian. Such care can be 
administered without consent if none is available and the patient does not object. This 
reflects the common law doctrine of necessity, which allows treatment to proceed without 
consent so long as it is in the best interests of the person to receive it. 
Major treatments, which includes operations, and forms of treatment with a risk of 
death or disability, require consent before they can be administered. The Act 
differentiates between life saving measures which may be administered in an emergency, 
and do not require consent, such as measures to stop bleeding, or correct dehydration; and 
measures which might save life, but carry a substantial risk of causing death or disability, 
such as some forms of surgery, for instance a coronary artery bypass graft, or removal of a 
brain tumour. The decision to administer treatment is not, under these circumstances, in 
the hands of the treating clinician, but requires discussion with, and consent from those 
responsible for the patient, or from the Tribunal. 
The Act does not specifically mention withdrawal of treatment, but procedures such as 
withdrawal of ventilation, or artificial hydration and nutrition, and the substitution of 
comfort cares, are treatments which result in death, and would require the consent of the 
person responsible for the patient, or the Tribunal, or the Supreme Court. In a recent case 
in New South Wales, Messihar, the Supreme Court upheld the right of the treating 
clinician to decide when to withdraw treatment which was medically futile: 
"The court will rarely act against medical opinion that treatment is futile for a 
terminally ill patient in a coma and with no prospect of recovery." 33 
The different types of guardian have the same powers in relation to most types of 
medical treatment, and the extent of their powers are not much greater than those who are 
not guardians, but have had a close personal relationship with the person, such as a 
spouse of close friend or relation. Guardians may be empowered by the Tribunal to 
consent to the continuation of special treatment, while those who are not guardians do not 
have this power. Guardians are above family members and others who have a close 
relationship with the person in the decision making hierarchy, so although their powers 
33 
Messihar v South East Health [2004] NSWSC 1061 
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are only slightly greater, they can override the wishes of other family members. 
The Guardianship Act empowers those who have a relationship with an incapacitated 
adult to act on their behalf. The Act allows the Public Guardian to make medical 
decisions on behalf of the incapacitated elderly who have no friends or family able to act 
for them.. Although some decisions, such as decisions to withdraw medical treatment, 
remain in the hands of the treating clinician, medical treatment cannot, in most 
circumstances, proceed without the consent of those empowered to consent. Medical 
treatment cannot be imposed on competent adults against their will, except in special 
circumstances, and medical treatment cannot be imposed on incapacitated adults, except 
in special circumstances. There is usually a requirement for consent, just as there is a 
requirement for consent by a competent adult. 
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Chapter 8. 
Conclusions: should the PPPR Act be amended? 
The Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 represents New Zealand's 
effort to protect and promote the rights of incapacitated adults. Despite the emphasis on 
rights in the title, the Act closely reflects the common law, particularly in relation to 
medical decision making. This is not surprising as most decisions regarding the care and 
welfare of the incapacitated elderly are made under the common law in New Zealand, and 
are made by those caring for the person, rather than by the Family Court or persons 
appointed to make decisions under the PPPR Act. This is because large numbers of 
incapacitated adults have no welfare guardian or attorney to act on their behalf, and 
family members and friends are not able to consent to treatment on their behalf, even 
though they may be consulted. 
Amendments to the PPPR Act might therefore be made to ensure that a close relative 
or friend is designated by law as a default decision maker for every incapacitated adult as 
a means of promoting and protecting their rights, even if some decisions made by carers 
were still made under the common law. 
This chapter looks at possible amendments to the PPPR Act required to promote and 
protect the rights of the incapacitated elderly in relation to medical decision making. 
I. The common law and medical decision making 
Most decisions made on behalf of the incapacitated elderly are those made under the 
common law doctrine of necessity. If these decisions were not made, the person would 
suffer from a lack of necessary care. This doctrine applies to both medical emergencies 
where there is no time to seek consent to treatment from anyone who may be empowered 
to make that decision; and to day to day care where there may be no-one empowered to 
make medical decisions on behalf of the person. Those making such decisions must make 
them in the best interests of the person. Medical treatment which is considered in the best 
interests of the person includes treatment which saves the life of the person, and treatment 
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which prevents senous damage to the person's health.
1 Such decisions about best 
interests, if made in good faith, protect the decision maker from both civil and criminal 
liability. Often these common law decisions work well for both the incapacitated adult, 
and for the decision maker. Sometimes the common law may be more advantageous to 
the person who delivers the care than to the person receiving it, particularly since the 
person delivering the care is the person who decides on the best interests of the 
incapacitated adult. 
The concept of best interests encompasses both medical and non-medical best interests. 
Tests for best interests are not entirely objective/ as they depend somewhat on the 
viewpoint of the person making the decision rather than on the needs of the incapacitated 
adult. The elderly and those with disabilities tend to have low status in the eyes of 
younger, able bodied decision makers, and their quality of life is underestimated. This 
may lead to decisions to withdraw or withhold treatment which would be available to 
other adults. Alternatively the perception that the person is currently enjoying a very poor 
quality of life may lead to decisions to administer inappropriate treatment on the grounds 
that any possible improvement in health, regardless of the unpleasantness of the 
treatment, is desirable. Family members and friends who have known the person for a 
long time may disagree with treatment decisions made by medical professionals with only 
the briefest acquaintance with the person, whose authority to make decisions rests upon 
their professional qualifications. Incapacitated adults may require protection from the 
prejudices of health professionals who are empowered by the common law to make 
medical decisions for them. 
To improve the quality of decisions made under the common law a checklist of factors 
or principles to be considered while making a decision about the best interests of the 
person, similar to those contained in s.4 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005,
3 and s.4 the 
1 
Section 18(1)(c) PPPRAct 1988 and Re F [1989] 2 All ER 545 
2 KR v MR [2004] 2NZLR 847 
3 
Section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 gives a checklist of things to be considered when deciding best 
interests. They are: whether or not the person will regain capacity, and if so when; the person's past and 
present wishes and feelings, and the beliefs and values they had while competent; the views of the person, if 
possible, including any written material, and the views of those caring for him or her. Those making the 
decision have duties NOT to be influenced by the person's age or appearance, or a desire to bring about the 
death of the person. 
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Guardianship Act 1987 ofNew South Wales,
4 would therefore be helpful. 
2. The PPPR Act, duties of care, and medical decision making 
The PPPR Act 1988 reflects the common law position that medical professionals can 
make the decision to treat a person based on the doctrine of necessity, and does not 
empower those appointed to represent the incapacitated elderly to refuse standard medical 
treatment which is intended to save the person's life, even if the treatment has only the 
slightest chance of success. The welfare guardian or attorney may know very well that the 
person would have refused the treatment if they were competent, but the inability to 
refuse takes the decision out of their hands. They must turn to the Family Court for 
directions or a personal order for another form of treatment if they wish to prevent the 
administration of the treatment in question, and have been unable to negotiate a solution 
with those treating the person. 
Family members and friends who are not welfare guardians or attorneys, but who have 
an interest in the person's welfare, may also seek to negotiate a solution with the person's 
doctors, or they may turn to the Family Court for directions or orders, or to the High 
Court for declarations or for consent on behalf of the person. The PPPR Act only partially 
addresses the situation of the incapacitated adult who may have refused the proposed 
treatment while competent, by not empowering anyone except the Family Court or High 
Court to refuse some forms of treatment that a health professional would be prepared to 
provide. 
Those who have been appointed by the Family Court to make decisions on behalf of 
incapacitated adults must, in addition to making decisions which are in the best interests 
of the person, try to encourage the person to exercise what capacity they have, seek to 
4 
Section 4 (a)-(h) of the Guardianship Act 1987 requires those making decisions on behalf of incapacitated 
adults to observe the following principles: That the welfare and interests of the person be given paramount 
consideration, that their freedom of decision and freedom of action be given as little restriction as possible; 
that they be encouraged, as far as possible to live a normal life in the community and be as self reliant as 
possible in relation to personal, domestic, and fmancial affairs; that decision-makers take into consideration 
the views of the person, preserve family relationships and recognise the importance of the person's cultural 
and linguistic environment; that the person be protected from neglect, abuse and exploitation; and that the 
community be encouraged to apply and promote the principles listed. 
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integrate them into the community, and consult with the person if possible and with those 
who have an interest in their welfare. 
The duties of those who are donees of enduring powers of attorney are not defined in 
the same way as those of welfare guardians by the PPPR Act, and they are not instructed 
to act in the person's best interests, to consult with others, or the person, or encourage 
them to develop and exercise their capacity, or to encourage their integration into the 
community. Although the limits of their powers are the same as welfare guardians, 
attorneys do not have the same positive duties as welfare guardians. In my view, their 
duties should be defmed in the same way as welfare guardians' are. 
5 
The PPPR Act does not impose any duty of care on members of the community who 
may be involved with the person's care and are not appointed (unlike the Mental Capacity 
Act of England and Wales)6• Nor does the PPPR Act impose any statutory duty of care on 
those administering medical treatment, unlike the New South Wales Guardianship Act, 
which requires that doctors treating incapacitated adults treat them in the same way as 
they would if the person had capacity. 
The PPPR Act could be amended to impose more substantial statutory duties of care on 
all those who care for, and treat, incapacitated adults, in the same way as the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 of England and Wales, and the New South Wales Guardianship Act 
1987. 
3. Rights, medical decision making, and the PPPR Act 
Those appointed as welfare guardians to make decisions on behalf of incapacitated 
adults must make decisions which are in the best interests of the person. If their ideas 
about the best interests of the person conflict with the ideas about the person's best 
interests held by the medical professionals treating the person they may have to turn to the 
Family Court if they are to override the decision of health professionals. Family Court 
5 See the New Zealand Law Commission Report no. 71: Misuse of enduring powers of attorney. 
http://www.lawcom.govt. nz/UploadFiles!Publications/Publication _78 _170 _ R71.pdf (accessed June 4th 
2006) 
6 Section 5 MCA 2005 
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judges making decisions on behalf of the incapacitated elderly must base their decisions 
7 
on different criteria to welfare guardians, and to medical professionals who may wish to 
recommend treatment. Their decisions must be based on the principle of the least 
restrictive intervention, and which will allow the person to exercise their capacity to the 
greatest extent possible. Such decisions are based on the Act's stated aim to promote and 
protect the personal and property rights of incapacitated adults. This form of decision 
making has been said to be more objective than the common law-based best interests 
tests, while not ignoring the person's best interests. It is a part of the PPPR Act which 
departs from the common law and attempts to encapsulate rights-based decision making. 
There is no reason why the obligation to consider the rights of the person by making the 
least restrictive intervention should not be imposed on all decision makers in the same 
way as s.4 of the Guardianship Act 1987 of New South Wales enunciates principles 
applicable to all decision makers. Section 18 of the PPPR Act could contain an 
instruction to welfare guardians to make decisions which are the least restrictive 
intervention in the person's life, as well as the instruction to observe the paramountcy of 
the person's best interests contained in s.18(3). The overall purpose of the Act, to promote 
and protect the personal (and property) rights of the person would be better served by this 
amendment to s.18. At present there is no specific duty on welfare guardians to promote 
and protect the rights ofthe person. A possible amendment to s.18(3) would be: 
"In exercising these powers, the first and paramount consideration of the 
welfare guardian shall be the promotion and protection of the best interests 
and personal rights of the person for whom the welfare guardian is acting, 
while making the least restrictive intervention in that person's life, and 
seeking at all times to encourage that person to develop and exercise such 
capacity as that person has to understand the nature and foresee the 
consequences of decisions relating to the personal care and welfare of that 
person, and to communicate such decisions." 
The PPPR Act inclines towards common law principles and affirms ideas about best 
interests in medical decision making by attorneys and welfare guardians, but allows a 
7 Section 8 PPPRAct 1988 
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more rights-based approach by the Family Court. Such a discrepancy may be confusing 
for those seeking to exercise powers in relation to medical decision making. Conferring 
the same duties on all those who make decisions on behalf of incapacitated adults, and 
extending those duties to all those who care for, and interact with them, would clarify the 
situation. 
An amendment of the PPPR Act may be required to include those responsible for 
administering care and treatment to incapacitated adults that would put doctors, nurses, 
and other carers in the same position regarding their duties in relation to incapacitated 
adults as those who are formally appointed to make decisions on their behalf. 
The PPPR Act would then be: 
"An Act to provide for the protection and promotion, by the courts and 
community of New Zealand, of the personal and property rights of persons 
who are not fully able to manage their own affairs." 
4. Consent to medical treatment 
Only a few categories of persons apart from the courts are able to consent to medical 
treatment on behalf of another adult, and healthcare professionals derive their authority to 
treat the person without consent from the common law. Often this works very well, but it 
may mean that the decisions made lack consistency; that there is no independent scrutiny 
of the decisions; and no redress for the incapacitated adult concerned because they have 
no-one to act on their behal£ Even if they do, common law remedies require the time and 
resources to pursue the matter through the courts. 
Persons who can consent to medical treatment on behalf of incapacitated adults are: 
(a) The person, while competent, in the form of an advance directive. 
(b) The donee of an enduring power of attorney. 
(c) A welfare guardian appointed by the Family Court. 
(d) The Family or High Court. 
Some other categories of decision makers may need to be introduced in order to promote 
and protect the personal rights of incapacitated adults in relation to medical decision 
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making, and provide the some degree of scrutiny of medical decision making. The two 
main categories of decision maker that might be better provided for are: the person's 
family or friends, and a Public Guardian who would act for those who have no-one able 
to advocate for them. These possible changes to the law governing the position of various 
treatment decision makers are discussed below. 
(a) Advance directives 
There is a common law right to make an advance directive specifYing the kind of 
medical treatment which would or would not be acceptable to that person should they 
become incapacitated. This right is not present in the PPPR Act in statutory form. If the 
Act is intended to promote and protect the personal rights of incapacitated adults it 
should contain both a right to make an advance directive regarding medical treatment, 
and a direction to those who administer treatment to honour the requests contained in the 
directive to the best of their abilities, unless they are empowered to override these 
requests by law. An advance directive under the PPPR Act should be written and allow 
the person to refuse medical treatment under certain circumstances, while not detracting 
from the more general common law right to make a verbal or videotaped advance 
directive. Welfare guardians, attorneys, the courts, and those treating the person should be 
required to comply with the directive if possible. An advance directive refusing 
resuscitation in the event of cardiac arrest, for example, would take priority over the 
instructions of a welfare guardian or attorney, and in particular over the desire to attempt 
resuscitation on the part of the person's medical attendants. 
A section dealing with advance directives could be included in Part IX of the Act 
which could then be entitled "Advance directives and enduring powers of attorney." It 
should specifY that the advance directive be made in writing on the appropriate form, 
signed by the person, and witnessed, and enumerate the categories of person who must 
comply with it, or take every possible step to comply. 
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(b) Donees of enduring powers of attorney 
At present donors of enduring powers of attorney are unable to confer powers to refuse 
standard medical treatment which may save, prolong or sustain life, or prevent serious 
damage to health. They may wish to confer these powers upon a trusted friend or relative, 
or they may not. A possible amendment to the Act would be to allow attorneys to 
withhold consent to life prolonging or life sustaining treatment if the donor had 
empowered them to make that decision. 
Those who felt that attorneys were abusing their powers in withholding consent to 
medical treatment could turn to the Family Court or Public Guardian for help (see (v) 
below). An application could then be made to the Family Court for review of the 
attorney's decision. If the attorney was found to be acting inappropriately and not 
promoting and protecting the personal and property rights of the person their powers 
could be restricted or revoked, and another person could then be appointed as a welfare 
guardian, possibly someone nominated by the Public Guardian. 
Section 7 of the PPPR Act would have to be amended to make the Public Guardian one 
of the categories of people able to approach the Family Court for decisions regarding 
incapacitated adults. This would not prevent those who wished to from approaching the 
Family Court directly, but a Public Guardian could be an effective avenue for those who 
lacked the knowledge or financial resources to approach the Family Court directly. 
The New Zealand Law Commission recommended changes to Part IX of the Act in 
2001 8 and the proposed amendments will not be discussed in detail here. Their intention 
was to eliminate discrepancies between the powers and duties of welfare guardians and 
property managers, the powers and duties of attorneys; and to clarify the circumstances 
under which enduring powers of attorney could be donated and activated. 
(c) Welfare guardianship 
There are two possible categories of welfare guardian: those who with a long 
8 New Zealand Law Commission Report no.71. Misuse of enduring powers of attorney. 
http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/UploadFiles/Publications!Publication _78 _170 _ R7J.pdf (accessed June 4th 
2006) 
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acquaintance with the person such as a sibling, and those who have no prior acquaintance 
such as social workers appointed by the Family Court. It may be necessary or desirable to 
give them differing powers in relation to consent to medical treatment and participation in 
research. Those who know the person well may be offered the power to withhold consent 
to life sustaining or life saving treatment, or participation in research. They may accept 
this power if they wish to do so, or may leave this power in the hands of the Family 
Court. Welfare guardians appointed by the Family Court from the staff of the Public 
Guardian's office to make medical decisions on behalf of the person are unlikely to have 
sufficient prior knowledge of that person and would normally not be granted the power to 
withhold consent to either life sustaining or life saving treatment, or to consent to 
participation in research, unless specifically directed to do so by the Family Court. 
(d) Consent and next of kin 
There is a common misconception that the person's next of kin has the right to consent 
to medical treatment on their behalf. While it may be good medical practice to consult 
with the next of kin in order to gain information about what the person would have 
wanted by way of medical treatment and its outcome, the next of kin cannot consent to 
medical treatment on behalf of another adult if they have not been appointed to do so. The 
Act could be amended to allow limited medical decision making by spouses or children 
of the person, so long as they could show a close continuing relationship with the person, 
and there was no other person appointed to make medical decisions. The family member 
could apply for welfare guardianship to formalise the arrangement, but until a someone 
could be appointed they would be able to consent to medical treatment. The Guardianship 
Act 1987 of New South Wales lists a hierarchy of decision makers who can consent to 
medical treatment if no one has been appointed. These include (in descending order) the 
spouse, or de facto partner of the person; a person who has the care of the incapacitated 
adult; or a close friend or relative of the person.
9 Other jurisdictions also allow consent to 
medical treatment by the family members of incapacitated adults if no other person has 
been appointed. In Ontario, for example, the hierarchy of persons able to consent includes 
9 
Section 33A(4) Guardianship Act 1987 
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the spouse or partner, then the person's adult children or parents, then an access parent, 
then siblings, and then any other relative by blood, marriage or adoption.
10 These persons 
are designated by law as the default decision makers unless another person is lawfully 
appointed. 
Acceptance of a family member or close personal friend as a decision maker reflects the 
practice of many nursing homes and medical practitioners, and would allow consent to 
medical treatment to take place pending the appointment of a welfare guardian, who 
could be the same person. 
The rights of incapacitated adults would be strengthened if the Act only allowed 
emergency treatment to proceed without obtaining consent, and required that consent for 
all other treatment be obtained either from the courts, or from attorneys or welfare 
guardians, or a designated family member. Under some circumstances, consent to medical 
treatment could be obtained from family members until such time as they were able to be 
formally appointed by the Family Court. The Act would have to be amended to include a 
hierarchy of decision makers who might consent to medical treatment in the. absence of 
another person able to give consent. If the person's partner were dead, or lacked the 
capacity to make decisions for themselves or others, the power to make a decisions would 
be conferred on the person's eldest child, or on the one with whom they had the most 
contact, and so on. 
Many of the incapacitated elderly to not have living relatives or friends who are able or 
willing to act on their behalf, and under these circumstances the Public Guardian would 
have to be approached. 
(e) Public Guardianship 
New Zealand, unlike England and New South Wales, lacks a Public Guardian who can 
advocate on behalf of incapacitated adults, and assist the person, their families and 
friends, and the Family Court when medical and other decisions need to be made. The 
purpose of the Public Guardian, like all others involved in deciding on behalf of the 
incapacitated elderly, would be to promote and protect the personal and property rights of 
10 
Section 20 Health Care Consent Act 1996 
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those unable to fully manage their own affairs. That may mean: 
(a) Taking action through the Family Court or High Court on behalf of groups or 
individuals whose personal and /or property rights required protection. This would 
include receiving reports of abuse or neglect of incapacitated adults, and being able to 
take appropriate action, for example review of the actions of attorneys, property managers 
or welfare guardians, and applications for orders for medical advice and treatment. 
(b) Having the power to disseminate information and educate the community about the 
rights of incapacitated adults, and the role of the Public Guardian, the courts, and the 
community in the protection and promotion of those rights. 
(c) Having statutory rights of entry and inspection of institutions such as rest and 
nursing homes, without notice, and the power to set standards of care for those resident in 
those institutions whether or not they were there voluntarily. In addition, the Public 
Guardian should be able to impose penalties on institutions who do not conform to the 
required standard of care if the powers to inspect and set standards are to have any 
meaning. 
(d) Having appropriately trained and qualified staff able to act as welfare guardians if 
no other suitable person were available. Such positions would have to be adequately 
resourced if welfare guardians appointed by the Family Court were to be able to advocate 
properly on behalf of the person. 
The Public Guardian, if functioning properly, would have an important role in both 
advocating on behalf of incapacitated adults, and protecting their rights, in the same way 
as the Children's Commissioner and the Health and Disability Commissioner advocate 
for, and protect the rights of children and consumers of healthcare, although with 
enhanced powers to enforce those rights. 
5. Types of medical treatment 
The PPPR Act describes two types of medical treatment: standard and experimental. 
The idea of standard medical treatment is related to common law concepts of medical 
treatments which are approved by a body of responsible medical opinion. It is confusing 
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and inadequate for the purpose, as ideas about standard treatment vary according to the 
time, place, and practitioner. It would greatly clarify the situation if the Act referred only 
to "medical treatment". 
Section 18(1 )(c) restricts the ability of welfare guardians to refuse standard medical 
treatment intended to be lifesaving or which prevents serious damage to the person's 
health. The likely outcome of the treatment, not the good intentions of the practitioner, 
should be the criteria for consent to treatment. Many treatments seen as lifesaving are 
more properly described as life sustaining or life prolonging treatments, and the Act 
should differentiate between treatments which are truly lifesaving, for example surgery to 
stop bleeding, and those which sustain or prolong life such as artificial hydration and 
nutrition, or ventilation. 
The prohibition on welfare guardians' refusing treatments which prevent senous 
damage to health are likely to be less problematic unless the manner of treatment, rather 
than the outcome, is one which would be unacceptable to the person. 
A new section dealing with medical treatment would be a helpful addition to the list of 
powers and duties of welfare guardians (and attorneys) and would include a direction 
that: 
"welfare guardians and attorneys who have been given the power to do so 
may withhold consent to life sustaining medical treatment under the 
following circumstances: 
(i) if there is no reasonable prospect of the person making a meaningful 
recovery after a trial of the treatment; or 
(ii) if the person has left an advance directive, or another clear indication 
that they would decline that form of medical treatment." 
In relation to life saving procedures there may be circumstances where attorneys and 
welfare guardians may withhold consent to the treatment, but they would be expected to 
promote and protect the personal rights of the person, and that would normally include 
the right to remain alive. The Act might say; 
"Welfare guardians and attorneys who have been given the power to do so 
may only withhold consent to medical treatment which has a reasonable 
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chance of saving the life of the person, and restoring that person to a 
standard of health that they would find acceptable IF: 
(i) the person has left a valid advance directive refusing the treatment; 
(ii) their knowledge of the person's religious beliefs, or other aspect of their 
character gives them reasonable grounds to believe that the person would 
have declined the treatment when competent." 
The person may have had strong religious grounds for declining transfusion or organ 
transplantation, or may have had a deep fear of mutilation or paralysis to such an extent 
that life as a tetraplegic or arnputee would have been unacceptable to them. 
In the event of a dispute between medical staff and welfare guardians or attorneys, the 
courts could be approached for directions. 
The Act refers to medical experiments rather than research or clinical trials, and this 
aspect of s.l8 will be discussed in the next part of this chapter. 
6. Participation in medical experiments 
The term "taking part in any medical experiment" in s.l8(1)(f) of the PPPR Act is 
confusing as only the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act refers to experiments, other 
legislation refers to "research" or "clinical trials". Use of the term "medical research" in 
the Act would be less confusing. 
Welfare guardians and attorneys cannot consent to the person's taking part in medical 
experiments other than those conducted for the purpose of saving that person's life or 
preventing serious damage to that person's health. 
There may be other reasons for consenting to the person's participation in medical 
research. The research into the illness which incapacitates them may only be possible if 
the incapacitated are able to participate. The research may benefit incapacitated adults in 
the long term by providing insights into the nature of their illness and ways in which it 
may be treated. The research may be non-intrusive and pose only minimal risks to the 
person, while conferring benefits on them. 
If the PPPR Act is to promote and protect the rights of incapacitated adults it should 
allow consent for their participation in research under some circumstances. Novel 
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treatments which may benefit the person should not fall into the category of research, but 
into the category of medical treatment which attorneys and welfare guardians may 
consent to after directions have been sought from the Family Court. At present, if the 
welfare guardian or attorney wish medical staff to initiate novel treatments they may have 
to seek the necessary orders from the Court on the grounds that this involves an 
'experiment' to which a welfare guardian cannot consent. 
The new section on medical treatment would refer to participation in medical research 
and the administration of novel treatments. It might state: 
"Welfare guardians and attorneys may consent to the person's taking part 
in medical research if: 
(i) the research can only be carried out on people whose illness means that 
they lack the capacity to consent; and 
(ii) the research will expose the person to no, or minimal risk; and 
(iii) the person will benefit from the research; and 
(iv) the person does not indicate that they object to the research; and 
(v) the person is able to continue to receive the treatment after the research 
is finished if they have benefited from it during the research. " 
In relation to novel treatments the Family Court would retain the ability to consent to 
treatment by means of a personal order, or could empower a welfare guardian or attorney 
to consent. Here the relevant provision might read: 
"Welfare guardians and attorneys cannot consent to the administration of novel 
medical treatments unless the Family Court has empowered them to do so." 
7.Summary 
Medical decision making on behalf of the incapacitated elderly and other incapacitated 
adults would be made easier if the PPPR Act was amended to include the duties of all 
those who deliver care to incapacitated adults, not just those who are appointed to make 
decisions. It would conform to the stated aims of the Act to promote and protect the 
personal and property rights of incapacitated adults by making everyone who administers 
care do so in a way that promotes and protects the rights of the person, and not just 
requiring that that they act in accordance with their particular view of the person's best 
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interests. 
A hierarchy of close family members should be empowered to consent to some forms 
of necessary medical treatment if there is no other person appointed to make decisions on 
behalf of an incapacitated adult. That family member should have the same duties 
towards the person as others who are appointed to act on their behalf. If the person is 
likely to be incapacitated for a long period of time, a welfare guardian should be 
appointed. This could be the same family member, or another suitable person. If no 
suitable person is available, the Public Guardian may nominate a suitable person. 
The Public Guardian's office could be created to assist those who seek help on behalf 
of the incapacitated elderly, and could provide advocacy for those who have no-one to 
advocate on their behalf. 
The term "standard medical treatment" is unclear and the word "standard" should be 
deleted. Medical treatment may proceed without consent if the situation is an emergency, 
otherwise consent should be sought and obtained from a person who is empowered to 
give consent and who has a duty to promote and protect the rights of the incapacitated 
adult for whom they act. 
Welfare guardians and attorneys may be empowered to withhold consent to life 
sustaining treatment under certain circumstances, having regard for the wishes of the 
person when competent. If the person was never competent then medical decision making 
should be based on the likely outcome of the proposed treatment, and its impact on the 
person. Those who have no prior knowledge of the person should not be able to make a 
decision to withhold consent to life sustaining medical treatment without authorisation 
from the Family Court. Decision makers would still be under an obligation to consult 
with those who did know the person, their carers, and the person themself, if possible. 
The Act should allow a valid advance directive to be made while the person is 
competent. It should, if possible, be honoured by those administering treatment, and by 
those empowered to consent on the person's behalf, unless overriding the direction is 
authorised by law. 
The term "medical research" should be substituted for "medical experiment" and under 
some circumstances welfare guardians who know the person, attorneys, and the Family 
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Court should be permitted to consent to the person's participation. This would allow 
incapacitated adults to benefit from research, something that may be achieved less readily 
under the current terms of the PPPR Act. 
In the 18 years since the inception of the PPPR Act medical technology and 
expectations in regard to the rights of incapacitated adults have changed considerably. 
The PPPR Act may need to change in order to reflect the greater emphasis placed on their 
rights, and on the duties of others to promote and protect those rights. The emphasis 
should shift away from "best interests" decisions made by those who are administering 
medical treatment, and towards decision making by persons who have a statutory duty to 
promote and protect the rights of the person. The idea of seeking consent for non urgent 
medical procedures administered to those in institutions may seem cumbersome and time 
consuming to those who deliver the care, but it ensures that there · is, in principle, 
consultation about the care the person receives. There is no reason to suppose that welfare 
guardians and attorneys would refuse consent to changes in medication, for example. 
There would need to be discussion about decisions to withdraw or withhold treatment, 
and some welfare guardians or attorneys may wish to refuse some forms treatment which 
is offered in the light of their knowledge of the person. 
The process of seeking consent might lead to more careful examination of attitudes 
towards the elderly and those with disabilities, and with time, a greater value being placed 
on their rights. At present the PPPR Act is under-utilised as a method of promoting and 
protecting the personal and property rights of incapacitated adults, who form a growing 
proportion of the population. Amendment in some of the ways suggested in this chapter 
could lead to more widespread recognition of the rights of incapacitated adults. 
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It is my express wish that if I should develop: 
a) senile, severe degenerative brain disease (due to Alzheimer's disease, arterial disease, 
AIDS, or other agency or 
b) serious brain damage resulting from accidental or other injury or illness or 
c) advanced or terminal malignant disease or 
d) severely incapacitating and progressive degenerative disease of the nerves or muscles 
and have become mentally incompetent to express my opinion about accepting or declining life 
sustaining treatment, and if two independent physicians conclude that, to the best of current 
medical knowledge, my condition is irreversible then the following points should be taken into 
consideration: 
• In the event of a cardiac arrest, regardless of the cause, I should not be given 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation. 
• Any separate illness - for example, pneumonia or a heart or kidney condition - that may 
threaten my life should not be given active treatment unless it appears to be causing me 
undue physical suffering. 
• During such an advanced illness, if I should become unable to swallow food, fluid, or 
medication then these should not be given by any artificial means except to relieve obvious 
suffering. 
• During such an illness, if my condition deteriorates without reversible cause, and as a 
result my behaviour becomes violent, noisy, or in other ways degrading, or if I appear to be 
suffering severe pain, then any such symptoms should be controlled with suitable drug 
treatment, regardless of the consequences on my physical health and my survival, within 
the extent of the law. 
• Other requests. 
The object of this directive is to minimise distress or indignity which I may suffer or create 
during an incurable illness, and to spare my medical advisers or relatives, or both, the burden 




Statement by one witness: I .................................. declare that in my opinion the above 
person ....................................... is of sound mind and understands the meaning and 
implications of this directive. 
Signed Date 
ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 
!. ........................................................................................................ . 
of ...................................•................••................................................... 
advise that in any circumstance that I am not competent to make a choice about a future healthcare 
procedure, should the following situation arise: 
............. that I accept/decline/withdraw (delete those which are not applicable) the following 
treatment/s 
............ .I confirm that information about the risks, consequences and treatment options of my 
decision were given (summarise below): 
•• .. •• 9 "" """" "" • """ •• ............. I' 99 ......... •••" ••" •• ...... •• ...... • ••" ............................ + ................................ "•• ........... " •• " "" .... " .... I 
··························································································································· 
................ Name of usual doctor (or Medical Practitioner with the closest relationship with the 
patient) 
............ Signed ........................................................................................ (Patient) 
Signed ........................................................................................ (Doctor) 
Witnessed ..............•........................................................... (Contact Person) 
Date .......................................................... . 
l.Jpdated/reconsidered/endorsed on ........•..........•......•.................. 
Updated/reconsidered/endorsed on ............................................. . 
APPENDIX2 
POLSTform 
HIPAA PERMITS DISCLOSURE OF POLST TO OTHER HEALTH CARE PROF
ESSIONALS AS NECESSARY 
Physician Orders 
for Life-Sustaining Treatment (POLST) 
Fint follow these orders, then contact physician or NP. This is a Physician Order 
Sheet based on the person's medical condition and wishes. 
Any section not completed implies fuU treatment for that section. 
Everyone shall be treated with dignity and respect. 
Last Name 
First Name/ Middle Initial 
A ' CARDIOPULMONARY RESUSCITATION (CPR): Person has no pulse and is not breathing. ..__./ 
al«k 0 Resuscitate/CPR 0 Do Not Attempt Resuscitation (DNR/no CPR) 
One When not in cardiopulmonary arrest, follow orders in B, C and D. ;S. 
:J .l MEDICAL INTERVENTIONS: Person has pulse and/or is breathing. 
B 1 0 Comfort Measures Only Use medication by any route, positioning, wound care and other 
al«kl measures to relieve pain and suffering. Use oxygen, suction and manual trea
tment of airway 
one obstruction as needed for comfort. Donottransfertohospitalforlife-sustaln
ingtreatment 
Transfer if comfort needs cannot be met in current location. 
0 Limited Additional Interventions Includes care described above. Use medical treatment, IV fluids 
I a
nd cardiac monitor as indicated. Do not use intubation, advanced airway interventions, or mech
anical 
ventilation. Transfer to hospital if indicated. Avoid intensive care. 
, , 0 Full ~tmen~ JJ:tcludes care. desct;Lbed ~o~e. Use intubation, ad~an~~d ~itway interv~ntio~, 
1 ;•~ · '' mechanical ventilation, and cardioverston as mdicated. Transfer to hospital if indicated.
 Includes intensiVe care. 
Additional Orders: 
C ANTIBIOTICS \\ '--- "-
ale& 0 No antibiotics. Use other measures to relieve symptoms. 
One 0 Determine use or limitation of antibiotics when infection occurs. 
D Use antibiotics if life can be prolonged. 
'' Additional Orders: 
D · AlmRCIALLY ADMINISTERED NUTRITION: Always offer food by mouth if feasible. 
0 ,«k 0 No artificial nutrition by tube. 
One 0 Defined trial period of artificial nutrition by tube. 
0 Long-term artificial nutrition by tube. 
1.r,. Additional Orders: 






I D Health Care Representative 
• 
1 D Court-Appointed Guardian 
l Ootber: 
•- Print Physician/ Nurse Practitioner Name 
. 
· Pbyslclan/ NP Signature (mandatory) 
Summary of Medical Condition 
MI)1)Q'NP FhoneNunDer Office Use Only 
Date 
SEND FORM WITH PERSON WHENEVER TRANSFERRED OR DISCHARGED
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Surrogate (optional) Relationship Phone Number 
Health Care Professional Preparing Form (optional) Preparer Title Phone Number Date Prepared 
Directions for Health Care Professionals 
Completing POLST 
Must be completed by a health care professional based on patient preferences and medical indications. 
POLST must be signed by a physician or nurse practitioner to be valid. Verbal orders are acceptable with 
follow-up signature by physician or nurse practitioner in accordance with facility/community policy. 
Use of original form is strongly encouraged. Photocopies and F AXes of signed POLST forms are legal and valid. 
Using POLST 
Any incomplete section ofPOLST implies full treatment for that section. 
No defibrillator (including AEDs) should be used on a person who has chosen "Do Not Attempt Resuscitation." 
Oral fluids and nutrition must always be offered if medically feasible. 
When comfort cannot be achieved in the current setting, the person, including someone with "Comfort Measures 
Only," should be transferred to a setting able to provide comfort (e.g., treatment of a hip fracture). 
N medication to enhance comfort may be appropriate for a person who has chosen "Comfort Measures Only." 
Trea1ment of dehydration is a measure which prolongs life. A person who desires IV fluids should indicate 
"Limited Interventions" or "Full Treatment." 
A person with capacity, or the surrogate of a person without capacity, can request alternative treatment. 
Reviewing POLST 
This POLST should be reviewed periodically and if: 
(1) The person is transferred from one care setting or care level to another, or 
(2) There is a substantial change in the person's health status, or 
(3) The person's treatment preferences change. 
Draw line through sections A through E and write "VOID" in large letters ifPOLST is replaced or becomes invalid. 
The Oregon POLST Task Force 
The POLST program was developed by the Oregon POLST Task Force. The POLST program is administratively housed at 
Oregon Health & Science University's Canter for Ethics in Health Care. Research about the safety and effectiveness of the 
POLST program is available online at <www.polstorg> or by contacting the Task Force at <polst@ohsu.edu>. 
SEND FORM WITH PERSON WHENEVER TRANSFERRED OR DISCHARGED 
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APPENDIX3 
AMA Advance directive 
Advance Health Care Directive 
Name ________________ __ 
Date, _____________ _ 
You have the right to give instructions about your own health care. You also have the right to name 
someone else to make health care decisions for you. This form also lets you write down your wishes 
regarding donation of organs and the designation of your primary physician. If you use this form, you may 
complete or change all or any part of it. You are free to use a different form. 
You have the right to change or revoke this advance health care directive at any time. 
Part 1 - Power of Attorney for Health Care 
(1.1) DESIGNATION OF AGENT: I designate the following individual as my agent to make health care 
decisions for me: 
Name of individual you choose as agent: ___________________ _ 
Relationship ___________ _ 
Address: ______________________________ _ 
Telephone numbers: (Indicate home, work, cell) ----------------
ALTERNATE AGENT (Optional): If I revoke my agent's authority or if my agent is not willing, able, or 
reasonably available to make a health care decision for me, I designate as my first alternate agent: 
Name of individual you choose as alternate agent: _______________ _ 
Relationship. ____________ _ 
Address: -----------------------------------
Telephone numbers: (Indicate home, work, cell) -----------------
SECOND ALTERNATE AGENT (optional): If I revoke the authority of my agent and first alternate agent or if 
neither is willing, able, or reasonably available to make a health care decision for me, I designate as my 
second alternate agent: 
Name of individual you choose as second alternate agent: -------------
Address: _____________________________ _ 
Telephone numbers: (Indicate home, work, cell) -------------------
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( 1.2) AGENT'S AUTHORITY: My agent is authorized to 1) make all health care decisions for me, including 
decisions to provide, withhold, or withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration and all other forms of health 
care to keep me alive, 2) to choose a particular physician or health care facility, and 3) to receive or 
consent to the release of medical information and records, except as I state here: 
{Add additional sheets if needed.) 
( 1.3) WHEN AGENT'S AUTHORITY BECOMES EFFECTIVE: My agent's authority becom~~ effective 
when my primary physician determines that I am unable to make my own health care deCisions unless I 
~ initial the following line. 
If 1 initial this line, my agent's authority to make health care decisions for me takes effect immediately. __ 
(1.4) AGENT'S OBLIGATION: My agent shall make health care decisions for me in accordance with this 
, power of attorney for health care, any instructions I give in Part 2 of this form, and my other wishes to the 
extent known to my agent. To the extent my wishes are unknown, my agent shall make health care 
decisions for me in accordance with what my agent determines to be my best interest. In determining my 
best interest, my agent shall consider my personal values to the extent known to my agent. 
, ( 1.5) AGENT'S POST DEATH AUTHORITY: My agent is authorized to make anatomical gifts, authorize an 
autopsy, and direct disposition of my remains, except as I state here or in Part 3 of this form: 
(Add additional sheets if needed.) 
, (1.6) NOMINATION OF CONSERVATOR: If a conservator of my person needs to be appointed for me by 
a court, I nominate the agent designated in this form. If that agent is not willing, able, or reasonably avail-
able to act as conservator, I nominate the alternate agents whom I have named. (initial here) 
Part 2 - Instructions for Health Care 
If you fill out this part of the form, you may strike out any wording you do not want. 
/ (2.1) END-OF-LIFE DECISIONS: I direct my health care providers and others involved in my care to 
provide, withhold, or withdraw treatment in accordance with the choice I have marked below: 
' 0 a) Choice Not To Prolong 
I 
I do not want my life to be prolonged if the likely risks and burdens of treatment would outweigh the 
expected benefits, or if I become unconscious and, to a realistic degree of medical certainty, 1 will not 
regain consciousness, or if I have an· incurable and irreversible condition that will result in my death in 
a relatively short time. 
Or 
0 b) Choice To Prolong 
I want my life to be prolonged as long as possible within the limits of generally accepted medical 
treatment standards. 
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(2.2) OTHER WISHES: If you have different o_r mor~ specific instructions other tha~ those marked above, 
such as: what you consider a reasonable quality of hfe, treatments you would cons1der burdensome or 
unacceptable, write them here. 
Add additional sheets if needed.) 
Part 3 - Donation of Organs at Death (Optional) 
(3.1) Upon my death (mark applicable box): 
D I give any needed organs, tissues, or parts 
D I give the following organs, tissues or parts only:. ______________ _ 
D I do not wish to donate organs, tissues or parts. 
My gift is for the following purposes (strike out any of the following you do not want): 
Transplant Therapy Research Education 
Part 4 - Primary Physician (Optional) 
(4.1) I designate the following physician as my primary physician: 
Name of Physician:. ________________________ _ 
Address: 
Telephone:---------------------------
Part 5 - Signature 
(5.1) EFFECT OF A COPY: A copy of this form has the same effect as the original. 
(5.2) SIGNATURE: Sign name:------------ Date: _____ _ 
(5.3) STATEMENT OF WITNESSES: I declare under penalty of pe~ury under the laws of California (1) that 
the individual who signed or acknowledged this advance health care directive is personally known to me, 
or that the individual's identity was proven to me by convincing evidence (2) that the individual signed or 
acknowledged this advance directive in my presence (3) that the individual appears to be of sound mind 
and under no duress, fraud, or undue influence, (4) that I am not a person appointed as agent by this 
advance directive, and (5) that I am not the individual's health care provider, an employee of the 
individual's health care provider, the operator of a community care facility, an employee of an operator of a 
community care facility, the operator of a residential care facility for the elderly nor an employee of an 
operator of a residential care facility for the elderly. 




Signature of Witness: -------------------------- Date: ______________ _ 
SECOND WITNESS 
PrintName: ____________________________________________________ ___ 
Address: 
Signature of Witness: -------------------------- Date: _____________ _ 
(5.4) ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF WITNESSES: At least one of the above witnesses must also sign the 
following declaration: 
I further declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of California that I am not related to the individual 
executing this advance directive by blood, marriage, or adoption, and to the best of my knowledge, I am 
- not entitled to any part of the individual's estate on his or her death under a will now existing or by opera-
tion of law. 
Signature of Witness: -----------------------------------------------
Signature of Witness: ------------------------------------------
Part 6 - Special Witness Requirement if in a Skilled Nursing Facility 
(6.1) The patient advocate or ombudsman must sign the following statement: 
STATEMENT OF PATIENT ADVOCATE OF OMBUDSMAN 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of California that I am a patient advocate or ombudsman 
. as designated by the State Department of Aging and that I am serving as a witness as required by section 
4675 of the Probate Code: 
! Print Name:. _____________________ _ Signature: ________________ _ 
Address: ---------------------------------- Date: ______ _ 
Certificate of Acknowledgement of Notary Public {Not required if signed by two witnesses) 
State of California, County of On this day of 
____ ,before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for 
said State, personally appeared , personally known to me or 
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person whose name is subscribed to the 
. within instrument, and acknowledged 
to me that he/she executed it. 
, WITNESS my hand an official seal. Seal 
Signature ___________________ _ 
PS-X-MHS-842 (Rev. 2-04) Page 4 of 4 MPS/PMD 
